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Abstract 
Following a disaster, an organisation’s ability to recover is influenced by its internal 
capacities, but also by the people, organisations, and places to which it is connected.  Current 
approaches to organisational resilience tend to focus predominantly on an organisation’s 
internal capacities and do not adequately consider the place-based contexts and networks in 
which it is embedded.  This thesis explores how organisations’ connections may both hinder 
and enable organisational resilience. 
Organisations in the Canterbury region of New Zealand experienced significant and 
repeated disruptions as a result of two major earthquakes and thousands of aftershocks 
throughout 2010 and 2011.  This thesis draws upon 32 case studies of organisations located in 
three severely damaged town centres in Canterbury to assess the influence that organisations’ 
place-based connections and relational networks had on their post-earthquake trajectories. 
The research has four objectives: 1) to examine the ways organisations connected to 
their local contexts both before and after the earthquakes, 2) to explore the characteristics of 
the formal and informal networks organisations used to aid their response and recovery, 3) to 
identify the ways organisations’ connections to their local contexts and support networks 
influenced their ability to recover following the earthquakes, and finally, 4) to develop 
approaches to assess resilience that consider these extra-organisational connections. 
The thesis contests the fiction that organisations recover and adapt independently 
from their contexts following disasters.  Although organisations have a set of internal 
capacities that enable their post-disaster recovery, they are embedded within external 
structures that constrain and enable their adaptive options following a disaster.  An approach 
which considers organisations’ contexts and networks as potential sources of organisational 
resilience has both conceptual and practical value.  Refining our understanding of the 
influence of extra-organisational connections can improve our ability to explain variability in 
organisational outcomes following disasters and foster new ways to develop and manage 
organisational resilience.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Overview 
This thesis explores how organisations’ connections to places and networks of 
relations affect their ability to survive and adapt in a disaster disrupted context.  When places 
are disrupted by disasters, organisations are also disrupted.  At the same time, organisations 
are the primary vehicles for response and reconstruction activities.  They are also essential for 
providing the jobs, services, and social opportunities for communities as they recover. 
Organisations that are resilient (i.e. able to survive a crisis and maintain positive functioning 
in challenging conditions (Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007)) can play an essential role in producing 
resilience in the places and communities they inhabit (Bruneau et al., 2003; Cutter, Burton, & 
Emrich, 2010; Norris, Stevens, Pfefferbaum, Wyche, & Pfefferbaum, 2008a; Tierney & 
Bruneau, 2007).  
In 2010 and 2011, the Canterbury region of New Zealand was affected by a series of 
damaging earthquakes in ways that had significant implications for organisations of all kinds.  
These earthquakes were the most expensive and socially disruptive disasters New Zealand 
has ever experienced.  At the time of writing in 2014, the affected people, communities, 
commercial centres, and organisations are at various stages of recovery and reconstruction.  
Many organisations have moved on to other places. Others closed, never to reopen, while still 
others have completely reinvented themselves and are thriving in the new post-earthquake 
environment.  
There is considerable interest from researchers and practitioners in identifying the 
determinants of organisational resilience.  Current literature conceptualises resilience as a set 
of capacities that emerge from the people, processes, resources, and technology that make up 
organisations.  Researchers have also identified various organisational capacities that enhance 
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resilience, including, leadership (Horne & Orr, 1998; McManus, 2008), a culture of learning 
(Burnard & Bhamra, 2011; James, 2011), transparent communications (Riolli & Savicki, 
2003), and agile and collaborative supply chains (Christopher & Peck, 2004; Sheffi & Rice, 
2005).  These and other factors help organisations adapt and continue operating in dynamic 
environments.  This is especially important when disasters significantly (and often suddenly) 
reshape the environments in which they operate.  Because organisations are “the building 
blocks of our societies” (Baum & Rowley, 2002, p.1) a clear and integrated understanding of 
organisational resilience needs to be a central component of resilience building and disaster 
risk reduction across all levels of society.  
 
1.2 Defining Organisations 
‘Organisation’ is a broad term employed in this study for its inclusiveness. An 
organisation can be understood as a group with an existing structure (Dynes, 1970).  Aldrich 
(1979) distinguishes organisations from other social-collectives on the basis of their structure 
and purpose, defining organisations as “goal-directed, boundary maintaining, and socially 
constructed systems of human activity” (p.2).  This definition is consistent with 
characterisations of organisations in hazards and disaster studies (Dynes, 1970, Kreps 1994, 
Tierney 2003).   
Some of the earliest published studies of disasters emphasized the role of 
organisations, arguing that they provided social “order, meaning, and continuity” (Fritz, 
1960, p.155) and were therefore essential to disaster preparedness, response, and recovery.  
Kreps’ (1994) work on organisations that emerge in response to disasters produced a useful 
system for distinguishing organisations from other forms of social collective. Kreps (1994) 
defines organisations as social structures that have identifiable means (i.e. resources and 
activities or goals) and ends (i.e. bounded areas of focus and tasks to achieve some desired 
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outcome).  From this perspective, a wide range of social actors can be considered as 
organisations, including for-profit businesses, churches, government agencies, non-profit 
groups, and social clubs.   
In this thesis, I discuss the activities of a range of organisation types, including 
businesses, government agencies, and non-profit groups, in a post-disaster context. I limit the 
discussion to (a) organisations that existed prior to the Canterbury earthquakes (as opposed to 
those that emerged in the response and recovery phase) and (b) to organisations that had a 
physical site or base prior to the earthquakes.  
 
1.3 Problem Statement 
Although organisations are a fundamental part of society and instrumental in the 
production of place or community resilience, there has been little consideration of the 
influence of society or place on organisational resilience.  Most often, the organisational 
resilience literature conceptualises the organisation as a rational economic entity, with 
negligible consideration of where the organisation is located or with whom or what the 
organisation interacts (Pelling, High, Dearing, & Smith, 2008; Yeung, 1998).  Current 
approaches to organisational resilience tend to imagine a rigid separation between an 
organisation and its external environment.  With some notable exceptions (Gilly, Kechidi, & 
Talbot, 2013; Pelling et al., 2008), the resources necessary to create and maintain resilience 
are characterised as originating within the organisation, and the potentially enabling or 
hindering effects of extra-organisational factors are generally overlooked.  
As with studies of organisational resilience, studies examining organisational 
outcomes post-disaster have demonstrated the influence of organisational characteristics, 
including organisational size (Dahlhamer & Tierney, 1996), sector (Kroll, Landis, Shen, & 
Stryker, 1991), market reach (Webb, Tierney, & Dahlhamer, 2002), and pre-disaster financial 
5 
 
 
 
health (Wasileski, Rodríguez, & Diaz, 2011) on organisational post-disaster recovery.  Again, 
these organisation-level characteristics only portray a partial picture of the various influences 
on organisational processes and outcomes (Doerfel, Lai, & Chewning, 2010).  
Organisations are “collectives that have agency,” but they are also guided and 
constrained by the social structures in which they operate (Pelling et al., 2008, p. 869).  
Researchers in a number of disciplines, including sociology, management, and geography, 
have engaged with issues of structure and agency in exploring organisational processes and 
outcomes.  The theory of embeddedness provides an avenue for exploring the influence of 
both structure and agency on organisations.  This theory proposes that all economic (social) 
action is embedded in cultural and political institutions and networks of relations.  It 
represents a middle path between an ‘over-socialised’ (exclusive focus on structure) and an 
‘under-socialised’ (exclusive focus on agency) approach to organisations (Barber, 1995; 
Granovetter, 1985; Ibata-Arens & Dierkes, 2006).  Economic geographers have extended 
consideration of embeddedness to explore how organisations engage with space and place, 
and the role space and place play in guiding organisational decisions and actions (Del Casino, 
Grimes, Hanna, & Jones, 2000; Dicken & Malmberg, 2001; Yeung, 1998).  Commenting on 
the co-production of organisations and their social and geographic environments, Yeung 
(1998) noted that organisations “are not merely physical entities distinct from their 
operational environment.  Rather, they should be conceptualized as social agencies 
possessing peculiar modes of rationality; they are reproduced through ongoing networks of 
social relations embedded in both society and space” (p.103).  The theory of embeddedness 
offers new conceptual territory for considering how organisations build and enact resilience 
before and after disasters.  
There is a growing body of research linking extra-organisational networks and social 
capital – resources embedded in and available through social relationships to organisational 
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resilience (Doerfel et al., 2010; Johnson, 2010; L’Heureux & Therrien; Lengnick-Hall & 
Beck, 2005).  Very few of these studies, however, have examined how organisations 
participate in communities and places in ways that cultivate the networks and social capital 
that they activate following a disaster.  Similarly, studies of extra-organisational networks 
tend to assume a certain economic rationality of post-disaster exchange, treating social 
networks as a form of informal supply chain without considering the intangible, multi-layered 
social-cultural and cognitive aspects of social engagement.  Whereas, studies in management 
and organisation theory have linked elements of embeddedness to positive outcomes 
including improved knowledge exchange (Huggins & Johnston, 2009; Inkpen & Tsang, 
2005; Kogut, 2000), survival in competitive environments (Walker, Kogut, & Shan, 1997), 
and resource sharing (De Wever, Martens, & Vandenbempt, 2005; Gulati, Nohria, & Zaheer, 
2000) during business as usual, but not in the context of disasters.  Disasters reshape the 
social and physical environments in which organisations engage, and therefore, it is valuable 
to translate and reinterpret the ideas of embeddedness and organisational social capital to the 
post-disaster context through empirical research.  
 
1.4 Approach and Contribution  
This thesis uses comparative longitudinal case-studies to examine the ways 
organisations connect to their local (place-based) and wider social-relational contexts.  It 
focuses on how this connectivity influences an organisation’s ability to survive and adapt 
following a major disaster.  A focus on local connections is adopted for three reasons.  First, 
the impacts of the Canterbury earthquakes were highly localised, and therefore the 
earthquakes most significantly disrupted organisations’ connections to their local 
environments.  Second, organisations’ adaptive actions are most often planned and enacted at 
the local scale (Pelling et al., 2008).  Certainly, organisations’ recovery and reconstruction 
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activities following the Canterbury earthquakes were focused and driven at the local scale. 
Finally, close and frequent interaction in localities is often tied to the development of 
relationships that shape supportive environments for organisations (Gaggio, 2006; Knoben & 
Oerlemans, 2012).  
The research presented here develops understandings of organisational resilience 
through an engagement with theories, such as embeddedness, that have proven fruitful for 
understanding the influence of social structures on organisational processes and outcomes.  
By retaining what is already known about the organisational properties that contribute to 
resilience while pushing organisational resilience into this new theoretical territory, I 
demonstrate ways that researchers and practitioners can explain more of the variability in 
organisations’ post-disaster outcomes.  In addition to this conceptual contribution, I also offer 
practical observations and insights into organisations’ adaptive processes following the 
Canterbury earthquakes.   
 
1.5 Thesis Structure 
Following this introductory chapter, the thesis is laid out as follows:  
Chapter 2 reviews the literature on the factors that lead to differential organisational 
outcomes following disasters, including exposure, vulnerability, and resilience.  It focuses, in 
particular, on the development of and deficiencies in current approaches to theorising and 
assessing organisational resilience.  The review then explores some of the community 
resilience and social capital literature that illustrate the relevance of embeddedness 
perspectives in understanding post-disaster processes.  The review is intended to demonstrate 
the value of considering the extra-organisational connections that constrain and enable the 
development of resilience. 
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In Chapter 3, I introduce my ontological and epistemological approaches to this work 
and the methods I employed in the research.  This chapter describes the approaches to data 
gathering and analysis of the 32 organisational case studies conducted between 2010 and 
2013 and the key informant interviews and field observations used to provide context for the 
case studies.  
Chapter 4 is an extended narrative description of the earthquake series that struck 
Canterbury between 2010 and 2011 and the regional and local study areas.  I discuss the pre-
earthquake and post-earthquake economic and social trends in the region of Canterbury and 
the three town centres (the Christchurch central business district (CBD), Kaiapoi, and 
Lyttelton) where the case study organisations were situated.  I consider the influence of these 
trends on the organisations’ post-earthquake experiences.  
Chapter 5 explores the case study organisations’ embeddedness in their local contexts, 
discussing the various ways in which organisations became locally embedded and the extent 
of their embeddedness.  I examine the ways organisational embeddedness influenced how 
organisations were impacted by the earthquakes and how embeddedness both restricted 
adaptive options for some organisations and enabled survival and adaptation for others.  This 
chapter focuses on organisations’ local networks and also attempts to move beyond the 
network metaphor of engagement to examine other ways in which organisations connect to 
places.  
Chapter 6 moves beyond the local context to examine the case study organisations’ 
embeddedness in relational networks.  This analysis and discussion focuses on the subset of 
the extra-organisational network that supported the CSOs in the earthquake aftermath.  I 
compare the nature of different support networks and identify network features that hindered 
or enabled positive organisational outcomes following the earthquakes. 
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Chapter 7 concludes the thesis with an overview of the findings and contributions of 
this study.  This chapter also provides recommendations for future research and suggests 
ways to expand upon some of the concepts developed in this thesis.    
10 
 
Chapter 2: Developing a Contextual and Relational Perspective of Organisational 
Resilience 
 
We can think about organisations in many different ways.  Organisations are 
aggregations of people, technology, and capital directed toward a shared purpose.  It is this 
shared purpose or goal that defines an organisation’s function and existence, and which unites 
its elements to act collectively (Baum & Rowley, 2002).  Organisations are collectives that 
have agency or power and accountability over their actions (Pelling et al., 2008).  They are 
also embedded in networks of connections and have a place in communities.  They are part of 
institutional structures (e.g. governing bodies and cultural systems) that set the boundaries of 
acceptable political, economic, and social action and interaction (North, 1991). 
If we recognise these aspects of organisations, then analyses of organisational 
learning, action, and adaptation need to account for both the influence of organisations’ 
agency and their relationships with formal and informal structures.  As we study 
organisations, we need a perspective that accounts for both the inside and the outside of the 
organisation, as well as the relationship between these two domains.  
One way in which we can think about the interplay between an organisation’s agency 
and external structures is through the concept of embeddedness.  Embeddedness refers to the 
social, cultural, political, and cognitive structuration of economic action and organisational 
behaviour (Barber, 1995; Beckert, 2003; Dacin, Ventresca, & Beal, 1999; Granovetter, 1985).  
Many fields of social science seek to explain economic and organisational outcomes using an 
embeddedness framework (Ibata-Arens & Dierkes, 2006).  This perspective accounts for both 
organisational agency and the influence of social structures on organisational experiences, 
actions, and outcomes. 
Current understandings of the factors determining an organisation’s capacity to 
survive and adapt following a disaster tend to over-emphasise an organisation’s agency and 
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under-emphasise structure.  By examining organisational resilience through an embeddedness 
lens, we may be able to explain a greater proportion of the variability in organisations’ post-
disaster outcomes. 
To this end, this chapter reviews a range of literature to develop a contextualised 
understanding of organisational resilience.  The arguments made in this chapter can be 
broken down into four related propositions:  
1. Current approaches to organisational resilience do not adequately consider an 
organisation’s interactions with its context and networks.  
2. The field of community resilience offers useful conceptual resources for developing 
more contextual approaches to organisational resilience.  
3. Developing a contextualised understanding of organisational resilience can improve 
our ability to explain organisational outcomes post-disaster. 
4. A contextual approach to organisations can also provide practical guidance for 
researchers and practitioners aiming to measure and build resilience in organisations.  
I develop and elaborate these propositions through a critical analysis of a range of relevant 
literature.  This analysis forms the theoretical context for the research presented in Chapters 
4, 5, and 6.  
This chapter begins by examining different conceptualisations of vulnerability and 
resilience and builds toward the idea of geographic embeddedness.  I introduce geographic 
embeddedness as an approach that can open new theoretical territory for organisational 
resilience, allowing for multidimensional contextual analyses that address a number of factors 
that influence organisational resilience.  
The rest of the chapter is laid out as follows. Section 2.1 summarises current 
understandings of the determinants of an organisation’s post-disaster trajectory, focusing on 
notions of exposure, impact, vulnerability, and resilience.  Section 2.2 explores the ways we 
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currently understand and evaluate organisational resilience, and describe how the 
organisational resilience literature currently approaches the relationship between 
organisations and their environments.  Section 2.3 critiques and extends the current 
understanding of organisational resilience by conceiving of organisations as part of wider 
social systems.  Here I address the concept of embeddedness, demonstrating its potential for 
explaining how organisations and the systems in which they are situated co-produce 
resilience.  Finally, section 2.4 reviews the four initial propositions in light of the reviewed 
literature, concluding with an explanation of how an integrated embeddedness perspective 
may enhance organisational resilience.  
 
2.1 Post-disaster Trajectories  
A disaster is an event that causes extensive human, material, or economic losses, and 
seriously disrupts a community or social system’s ability to function (UNISDR, 2009).  After 
disasters, the disrupted community or social system normally attempts to reorganise itself and 
return to an approximation of its pre-disaster functioning (i.e. to recover) (UNISDR, 2009).  
As this study focuses on organisations, ‘recovery’ after a disaster is understood here as an 
organisation re-establishing a level of performance that allows it to achieve its core objectives 
and financial sustainability. 
When considered longitudinally, an organisation’s reorientation following a disaster 
can be described as its post-disaster trajectory.  A trajectory defines the path of an object 
through space and time, and an organisation’s post-disaster trajectory is a reflection of its 
efforts to achieve a recovered state.  The path to recovery, however, is seldom if ever linear, 
and an organisation’s arrival at its desired state is not guaranteed.  Organisations may 
experience both improvement and deterioration at various points along a post-disaster 
trajectory.  Some organisations never arrive at a sustainably recovered state, and instead 
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experience chronic dysfunction (characterised by an inability to adequately perform key 
organisational tasks) or failure (i.e. permanent cessation of the organisation’s business, 
usually resulting in a loss to the owners and the organisation’s creditors) (Schrank, Marshall, 
Hall-Phillips, Wiatt, & Jones, 2012).   
A central line of inquiry in disaster research is to understand why some people, 
organisations, or places recover following disruption while others do not.  The ultimate goal 
of such research is to develop interventions that can improve the chances of recovery or, even 
better, reduce the chances that a disaster will disrupt functions in the first place.  These 
studies focus on three characteristics of human systems that determine their recovery 
potential: exposure, vulnerability, and resilience.  Exposure and vulnerability together 
determine the degree to which a disaster disrupts people, organisations, and places, while 
vulnerability and resilience determine their capacity to maintain or regain functionality and 
improve following such disruptions (Tierney, 2013).  Exposure, vulnerability, and resilience, 
together, help to explain divergent post-disaster trajectories.  The next sections explain each 
of these elements in more depth.  
 
2.1.1 Exposure 
Exposure is the first organisational characteristic, which may influence an 
organisation’s post-disaster outcome.  Organisations are exposed when they or any of their 
elements (i.e. members, markets, or assets) are in the zone where direct physical hazard 
impact may occur (UNISDR 2009).  Organisations that are exposed may incur direct and 
indirect losses.  Direct losses are the result of disaster-related damage, and include stock 
losses (i.e. physical damage to property or assets) and flow losses (i.e. business interruption 
or reduced productivity resulting from disaster induced damage) (Rose, 2004).  Indirect loss 
covers all flow losses that are not directly linked to damage, and do not necessarily cause a 
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direct reduction in output. Indirect losses, for example, include decreased customer numbers 
or increased costs of labour or supplies (Rose, 2004).   
Organisations can be exposed to direct and indirect losses from hazards whether or 
not the organisation itself (i.e. the physical building, operations, or assets) is located in the 
hazard zone.  Within the hazard zone organisations are exposed to direct losses, such as 
building damage or damage to the electricity system that stops them from operating.  They 
can also experience indirect losses as a result of being in the hazard zone.  For example, an 
organisation may experience reduced productivity or have fewer customers as a result of 
post-disaster damage to neighbouring organisations, disruption to transport flows, and 
demographic shifts (Alesch, Holly, Mittler, & Nagy, 2001; Okuyama, 2007).  Following the 
2001 Nisqually earthquake in Seattle, Chang and Falit-Baiamonte (2002), for example, found 
that organisations suffered indirect losses as a result of people’s perceptions that the business 
district was unsafe. 
Organisations that are not located in the hazard zone, can still be exposed to hazards 
through connections to external elements, such as customers, suppliers, and resources.  For 
example, ripple effects of physical damage in one sector of the economy may influence 
activities in another area, due to inter-sectoral requirements in production or consumption 
(Olshansky & Chang, 2009).  Similarly, disruptions to crucial intermediate sectors, such as 
manufacturers or transport organisations, may affect businesses that are interconnected.  As a 
result of these connections, “it is possible for businesses outside of the impact area to be more 
severely affected than one inside the impact area” (Zhang, Lindell, & Prater, 2009, p. 42). 
The direct and indirect effects an organisation experiences after a disaster influence its 
post-disaster outcome (Hallegatte & Przyluski, 2010).  Organisations that have greater 
property damage or that experience capacity reductions from indirect disruptions are more 
likely to have adverse outcomes, chronic poor performance, and failure (Webb et al., 2000, 
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Webb et al., 2002a, Alesch et al., 2001).  Direct physical damage is also associated with 
forced business relocation and closure (Tierney, 1997; Wasileski et al., 2011).  Similarly, a 
business is more likely to experience losses if its suppliers are disrupted (Tierney, 1995; 
Zhang et al., 2009).  Thus, exposure to effects from disasters has a negative relationship with 
sustainable function.  The impact that a disaster will actually have on an organisation, 
however, is moderated by its vulnerability and resilience.  
 
2.1.2 Vulnerability   
Vulnerability is the second characteristic seen as a determinant of organisational post-
disaster outcomes.  Vulnerability refers to an organisation’s susceptibility and sensitivity to 
harm (Gall, 2007).  Studies of vulnerability to hazards are rooted in three primary research 
perspectives: risk-hazard; political ecology and political economy; and social ecological 
systems (Tate, 2011).  In all of these approaches, it is vulnerability, not the magnitude of the 
physical event that enables a hazard to become a disaster (Gaillard, 2010).   Each of these 
perspectives has a different understanding of where vulnerability is produced in society, 
which has implications for how it is researched.   
In the risk-hazard perspective, vulnerability is understood as the combined result of 
biophysical, social, and economic factors (Hewitt, 1997; Mileti, 1999).  Vulnerability 
reduction is achieved through adjustment of physical exposure to hazard (e.g. by restricting 
development in floodplains) and through social interventions (e.g. by providing social 
services) (Tate, 2011). 
Political economy and political ecology 
1
 perspectives argue that vulnerability exists 
in social systems regardless of physical exposure to hazards.  In these approaches 
vulnerability is a result of root causes produced in social structures (i.e. political, economic, 
                                                 
1
 Political ecology, unlike political economy, explicitly considers the effects of social-political systems on 
constructing and changing the environment and people’s experiences of the environment.  
16 
 
social, historical, and institutional contexts), which are subject to dynamic pressures that 
channel vulnerable populations into hazardous conditions, creating place-vulnerability 
(Cutter, 1996; Wisner, 2003).  
Finally, in social-ecological systems (SES) theories, social and ecological systems are 
seen as complex, dynamic, and tightly coupled (Carpenter, Walker, Anderies, & Abel, 2001; 
Tate, 2011).  SES are perpetually growing, accumulating, restructuring and undergoing 
renewal (Gunderson, 2010; Holling, 2001).  As a result, vulnerability is understood not just as 
susceptibility to disruption as a result of physical exposure and social pressures, but also 
considers a system’s capacity for renewal and adaptation (Adger, 2006; Turner et al., 2003).  
Studies of organisational vulnerability tend to be implicitly situated in the risk-hazard 
paradigm, recognising interactions between physical and organisational systems but not 
characterising them as tightly-coupled as in SES research.  Studies of organisational and 
particularly business vulnerability focus on identifying physical and organisation-led 
interventions to reduce vulnerability.  Post-disaster studies of organisations have identified a 
number of organisational characteristics that increase their susceptibility to loss and reduce 
their coping capacity (Chang & Falit-Baiamonte, 2002; Tierney & Webb, 2001).  Many of 
these studies focus on identifying factors that predict organisational failure in terms of 
permanent closure or a sustained reduction in financial viability post-disaster.  
An organisation’s vulnerability has two main dimensions — the organisation’s 
antecedent conditions (e.g. attributes such as size and financial health) and the vulnerability 
of its interdependent systems.  Thus, vulnerability emerges both from within the organisation 
and through interaction with the other systems to which it is connected.  These are both 
important as we consider the interactions between the characteristics of an organisation and 
its environment.  Previous studies of disaster-affected organisations provide some insights 
into the way these characteristics may influence organisations’ post-disaster outcomes.   
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Size is a commonly identified contributor to organisational vulnerability.  Smaller 
organisations (e.g. those that are sole proprietorships, have few employees, and are typically 
not industry leaders), are especially vulnerable to a disaster’s negative impact (Alesch & 
Holly, 1996; Dahlhamer & Tierney, 1996).  Small organisations are more likely to rely 
heavily on day-to-day cash flow, have fewer financial resources, and have less access to 
capital.  They are often intensely competitive with one another and experience high failure 
rates under normal conditions (Runyan, 2006).  They also tend to have smaller or less 
influential networks and access to fewer external resources compared to larger organisations 
(Alesch et al., 2001).  In contrast, large organisations are typically better able to distribute 
their risk both financially and geographically, and often wield a greater degree of financial 
and political influence (Zhang et al., 2009). 
An organisation’s pre-disaster financial health is another common indicator of its 
vulnerability.  Organisations that were performing poorly before a crisis tend to have less 
capacity to cope with disruption compared to those that were performing well (Alesch et al 
2001).  This relationship, however, is not always straightforward.  For example, Tierney and 
Webb (2001) found that a substantial proportion of business respondents that reported poor 
performance prior to the 1994 Northridge earthquake saw that their business improved in the 
year following the earthquake.  Their work also revealed that general trends in the local, 
regional, and national economies and institutional decisions post-disaster tend to have a 
greater long-term impact on organisational financial outcomes than an organisation’s 
financial health prior to the event (Tierney & Webb, 2001). 
There is some evidence that certain industry sectors are more vulnerable than others 
to the effects of disasters.  Following the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake in the San Francisco 
Bay Area of California, Kroll et al. (Kroll et al., 1991) found that single location retail, 
service organisations, and trades such as finance and real estate in the cities of Santa Cruz 
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and Oakland experienced proportionally greater losses and had more difficulty recovering 
than other types of organisations.  Interestingly, Dahlhamer and Tierney (1996) did not find 
the type of sector to be a statistically significant predictor of short-term business recovery in 
Santa Cruz following the Loma Prieta earthquake or in South Dade following Hurricane 
Andrew.  However, in a follow-up study with the same businesses, the industry sector was 
found to be a strong predictor of long-term recovery in South Dade but not in Santa Cruz 
(Webb et al., 2002).  On the other hand, large disasters can stimulate activity for 
organisations involved in the construction (West & Lenze, 1994) and the manufacturing 
sectors (Tierney & Webb, 2001) through increased workloads during demolition and 
reconstruction.  
Organisations with locally oriented markets, especially businesses that rely on foot-
traffic, tend to recover more slowly than those with regional, national, and international 
market scope (Alesch et al., 2001; Chang & Falit-Baiamonte, 2002; Kroll et al., 1991).  
Disasters can cause population dislocation from local markets and increase competitive 
pressure from organisations in less affected areas (Xiao & Nilawar, 2013; Zhang et al., 2009).  
Thus, organisations with multiple locations tend to do better, because they can funnel 
resources from less- to more-affected parts of their organisations (Tierney & Webb, 2001).  
There is also evidence to suggest that organisations that reach markets via the internet are 
better able to diffuse the impacts of localised disasters (Pearson, Hickman, & Lawrence, 
2010). 
An organisation’s vulnerability is also shaped by the vulnerability of the systems to 
which it is connected (e.g. its labour supply, market, and suppliers) (McManus, Seville, 
Vargo, & Brunsdon, 2008; Zhang et al., 2009).  A significant amount of work has, for 
example, demonstrated links between infrastructure vulnerability and organisational 
disruption (Comerio, 2006; Rose, Oladosu, & Liao, 2007; Tierney & Nigg, 1995).  In their 
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comprehensive review of business vulnerability, Zhang et al. (2009) defined the vulnerability 
of a business’s labour input through two dimensions: 1) the potential for loss through casualty 
or relocation and 2) labour substitutability.
2
  Similarly, customer vulnerability is the potential 
for loss, substitutability, and shifts in preference or demand (Xiao & Nilawar, 2013; Zhang et 
al., 2009). Vulnerability is thus, in part contingent upon the degree of exposure an 
organisation has in a disaster-affected area, but it can be moderated by organisational 
resilience.   
 
2.1.3 Resilience  
Resilience is the third characteristic understood as a determinant of organisational 
post-disaster outcomes.  At its most general level, the concept of resilience offers an 
explanation for why some organisations are better able to absorb and adapt to stressors in 
their environment than others.  Although the term resilience has classical etymological 
origins and a history of use in psychology and anthropology (Alexander, 2013), the generally 
accepted view is that resilience was brought into modern scientific prominence by Holling’s 
(1973) paper in which he defined an ecological property,  
“…termed resilience, that is a measure of the persistence of systems and of their 
ability to absorb change and disturbance and still maintain the same relationships 
between populations or state variables” (p.14).  
Holling (1973) introduced the concept that dynamism and variability actually create stability 
and ensure system continuation.  This is because the environments to which systems are 
connected change, and therefore the system often needs to adapt in order to continue 
functioning in the changed environment.  In this ecological definition, resilience is assessed 
as the capacity of a system to resist a disturbance and the speed with which a system returns 
                                                 
2
 Labour substitutability refers to the ease with which staff members can be replaced. “All other factors being 
equal, a large labour pool and reliance on less skilled workers makes it easier to replace employees that have 
been displaced by disaster” (Zhang et al., 2009, p.43).   
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to equilibrium (Burton, 2012; Davoudi et al., 2012).  The existence of an equilibrium state (in 
engineering) or multiple equilibrium states (in ecology) is a central, but controversial, 
component of Holling’s conceptualisation of resilience (Davoudi et al., 2012; Klein, Nicholls, 
& Thomalla, 2004).  Concerns about whether equilibrium exists at all for living systems, 
whether systems experience continuous state changes through adaptation, and whether 
‘returning’ to some predefined state retains vulnerability in the system is a central challenge 
when conceptualising and assessing resilience (Alexander, 2013; Burton, 2012; Klein et al., 
2004).  
As shown in Table 1, as resilience has been translated from natural (ecological) and 
material (engineering) science to social science, theorists have developed more integrated 
approaches to resilience, focusing less on the attainment of equilibrium and giving more 
emphasis to interaction between systems at different scales and to system learning.  
Table 1: A sequence of resilience concepts 
Resilience perspective Characteristics  Focus on  Resilient states 
Engineering resilience Return time, efficiency Recovery, constancy 
Vicinity of a stable 
equilibrium 
Ecological/ecosystem 
resilience social 
resilience 
Buffer capacity, 
withstand shock, 
maintain function 
Persistence, robustness 
Multiple equilibria, 
stability landscapes 
Social-ecological 
resilience 
Interplay disturbance and 
reorganization, sustaining 
and developing 
Adaptive capacity, 
transformability, 
learning, innovation 
Integrated system 
feedback, cross-scale 
dynamic interactions 
Source: adapted from Folke (2006, p. 259) 
SES approaches emphasise the inseparable interaction of social and ecological systems in 
creating and sustaining resilience.   
Timmerman (1981) is one of the earliest cited researchers to discuss the resilience of 
society to hazards and disasters (Burton, 2012; Eakin & Luers, 2006; Klein et al., 2004).  
Timmerman (1981) defined resilience as “the measure of a system’s or part of the system’s 
capacity to absorb and recover from an occurrence of a hazardous event” (p.21).  He 
introduced this term into a field that had a growing orientation in social-ecological 
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perspectives which rejected ‘human exemptionalism’ (Kates, 1971) instead, portraying 
human systems as inextricably embedded within ecological processes (McLaughlin & Dietz, 
2008).  From this perspective, resilience is a property created through the constant, fluid 
interaction of human and non-human systems.  
Numerous definitions of resilience have proliferated in the hazards and disaster 
literature (and beyond) over the last three decades, referring to the capacity of a variety of 
systems to respond, adapt, and recover from changes or disruptions.  As resilience has 
permeated different subfields of social sciences it has received a slightly different treatment, 
depending on the systems being analysed and the epistemological assumptions of the 
researchers.  Table 2 includes a sample of resilience definitions developed with different 
‘scales’ of human systems in mind.   
Comparing the definitions in Table 2 reveals that, despite the different theoretical 
backgrounds and scales of analysis, there is a consensus around the point that resilience 
involves some degree of adaptation.  Although there are exceptions, most discussions of 
resilience, if not the definitions themselves, also refer to elements of learning, mitigation, and 
vulnerability reduction as an important part of the resilience development process.  
Some definitions of resilience refer to the maintenance of functionality under 
challenging circumstances or returning to a pre-disaster state.  However, the stability that 
comes as a result of resistance to change can actually compromise resilience.  In Table 2, 
only Wildavsky (1988) refers to the ‘bounce back’ principle.  Bouncing back following a 
disruption can imply re-establishing vulnerabilities in the system.  So researchers often avoid 
descriptions of ‘bounce back’ in favour of adaptation.  Adaptation implies bouncing forward, 
and in doing so, learning from previous disruptions and evolving improved coping capacity.  
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Table 2: Selected definitions of resilience representing different ‘scales’ of human systems  
Scale Source Definition 
Individual 
Egeland (1993) 
The capacity for successful adaptation, positive functioning, or 
competence…despite high-risk status, chronic stress, or following 
prolonged or severe trauma. 
Norris et al. 
(2009) 
The process of, capacity for, or outcome of successful adaptation after 
trauma or severe stress.   
Organisational 
Wildavsky (1988) 
The capacity to cope with unanticipated dangers after they have become 
manifest, learning to bounce back.  
Vogus and 
Sutcliffe (2007) 
Maintenance of positive adjustment under challenging conditions such 
that the organization emerges from those conditions strengthened and 
more resourceful.  
McManus (2008) 
A function of an organisation’s situation awareness, management of 
keystone vulnerabilities and adaptive capacity in a complex, dynamic 
and interconnected environment.  
 Seville et al. 
(2008) 
The ability to survive a crisis and thrive in a world of uncertainty.  
Community  
Sonn (1998) 
The process through which mediating structures (schools, peer groups, 
family) and activity settings moderate the impact of oppressive systems.  
Norris et al. 
(2008a) 
A process linking a set of adaptive capacities to a positive trajectory of 
functioning and adaptation after a disturbance.  
UNISDR (2009) 
The ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to 
resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard 
in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and 
restoration of its essential basic structures and functions.  
Urban 
Godschalk (2003) 
A sustainable network of physical systems and human communities, 
capable of managing extreme events; during disaster, both must be able 
to survive and function under extreme stress.  
Campanella 
(2006) 
The capacity of a city to rebound from destruction… [and] is largely a 
function of resilient and resourceful citizens.  
Regional  
Foster (2007) 
The ability of a region to anticipate, prepare for, respond to, and recover 
from a disturbance. 
Hill et al. (2008) 
The ability of a region…to recover successfully from shocks to its 
economy that either throw it off its growth path or have the potential to 
throw it off its growth path.  
Society/social 
Bruneau (2003) 
The ability of social units to mitigate hazards, contain the effects of 
disasters when they occur, and carry out recovery activities in ways that 
minimise social disruption and mitigate the effects of future 
earthquakes.  
Paton & Johnston 
(2006) 
A measure of how well people and societies can adapt to a changed 
reality and capitalize on the new possibilities offered.  
23 
 
 
 
2.2 Organisational Resilience 
A body of literature has emerged that specifically addresses the resilience of 
organisations.  Many of the general principles of organisational resilience are consistent with 
approaches in other fields.  Organisational resilience refers to the capacity of an organisation 
to absorb or minimise the negative impacts of a crisis and continue to function after 
disruption.  Resilience exists in an organisation’s capacity to adjust its strategy, systems, and 
governance structure to dynamic environments (McManus et al., 2008).   
This body of literature, however, has developed from a different theoretical 
background than work on communities and SES.  Unlike examinations of community and 
place-based resilience which emerged from psychology, sociology, and human geography, 
work on organisational resilience typically draws upon knowledge developed in engineering, 
logistics, and business management.  Research on organisational resilience builds on a large 
existing literature and practice in risk management, business continuity, and high reliability 
organisations (HRO) (Stephenson, 2010).
3
  As a result of its conceptual origins, work on 
organisational resilience tends to focus less on organisational interactions and more on its 
internal capacity to manage and contain organisational risk.  
Early approaches to organisational resilience focused on identifying and managing 
risk within organisational systems (Tarrant, 2010).  Risk is understood as the probability of 
an event and its potential or probable negative consequences (UNISDR, 2009).  This risk 
focus has a significant influence on the way practitioners developed interventions to improve 
organisational capacity to survive and adapt following a disruption.  Risk management 
traditionally focused on hedging or distributing potential losses (e.g. through insurance or 
portfolio diversification) and on ‘point solutions’ which attempted to moderate risk by 
strengthening potential vulnerable spots against disruption (McManus, 2008; Starr, 
                                                 
3
 A high reliability organisation is defined as an organisation that operates in extremely challenging or high risk 
environments where errors are unacceptable (Bigley & Roberts, 2001).  
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Newfrock, & Delurey, 2003).  Similarly, work in crisis management  focused on developing 
organisational preparedness through training and planning, and by establishing organisational 
cultures, communication strategies, and management structures that better deal with crises 
(e.g. Mitroff, Pauchant, Finney, & Pearson (1989),Pearson & Clair (1998), Robert & Lajtha 
(2002), Smith & Sipika (1993)). 
Since the 1990s, organisational systems management perspectives have moved from 
an exclusive focus on risk reduction and business continuity, toward resilience thinking, 
accepting “that adaptability will be the primary lifestyle for the future” (Horne & Orr, 1998, 
p. 29).  Although Horne and Orr (1998) describe this transition from risk management to 
resilience thinking as a “wrenching shift,” it might be more accurately described as a process 
of selective retention and expansion.  Many of the key concepts in risk, crisis, and business 
continuity management remain integral to organisational resilience.  The resilience construct, 
however, moves organisations past the prescriptive planning and top-down responses that 
dominated the risk mentality (Boin & McConnell, 2007). As a result, resilience has become 
an increasingly important approach and framing mechanism in business continuity 
management (Paton & Hill, 2006).  
This move toward resilience thinking has strengthened and spread through the 2000s. 
Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the U.S., research on organisational 
resilience increasingly emphasised the inability of organisations to mitigate the effects of 
specific events.  The studies instead focused on the inter-personal dynamics within 
organisations, identifying practices and behaviours that could improve coping capacity, 
learning, and organisational innovation (Kendra & Wachtendorf, 2003; Linnenluecke & 
Griffiths, 2013).  
In contrast to conventional risk and crisis management perspectives, resilience 
thinking seeks to avoid the compartmentalisation of risk.  Resilience better accommodates 
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what Dalziel and McManus (2004) refer to as ontological uncertainties or ‘unknown 
unknowns.’  As a result, resilience approaches prioritise the development of inherent and 
adaptive capacities to facilitate flexibility over prediction and control (Gilpin & Murphy, 
2008).  
2.2.1 The resilient systems paradigm 
At present, our understandings of organisational resilience are predominantly 
grounded in systems theory approaches developed in engineering and ecology.  Complex 
adaptive systems (CAS) theory, in particular, has influenced the way organisational resilience 
is understood and approached.  CAS are self-organising, capable of anticipating potential 
disturbances, and rearranging their components to enable survival and persistent function 
(Holland 1992; Meadows 2008).  The defining feature of a CAS is its ability to bend, flex, 
and reorganise its components within a continuously changing environment (Holland, 1992; 
Horne & Orr, 1998).  
From a complex systems perspective, resilience is an inherent characteristic emerging 
from the actions and interactions of elements in a dynamic system.  Resilience decreases 
when the system organises itself around stability at the expense of flexibility and when the 
system does not adequately consider the influence of its environment.  In other words, 
resilience is compromised when the system “is paying much more attention to its play than to 
its playing space” (Meadows, 2008, p. 78).   
Complex systems approaches to organisational resilience emphasise flexibility and 
adaptation over prescriptive planning or mapping and controlling the entire system (Choi, 
Dooley, & Rungtusanatham, 2001; Gilpin & Murphy, 2008).  Choi et al. (2001), for example, 
demonstrated this in their study of a leading automobile manufacturer who found that 
understanding the limitations of their possible knowledge and maintaining flexibility in 
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response to the unknown was a far more successful strategy than their attempts to 
comprehensively map and manage their complex and dynamic supply chain. 
2.2.2 Assessing organisational resilience 
The ultimate purpose of exploring organisational resilience is to identify the factors 
that enable organisations to resist the negative impacts of a crisis and adapt in a way that 
enables them to thrive in a changing environment (Seville et al., 2008).  Thus, studies of 
organisational resilience often focus on identifying the components of an organisational 
system that contribute to resilience.  These studies seek to develop tools that assess and 
promote organisational resilience before an organisation is faced with a crisis. 
One of the earliest studies to examine organisational resilience in the context of an 
environmental disaster was Karl Weick’s (1993) study of the Mann Gulch fire in Montana 
(U.S.).  Weick’s (1993) characterisation of pre-disaster capability building for improved 
adaptive capacity is now captured in most current assessments and measures of organisational 
resilience.  In his study, Weick (1993) identified four dimensions of organisational resilience: 
improvisation, virtual role systems, the attitude of wisdom, and norms of respectful 
interaction.  Each dimension refers to elements that emerged after the disaster but their 
foundations were developed by the group or individuals before the disaster.  First, 
improvisation refers to maintaining creativity under pressure, but is associated with 
individuals that “routinely act in chaotic conditions” (p.639).  Next, virtual role systems refer 
to an individual’s willingness to take on all roles as needed in the crisis situation, but it comes 
from familiarity with the roles and processes within the organisation and communication 
patterns established prior to the disaster.  Third, the wisdom to which Weick (1993) refers is 
knowledge without extreme confidence or extreme caution, emerging from familiarity with 
what is and an acceptance of what is unknown.  Finally, respectful interaction describes intra-
organisational transparency and trust.  
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In addition to its focus on adaptive capacities, much of the organisational resilience 
literature also integrates elements of formal planning, reminiscent of its management and 
business continuity roots.  Some believe that anticipatory approaches, including formal 
planning, create space in systems to “organise for resilience” (Boin & Lagadec, 2000, p. 
188).  Planning and anticipatory action supplement flexible and adaptive processes, not 
supplant them (Stephenson, 2010).  Anticipation is also captured in the cyclical feedback 
process of vulnerability reduction and adaptive learning that are incorporated in 
organisational resilience constructs (Mallak, 1998; McManus, 2008; Somers, 2009).   
Table 3 displays several common indicators of resilience derived from both 
conceptual models and models designed to be deployed as organisational resilience 
assessment tools.  In these assessments, resilience is considered an organisational property 
which can be developed prior to a crisis and activated both in anticipation of and response to 
a disruption.   
Horne and Orr developed the Organizational Resilience Inventory (©1996), a 74-item 
survey tool, designed to identify organisational behaviours that contribute to resilience 
(Horne & Orr, 1998).  Similarly, Mallak (1998) developed a scale for assessing latent 
resilience which Somers (2009) later expanded into the Organizational Resilience Potential 
Scale, a quantitative survey tool.  McManus et al. (2008) introduced a model of 
organisational resilience developed from grounded theory analysis of 10 case study 
organisations in New Zealand.  McManus (2008) developed a qualitative model to gauge the 
“relative overall resilience” (p.67) of organisations, based on 15 key resilience indicators.   
These indicators represented three dimensions of organisational resilience: situation 
awareness, identification and management of keystone vulnerabilities, and adaptive capacity.  
McManus et al.’s (2008) work did not offer a tool that could quantify and compare 
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organisational resilience, but it was later developed by Stephenson (2010) and Lee et al. 
(2013) in these respects, as discussed in more detail below.   
Table 3: Indicators of organisational resilience 
 
Indicator 
Horne & 
Orr 
(1998) 
Mallak 
(1998)/ 
Somers 
(2009) 
McManus 
et 
al.(2008) 
Burnard & 
Bhamra 
(2011) 
1 Forward planning/participation in exercises 
 
  
2 
Goal oriented solution seeking/ appropriate response 
and recovery priorities   

 
3 Improvisation/ Innovation 
  
 
4 Proactive posture/ change willingness    
5 
Processes for identifying and analysing 
vulnerabilities or risk 
    
6 
Situation awareness of the external environment / 
ability to perceive and respond to emerging issues 
   
7 Effective leadership/ strategic vision     
8 
Minimisation of organisational silos/ high 
permeability between organisational boundaries 
   
9 
Culture of knowledge sharing/ reporting and internal 
feedback processes    
 
10 Culture of learning 
 
 
11 Devolved responsibilities and decision making 
 
  
12 Staff engagement and effective communication     
13 
Access to and ability to mobilise appropriate 
resources (internal & external) 
   
14 
Critical understanding of organisational 
connectivity/ ability to manage complexity 
   
Finally, Burnard and Bhamra (2011) provided a conceptual framework for organisational 
resilience that is geared toward identifying organisational features that contribute positively 
to crisis response.  
Assessments of organisational resilience, such as those presented in Table 3, tend to 
be geared toward practitioners (those in a position to enact resilience interventions within an 
organisation).  Practitioners may employ such tools or frameworks to: see where they stand 
against others in their area or industry, identify areas for improvement, and evaluate the effect 
of interventions intended to enhance resilience (Lee, Vargo, & Seville, 2013).  
Because they are targeted toward practitioners, the majority of the resilience 
indicators that researchers identify fall within an organisation’s management scope.  The 
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majority focus on systems within the organisation and only a few consider any extra-
organisational elements.  For example, indicators 1-6 in Table 3 reflect attitudes and postures 
toward change, monitoring, and planning within an organisation that may lead to improved 
adaptability.  Indicators 8-12 in Table 3 refer to relationships and culture within the 
organisation that develop transparency, empower staff members, and encourage collective 
improvement.  Similarly, indicator 7 refers to leadership and strategic vision within the 
organisation.  
Only indicators 6, 13, and 14 capture elements of extra-organisational interactions, 
and again they focus on an organisation’s internal capacities to manage interactions with the 
external environment.  Indicator 13 refers to connections to resources that might be accessed 
from others outside the organisation while indicator 14 reflects broader references to an 
awareness of the organisation’s mostly formal relationships and operating environments.  For 
example, McManus (2008) includes an indicator referred to as “connectivity awareness,” 
described as an organisation’s “awareness of the links between the organisation and its entire 
community of stakeholders, internally (staff) and externally (customers, local authorities, 
consultants, competitors” (p.134).  Discussion of this indicator focuses primarily on 
managing potential disruptions that might flow between the organisation and these 
stakeholders. Finally, indicator 6 refers to an organisation’s capacity for monitoring their 
operating environment to anticipate changes that might disrupt the organisation.   
McManus’s (2008) work formed the basis of the Benchmark Resilience Tool, a 
quantitative survey tool developed by Stephenson (2010) and further refined in Lee et al. 
(2013).  This tool has a strong theoretical grounding in the organisational resilience and crisis 
management literature, and has been empirically tested and refined (Lee et al., 2013; 
Stephenson, 2010)  (Table 4).   
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Table 4: New model of organisational resilience 
Factors  Indicator Definition  
Adaptive 
capacity 
Minimization 
of silos 
Minimization of divisive social, cultural, and behavioural barriers, which are most 
often manifested as communication barriers, creating disjointed, disconnected, 
and detrimental ways of working. 
Internal 
resources 
The management and mobilization of the organisation’s resources to ensure its 
ability to operate during business-as-usual, as well as being able to provide the 
extra capacity required during a crisis. 
Staff 
engagement 
and 
involvement 
The engagement and involvement of staff who understand the link between their 
own work, the organisation’s resilience, and its long-term success.  The staff is 
empowered, and they use their skills to solve problems. 
Information 
and knowledge 
Critical information is stored in a number of formats and locations, and the staff 
has access to expert opinions when needed. Roles are shared and staff is trained 
so that someone will always be able to fill key roles. 
Leadership 
Strong crisis leadership provides good management and decision making during 
times of crisis, as well as continuous evaluation of strategies and work programs 
against organisational goals. 
Innovation and 
creativity 
Staff are encouraged and rewarded for using their knowledge in novel ways to 
solve new and existing problems and for utilising innovative and creative 
approaches to developing solutions. 
Decision 
making 
Staff have the appropriate authority to make decisions related to their work and 
authority is clearly delegated to enable a crisis response. Highly skilled staff are 
involved, or are able to make, decisions where their specific knowledge adds 
significant value, or where their involvement will aid implementation. 
Situation 
monitoring and 
reporting 
Staff are encouraged to be vigilant about the organisation, its performance and 
potential problems. Staff are rewarded for sharing good and bad news about the 
organisation including early warning signals and these are quickly reported to 
organisational leaders. 
Planning 
Planning 
strategies 
Plans and strategies are developed and evaluated to manage vulnerabilities in 
relation to the business environment and its stakeholders. 
Participation in 
exercises 
Staff participate in simulations or scenarios designed to practice response 
arrangements and validate plans. 
Proactive 
posture 
Staff have a strategic and behavioural readiness to respond to early warning 
signals of change in the organisation’s internal and external environment before 
they escalate into crisis. 
External 
resources 
There is an organisation wide understanding of the relationships and resources the 
organisation might need to access from other organisations during a crisis, and 
plan and manage to ensure this access. 
Recovery 
priorities 
There is an organisation wide awareness of what the organisation’s priorities 
would be following a crisis, clearly defined at the organisation level, as well as an 
understanding of the organisation’s minimum operating requirements. 
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The latest iteration of the Benchmark Resilience Tool, now called the New Model of 
Organisational Resilience, uses a 53-item quantitative survey that measures 13 indicators of 
resilience. 
The indicators are grouped into two factors: planning and adaptive capacity (Lee et 
al., 2013; Stephenson, 2010).  Each indicator is defined in   (Table 4).   
Table 4, which is adapted from Lee et al. (2013, p.34).  The survey uses several items 
(declarative statements where the participant indicates his or her level of agreement on a 
Likert scale) to assess each indicator and these are then aggregated to generate a total 
resilience score.   
Stephenson (2010) and Lee et al.’s (2013) tool offers additional specificity around 
some of the indicators.  It also examines, in greater detail than the other models discussed, 
how organisations can manage their interactions with their extra-organisational environment.  
For example, Stephenson (2010) includes the indicator “situation monitoring” to 
“acknowledge input or feedback from the organisation’s environment” (p.84), referring to the 
operational environment (e.g. supply web or markets).  Lee et al. (2013) also notes that 
engagement with extra-organisational actors expands organisations’ potential access to 
resources in times of need.  
The New Model of Organisational Resilience offers a useful starting point for 
assessing the endogenous indicators of resilience (i.e. the aspects of resilience originating 
from within the organisation).  In this thesis I use the New Model of Organisational 
Resilience as a reference point for discussing aspects of the relationship between an 
organisation’s endogenous resilience including resources, management policies, attitudes, 
and procedures and its post-disaster trajectory.  
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2.2.3 Limitations of current approaches  
Current models of organisational resilience tend to be ‘under-spatialised’ (to borrow a 
term from Yeung (2006)) and under-socialised.  These limitations stem largely from the 
organisational resilience literature’s roots in crisis management and systems engineering.  By 
focusing exclusively on indicators directly within the management scope of an organisation, 
these models do not consider the potential co-creation of resilience between the organisation 
and its social, economic, political, and physical environments.  This means that the New 
Model of Organisational Resilience and the other models discussed in the previous section 
are unable to explain adequately significant portions of the variability in post-disaster 
organisational outcomes.  
In studies of organisational resilience there is a tendency to reify the boundary 
between an organisation and everything outside of the organisation.
4
  This leads to an almost 
exclusive focus on the system of interest (the organisation), and only a fuzzy, abstract 
depiction of the ‘environment,’ even studies that employ CAS approaches.  When resilience 
models do consider the organisation’s environment, it is usually as a source of disruption or 
as a source of inputs and receptacle of outputs.  And yet there is considerably more to an 
environmental context than these aspects alone.  
In systems approaches to organisational resilience, organisations tend to be abstracted 
from their physical environment.  These approaches overlook important aspects of 
organisational location and spatial interactions, as well as issues such as the owner or 
employees’ place attachment, organisational place identity, and other place-based 
interactions.  This is the root of the first issue, the under-spatialised understanding of the 
organisation in resilience literature.  If organisations are situated in a resilient neighbourhood, 
                                                 
4
 A researcher is responsible for identifying the boundaries of the system of interest (i.e. the set of 
interconnected elements that are coherently organised into a structure that produces a function such as an 
organisation or a supply chain).  The researcher also identifies the extent of the ‘environment,’ which is defined 
as anything outside of the system’s boundaries (Meadows, 2008). 
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are connected to resilient infrastructure, or operate in a region with a strong economy, then it 
is likely that this will influence their capacity to respond and recover from disruptions.  These 
factors are, however, not considered in any of the previously discussed assessment tools of 
organisational resilience.  
In these models, organisational context or environment is never considered as a place 
containing a set of vulnerabilities and capacities, as the hazardousness of place model 
developed by Hewitt and Burton’s (1971).  For example, Gibson and Tarrant (2010) present 
several conceptual models of organisational resilience, only one of which depicts the 
organisation as situated in a context (see Figure 1).  In this model, the context is described 
only as “the changing internal and external environment” (p.10), while the organisational 
processes and capacities are defined in comparatively greater detail. 
Figure 1 Resilience triangle model 
 
 Adapted from: Gibson and Tarrant (2010, p.10) 
 
In Gibson and Tarrant’s (2010) conceptual model, an organisations’ context is 
presented as a set of conditions that can disrupt the system.  From this perspective, resilience 
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is then seen as emerging from an organisation’s internal resources, processes, leadership, and 
people.  It is unclear from the model what effect, if any, context has on organisational 
resilience.  
In addition to having a limited or underspecified sense of context, current approaches 
to organisational resilience are also under-socialised.  Organisations tend to be treated as 
rational and utility optimising entities, whose interactions are devoid of social meaning and 
unaffected by culture and norms of interaction.  If and when the models consider exchanges 
outside of the organisation’s boundaries, there is an almost exclusive focus on organisations’ 
formal and market-based relationships (e.g. suppliers, customers, government institutions).  
In systems theory approaches, organisations are seen as independent actors engaging in 
discrete transactions with others outside of their organisation, and they are rarely considered 
as part of wider social and cultural structures.  Systems theory, therefore, “maintains the 
fiction that [disaster] ‘events’ and social actors are at the same time bound together and yet 
independent of each other” (Iversen & Armstrong, 2008, p. 184). 
In systems perspectives on organisational resilience, the organisation’s connections 
with networks, physical environments, and cultural and political institutions facilitate discrete 
transactions, but ultimately resilience is created and maintained within the organisation.  This 
is depicted schematically on the left side of d extra-organisational entities. 
In contrast, approaches to community resilience characterise it as emerging from the 
interaction of systems that compose each other (as depicted on the right side of Error! Not a 
valid bookmark self-reference.).  The (usually spatially defined) community is understood 
as an integral part of its networks, built and natural environments, and cultural and political 
institutions.  
 The interactions among the various components create the conditions that restrict or 
enable the emergence of resilience.  In this view, resilience is developed and maintained at 
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the convergence of the various systems of which the community is a part.  In other words, the 
community is embedded in the various environments that compose its context.  The 
community and its context are mutually constitutive and therefore co-produce both 
vulnerability and resilience.   
Organisations, like communities, are social collectives that inhabit social and physical 
space.  Given the aforementioned limitations of a systems theory approach to organisations, it 
is useful to consider other perspectives on the continuum of interactions that shape and guide 
organisational processes and outcomes.   
Figure 2.  An organisation tends to be portrayed as connected to but separate from the 
contexts they inhabit.  This leads to over-simplified and incomplete understandings of the 
way organisations are shaped by and shape their environments.  
In current approaches to organisational resilience, organisations connect with the 
various elements in their amorphous context including the physical environment, networks, 
and institutions. 
5
 Yet few studies of organisational resilience consider these contexts as 
significantly shaping the organisation. Instead, they focus on the organisations’ direct formal 
exchanges between an organisation and extra-organisational entities. 
In contrast, approaches to community resilience characterise it as emerging from the 
interaction of systems that compose each other (as depicted on the right side of Error! Not a 
valid bookmark self-reference.).  The (usually spatially defined) community is understood 
as an integral part of its networks, built and natural environments, and cultural and political 
institutions.  
                                                 
5
 Pelling et al., (2008) refer to both the formal regulatory institutions that penetrate and influence organisations 
and the informal “communities of practice…that are often not officially recognised by the organisations they 
permeate.”  The authors distinguish between communities and networks, describing communities as associations 
“founded in shared identity, where shared values and practices are reinforced” and networks as relationships 
“that cross boundaries of identity, providing an informal vehicle for the flow of information in an organisation,” 
(p.870).  All of these elements influence learning and adaptation in organisations both positively and negatively 
(Pelling et al., 2008; Pelling & High, 2005). 
36 
 
 The interactions among the various components create the conditions that restrict or 
enable the emergence of resilience.  In this view, resilience is developed and maintained at 
the convergence of the various systems of which the community is a part.  In other words, the 
community is embedded in the various environments that compose its context.  The 
community and its context are mutually constitutive and therefore co-produce both 
vulnerability and resilience.   
Organisations, like communities, are social collectives that inhabit social and physical 
space.  Given the aforementioned limitations of a systems theory approach to organisations, it 
is useful to consider other perspectives on the continuum of interactions that shape and guide 
organisational processes and outcomes.   
Figure 2: Conceptual approaches to contextual interactions and the creation of organisational and 
community resilience 
 
In the following section I introduce the theory of embeddedness and discuss how it can 
improve organisational resilience theory and research. 
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2.3 Organisational Embeddedness 
Understanding how organisation’s external interactions and environment shape its 
resilience requires seeing organisations as part of social systems.  The theory of 
embeddedness offers an established theoretical basis for exploring the social and spatial 
aspects of organisations.  Embeddedness refers to the complex interrelatedness of economic 
actors
6
 within their social environments (Ibata-Arens & Dierkes, 2006).  Proponents of 
embeddedness, the concept that “social relations shape economic action” (Uzzi, 1996, p. 
674), argue that all economic behaviour is embedded in a social context (Borgatti & Foster, 
2003; Granovetter, 1985).  Some of the earliest considerations of embeddedness were 
motivated by opposition to neoclassical economists’ attempts to exclude social and political 
processes from our understandings of market exchanges (Barber, 1995; Dacin et al., 1999).  
Embeddedness emerged from Karl Polanyi’s (1944) consideration of exchange in 
‘market’ and ‘non-market’ societies, where he identified three types of economic exchange: 
reciprocal, redistributive, and market.  Reciprocal exchange refers to exchanges within close 
social relationships, the terms of which are dictated by values and social norms (Barber, 
1995; Hess, 2004).  Redistributive exchanges are also dictated by collective values and 
norms, but in this instance each participant contributes taxes, goods or services and a central 
agency (e.g. the government or the church) redistributes these contributions (Barber, 1995; 
Hess, 2004).  Finally in market exchanges, price is the only factor considered and all actors 
treat each other “impersonally and honestly” (Barber, 1995, p. 398).  Polanyi (1944) argued 
that the concept of the market began as a utopian ideal but was subsequently reified as an 
establishment ideology, becoming a powerful structuring ideal in capitalist societies (Barber, 
1995). 
                                                 
6
 All actors that exchange with one another in a society are considered ‘economic’ actors. 
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In the utopian market ideal (and neoclassical economic theory), people and 
organisations are characterised as rational actors (Baum & Rowley, 2002).  The rational actor 
places the notion of efficiency maximisation (greater value output for lesser value input) as 
the central driver behind all action.  In the rational economy, environments are only 
considered as sources of inputs and outputs.  Opportunism (the rational tendency of economic 
actors to pursue their own interests with every means necessary) is managed through 
hierarchies and authority relations (Powell, 1990). 
Markets as they exist outside of the purified ideal are a more complex mix of 
reciprocal, redistributive, and market exchanges.  Exchange is laden with social, cultural, and 
institutional values, norms and meanings. Thus, as Polanyi (1944) concluded, all exchange is 
embedded in social relations. 
The concept of embeddedness was revitalised by Mark Granovetter’s (1985) seminal 
paper linking economic action of individual businesses and social structure. Granovetter 
(1985) utilised the embeddedness framework to address the ‘under-socialised’ view of 
neoclassical economics and the ‘over-socialised’ view of social structure in the economy 
promoted by reformist economists in sociology (Dacin et al., 1999).  The theory of 
organisational embeddedness addressed “the classical problem of how it can be that daily 
economic life is not riddled with mistrust and malfeasance” (Granovetter, 1985, p.488).  
While mistrust, opportunism, and malfeasance are not absent from economic life, in many 
relationships they are regulated by norms, trust, and other investments in social relationships.  
Granovetter’s work demonstrated that organisations have varying levels of embeddedness 
within a wider set of social and cultural processes.  Embeddedness theory recognises that 
social relationships can be more important than authority relationships in bringing order to 
economic life (Ibata-Arens & Dierkes, 2006).  
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Iversen and Armstrong (2008) argue that embeddedness perspectives can open new 
theoretical territory for disaster researchers.  Embeddedness perspectives recognise that 
processes are historically contingent and shaped by both institutional and relational 
structures, but they also recognise the agency of actors within those structures.  This view is 
consistent with sociological approaches (as well as those in anthropology and geography) 
which understand disasters as socially constructed and socially produced (Quarantelli, 2005), 
and explore the production of vulnerability and resilience as relational processes, formed 
through interaction, and shaped by social structures (Cutter, Boruff, & Shirley, 2003; 
Tierney, 2007).  
2.3.1 Embeddedness of what in what?  
Organisations develop connections with people, organisations, economies and places.  
Organisations may strategically cultivate connections to gain a competitive advantage (Coe, 
Johns, & Ward, 2012; Dacin et al., 1999; Dicken & Thrift, 1992), and organically accumulate 
resource dependencies and shared understandings over time as the unintentional result of 
frequent interaction (Aldrich and Pfeffer 1976; Bakker et al. 2011; Burt 1992).  This 
multiplicity is reflected in the various types of embeddedness that researchers examine, 
including cognitive (Bakker, Cambre, Korlaar, & Raab, 2011; Kalantaridis & Bika, 2006), 
economic or market (Kalantaridis & Bika, 2006), institutional (which is also variously 
characterised as societal, cultural, and political) (Jessop, 2001; Pallares-Barbera, Tulla, & 
Vera, 2004; Zukin & Dimaggio, 1990), and relational or network embeddedness (Barber, 
1995; Hess & Coe, 2006; Zukin & Dimaggio, 1990). 
In their influential book on the social organisation of the economy, Zukin and 
DiMaggio (1990) identify four types of embeddedness: cognitive, cultural, political, and 
relational (network) embeddedness.  Each type of embeddedness explores a different 
dimension of society that shapes organisational decision, actions, and outcomes.  Cognitive 
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embeddedness refers to people’s shared representations and systems of meaning (Bakker et 
al., 2011), and the way the “structured regularities of mental processes limit the exercise of 
economic reasoning” (Zukin & Dimaggio, 1990, pp. 15–16). In social collectives, cognitive 
rules, patterns of reasoning and interpretation result from shared experiences, histories, and 
interaction, and also underpin collective learning processes in organisations (Kalantaridis & 
Bika, 2006; Malmberg & Maskell, 2002). Accepting that due to complexity, imperfect 
information, and other social factors economic actors experience bounded rationality, 
cognitive embeddedness can form a kind of rationality inside of a particular social collective 
(e.g. through accepted organisational procedures or community practices) which help 
organisations make decisions in uncertain or volatile environments (Zukin & Dimaggio, 
1990). For example, Zaheer and Nachum’s (2011) description of organisational sense of 
place is a form cognitive embedding. If an organisation’s members collectively identify with 
a location, then the organisation is better able to recognise and interpret location-specific 
resources and how to appropriate them. 
Cultural embeddedness refers to the imprint of shared heritage on actors in ways that 
influence their economic behaviour even if the actor leaves its ‘home’ territory (Hess & Coe, 
2006; Hess, 2004). Culture and social institutions provide the norms, rules, and frames of 
action and interaction that are often developed among people in a common geographic 
location (Dequech, 2003; Pallares-Barbera et al., 2004).  
Political embeddedness refers to “the manner in which economic institutions and 
decisions are shaped by a struggle for power that involves economic actors and nonmarket 
institutions” (Zukin & Dimaggio, 1990, p.20). This most commonly manifests itself in terms 
of the local, regional, or national policies that dictate organisational form or constrain 
behaviour, for example promoting certain economic forms (e.g. high-tech agglomerations) 
through development efforts or tax incentives. 
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Finally, structural embeddedness most closely follows Granovetter (1985) in referring 
to the entrenchment of economic exchange “in patterns of ongoing interpersonal 
relationships” (Zukin & Dimaggio, 1990, p.18). Structural embeddedness is commonly 
evaluated as the degree of closeness of organisational actors or the reported level of trust 
between actors in a network (Bakker et al., 2011; Uzzi, 1996).   
The cognitive frames, cultural and political institutions, and structural networks 
represent the different elements of society of which organisations are a part.  Organisations 
are differentially connected to these elements and as a result are shaped by embeddedness in 
different ways.  Much of the research exploring the effect of embeddedness on organisational 
behaviours and outcomes focuses on networks.  In the next sections I highlight some of 
insights provided by examinations of network embeddedness.   
Aspects of network theory in embeddedness 
Network embeddedness is arguably the most important form of embedding for 
organisations (Zukin & DiMaggio, 1990), and it can have both positive and negative 
implications.  As it has evolved in sociology and economic geography, the study of 
embeddedness has been strongly guided by the network paradigm.  Granovetter’s approach to 
embeddedness, for example, focused almost exclusively on the role of “concrete personal 
relations and structures (or ‘networks’) of such relations” in generating order in systems of 
exchange and shaping business behaviour (Granovetter, 1985, p.490).   
There are two aspects of network embeddedness.  The first is relational 
embeddedness, which is characterised by sets of dyadic ties (pairs of actors in the network).  
Relational embeddedness describes the nature of an organisation’s dyad relationships, 
accounting for the reciprocal, on-going, preferential and mutual exchanges that are neither 
price driven (i.e. markets) nor regulated by administrative sanctions (i.e. hierarchies) 
(Podolny & Page, 1998; Powell, 1990).  The second is structural embeddedness, which 
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encompasses the overall network structure in which an organisation is situated.  Structural 
embeddedness involves not only the organisation’s direct ties but its position in a larger 
network of ‘third parties’ (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994, p.1422).  This dual view of network 
embeddedness encompasses the nature of an organisation’s one-on-one relationships and the 
broader societal networks. 
In inter-organisational networks, strong relationally embedded ties are associated with 
increased knowledge transfer and cooperative behaviours (Gulati, 2007).  Moran (2005) 
found that even when controlling for variations in the structure of organisational networks 
(e.g. network size or density of connections), organisations with high relational 
embeddedness (i.e. a larger number of deep, high-trust relationships) produced better 
innovation outcomes, in part because these relationship types were conducive to ‘thicker’ 
information exchange (Moran, 2005).  Similarly, a high degree of relational embeddedness 
facilitated greater technical success for companies working in open source environments 
(Grewal, Lilien, & Mallapragada, 2006), influenced the formation of corporate alliances 
(Gulati, 1998, 1999, 2007), and increased the ability of small businesses to obtain lower 
interest rates from financial institutions with whom they have longer and more complex 
relationships (Uzzi & Gillespie, 1999).  Non-relationally embedded ties or ‘strategic’ network 
relations tend to be characterised by less open information and resource flows, and are often 
regulated through power relations, formal contracts, or arms-length market exchanges 
(Grabher, 2006). 
Studies of network structure focus, in large part, on how the structure of network 
connections influences the benefits that organisations obtain from their networks (Gulati, 
Lavie, & Madhavan, 2011; Gulati, 2007).  For example, structural holes – a lack of 
interaction between two individuals or groups in a network – offer opportunities for network 
actors to broker the flow of information between the groups and control the ways the groups 
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work together (Burt, 1992).  Similarly, network density – the proportion of group members 
who are tied to each other – can influence an organisation’s access to unique resources from 
their network (Borgatti, Jones, & Everett, 1998).  Organisations may face challenges as a 
result of high relational embeddedness (i.e. many strong ties and few weak ties).  They may 
experience isolation from external information and resources and expend energy supporting 
unhelpful network members (Pallares-Barbera et al., 2004; Uzzi, 1996). 
From a competitive perspective, the more structurally embedded an organisation is in 
a network, the more information actors know about that organisation, and the more 
constraints there are on that organisation’s behaviour (Burt, 1992; Pallares-Barbera et al., 
2004).  Theories of organisational resource dependence (Aldrich & Pfeffer, 1976) and 
network constraint (Burt, 1992) suggest that organisations which draw heavily upon the 
resources of external actors become increasingly dependent upon and influenced by these 
actors.  This ultimately limits the organisation’s strategic choices (Aldrich & Pfeffer, 1976; 
Burt, 1992; Knoben, 2008).  
Networks and resilience  
Considerations of organisational networks in the hazards and disaster literature tend to 
focus on the role of inter-organisational networks in post-disaster response and the early 
phases of recovery (Hutter, 2011; Raab & Kenis, 2009).  These studies, for the most part, 
analyse the way inter-organisational networks can be managed to enhance the abilities of 
organisations directly involved in disaster response.  They consider how organisational 
networks’ facilitate flexible communication systems (Comfort, Lin, & Hauskrecht, 2008; 
Zagorecki, Ko, & Comfort, 2010); effective emergency response coordination and integrated 
crisis management (Corbacioglu & Kapucu, 2006; Kapucu, Arslan, & Collins, 2010; Topper 
& Carley, 1999); the transmission of resources that allow organisations to perform response 
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actions such as mass evacuations (Waugh & Smith, 2006; Zakour, 2008); and collaboration 
and task coordination during disaster response (Nolte & Boenigk, 2012).  
Only a small handful of studies offer empirical insights about how networks facilitate 
or speed the recovery of the organisations themselves (e.g. Bowden, 2011; Chewning, 2009; 
Graham, 2007).  Yet these studies indicate that there is great potential for improving our 
understanding of organisational recovery and resilience by closely examining an 
organisation’s post-disaster extra-organisational networks, and especially its relationally 
embedded ties.  An excellent example is Doerfel et al.’s (2010) examination of the role of 
inter-organisational communication and social capital on organisational recovery following 
Hurricane Katrina.  Doerfel et al.(2010) interviewed representatives from 56 organisations in 
New Orleans over a period of several years and found that the disaster created an “open-
resource environment in which organisations tend to collaborate with each other in order to 
obtain resources” (Doerfel, et al., 2010, p.128).  They also found that organisation leaders 
(e.g. managers and owners) progress through different phases of post-disaster communication 
in which they communicate with different segments of their extra-organisational networks to 
address different needs as they emerge (Doerfel et al., 2010).   
Social capital  
Social capital is accumulated in networks characterised by repeated interaction.  
Social capital refers to the basic sociological principle that interpersonal engagement and 
involvement in groups can have positive consequences for individuals, organisations, and 
communities. I approach social capital as an important part of the much broader concept of 
structural and relational embeddedness.  
Bourdieu (1986) offered the earliest systematic description of social capital (Table 5), 
focusing on the way benefits accrue to individuals through interaction, and how the quantity 
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and quality of resources available to an individual differed based on their acquaintances.
7
  
Like Bourdieu, Coleman (1988, 1990) an early and influential social capital theorist, defined 
the concept based on its form and function (Table 5).  Coleman (1988) was influenced by 
Granovetter’s (1985) work on embeddedness, extrapolating it to include all social action 
rather than focusing on economic action.  Coleman (1988) describes both ‘public’ and 
‘private’ good forms of social capital.   
Table 5: Definitions of social capital 
Author Definition of Social Capital 
Bourdieu (1986) 
The aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a 
durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and 
recognition – or in other words, to membership in a group. 
Coleman (1990) 
A variety of different entities having two characteristics in common: They all consist of 
some aspect of social structure, and they facilitate certain actions of individuals who are 
within the structure. 
Baker (1990) 
A resource that actors derive from specific social structures and then use to pursue their 
interests; it is created by changes in the relations among actors. 
Putnam (1993) 
Features of social organisations, such as networks, norms, and trust that facilitate action and 
cooperation for mutual benefit.  
Nahapiet & 
Ghoshal (1998)  
The sum of the actual and potential resources embedded within available through, and 
derived from the network of relationships possessed by an individual or social unit.  Social 
capital thus comprises both the network and the assets that may be mobilized through that 
network. 
Burt (2000) 
The social capital metaphor is that the people who do better are somehow better connected.  
Certain people or certain groups are connected to certain others, trusting certain others, 
obligated to support certain others, dependent on exchange with certain others.  Holding a 
certain position in the structure of these exchanges can be an asset in its own right.  That 
asset is social capital, in essence, a concept of location effects in differentiated markets.  
Lin (2005) 
Social capital is defined as resources embedded in one’s social networks, resources that can 
be accessed or mobilized through ties in the networks.  
The first form refers to the internalised norms that reinforce socially beneficial 
behaviour, for example obeying traffic rules or discouraging crime, that are then appropriable 
                                                 
7
 Bourdieu (1986) argued that the accumulation of social capital was a means of perpetuating and exacerbating 
social stratification, because elite members of society had access to farther reaching and better positioned social 
networks and therefore a greater quantity and quality of social resources.  
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as a generalised benefit to anyone operating in that social system.  The second refers to the 
results of direct engagement with a network of actors which transfer instrumental resources to 
individuals (e.g. access to privileged information).  
Robert Putnam, a prominent advocate of the social capital approach, characterises 
social capital as a property of communities and nations, and examined social capital created 
through active citizenship (Putnam, 1993, 1994, 2000).  Bourdieu, Coleman, and Putnam in 
different ways examine social capital in the context of a critical theory of society. 
Ronald Burt and Nan Lin, whose basic definitions of social capital are also included 
in Table 5, are proponents of the network based “utilitarian approach” to social capital (Adam 
& Roncevic, 2003, p.158).  Network approaches focus on an actor’s ability to access benefits 
as a function of their position within a network (Lin, 1999, 2001).  Lin (2001) argued that 
integrating social capital research under the common conceptualisation of network theory 
would help maintain social capital as a rigorous scientific concept.  Some, however, argue 
that the network approach focuses exclusively on elements that are easy to operationalise and 
measure, and therefore ignores the important notion of social capital as a collective good 
reinforced through structural norms, trust, and sanctions (Adam & Roncevic, 2003; Coleman, 
1990).  Thus, as I discuss social capital in this thesis, I refer to both the broader notion of 
structural cohesion that produces collective ‘good-will’ (Adler & Kwon, 2009, p.17), and the 
instrumental benefits garnered by individuals through their engagement with a relational 
network.   
Organisations can also accumulate and use social capital.  Baker (1990), Woolcock 
(1998), and Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) conducted some of the earliest work linking social 
capital to organisational advantage.  Their work guided conversations about organisational 
advantage away from a consideration of the particular capabilities of the organisation and 
towards a focus on organisational advantage accrued through relational structures.  These 
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studies found that the differences between firms, including their productive performance, 
often represented differences in the firm’s ability to create and exploit social capital. 
 Social capital within organisations is associated with improved product innovation 
(Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998), increased knowledge sharing (Chow & Chan, 2008), reduced staff 
turnover rates (Krackhardt & Hanson, 1993), and smoothed intra-organisational resource 
exchange (Gabbay & Zuckerman, 1998). Research has also demonstrated how social capital 
between organisations and extra-organisational ties has reduced interest rates between 
corporate borrowers and banks (Uzzi & Gillespie, 1999), strengthened relationships with 
suppliers (Baker, 1990; Uzzi, 1997), eased the acquisition of strategic resources (De Wever et 
al., 2005), shaped patterns of collective innovation (Ahuja, 2000), and helped firms acquire 
new skills and knowledge (Inkpen & Tsang, 2005; Podolny & Page, 1998; Powell & Smith-
Doerr, 1994).  
Social capital has received an increasing amount of attention from researchers, 
practitioners, and policy makers interested in resilience to hazards and disasters. Those 
seeking to understand differential post-disaster outcomes increasingly account for social 
capital in individual psychological (Bonanno, Galea, Bucciarelli, & Vlahov, 2007; Norris et 
al., 2009) and community (Airriess, Li, Leong, Chen, & Keith, 2008; Chamlee-Wright & 
Storr, 2011; Dynes, 2006) resilience, response, and recovery. Aldrich (2010, 2012a, 2012b) 
for example, found that social capital was the best predictor of population recovery in disaster 
damaged neighbourhoods in New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina, Kobe following the 
1995 earthquake, and Tokyo after the 1923 earthquake.  In these studies Aldrich found that 
collectively held trust and resources mobilised through social networks drove place-based 
resilience, in terms of the speed at which the place was repopulated and reconstructed.  
Similarly, community resilience indices developed by Norris et al. (2008a) (later 
expanded by Sherrieb et al.(2010) and Cutter et al.(2010)) include proxies for assessing 
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place-based social capital.  While these indices tend to rely on relatively rough measures of 
community social capital, such as the number of civic and social advocacy organisations per 
10,000 people (intended to measure social engagement or place attachment) and net 
migration in the community (to measure community bonds), they do facilitate analyses of the 
spatial variation of social engagement and community resilience.   
To a lesser extent social capital has been linked to organisations’ post-disaster 
experiences.  For example, Zakour (2008) found that social service organisations that had 
diverse inter-organisational networks and strong ties with their client-base (defined as social 
capital) were better able to provide disaster evacuation services for their organisation and 
clients.   
Although networks, particularly formal supply networks and strategic networks are 
often considered in systems perspectives of organisational resilience; the exploration of the 
relationship between social capital and organisational resilience is still in its nascent stages. 
Recent work by Noel Johnson and colleagues (i.e. Johnson, Elliott, & Drake, 2013; Johnson 
& Elliott, 2011; Johnson, 2010) uses case studies of organisations in the United Kingdom to 
explore intra- and inter-organisational social capital for organisations, public-private 
partnerships, and organisational supply chains.  The authors use Nahapiet and Ghoshal’s 
(1998) three dimensions of social capital to examine the structural, relational, and cognitive 
dimensions of organisational interaction.  Their research shows, among other things, that 
elements of social capital, including the easy transfer of tacit information and the translation 
of codified lessons into practice, can supplement (generally insufficient) business continuity 
management processes.  Although these studies do not include a systematic analysis of 
organisations’ network structures or relational attributes, they do provide a useful theoretical 
precedent for more systematic analyses.  
49 
 
 
 
Lengnick-Hall and Beck (2005) offer another conceptualisation of social capital in 
their theoretical model of organisational resilience.  They argue that some organisations are in 
a better position or have more capacity to access network resources than others.   They 
propose a form of contextual resilience which refers to socially embedded relationships that 
create social capital in a network, and the broader structure of weak connections that give 
organisations access to a range of tangible and intangible resources. In their model “deep 
social capital evolves from repeated, personal interactions between people and between 
organizations and is most effective when based on trust” and “broad resource networks 
encompass both tangible and intangible resources” (p.752). 
In this model organisations gain network advantages if they make highly visible 
contributions, occupy crucial economic positions, or are seen as essential factors of 
production (Lengnick-Hall and Beck, 2005).  As a result these organisations in privileged 
social positions are able to obtain resources, concessions, and assistance that other 
organisations are denied. 
Social capital is an important aspect of organisational network relations, but it should 
not be treated as the only or even most important role of organisational networks.  
Organisational networks can be conduits for impacts, vulnerability (Sheffi & Rice, 2005), 
formal or market exchanges, in addition to social capital.  Relying too much on close network 
connections in business interactions was shown to increase the failure rate of business (Uzzi, 
1996).  Similarly, an exclusive focus on social capital creation through embedded networks 
can divert analysis from larger structural concerns that provide explanatory nuance in hazards 
and disaster research (Pelling & High, 2005).   
2.3.2 Geographic embeddedness 
An organisation’s embeddedness in society can cause it to become tied to specific 
places.  Geographic embeddedness refers to an organisation’s place rootedness.  There are 
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many ways to understand embeddedness, and Hess (2004) offers a useful heuristic for 
engaging with the concept from a geographical perspective.  The author specifies three major 
divisions of analysis that emerged from different disciplines: societal, network, and territorial. 
Figure 3 (from Hess, 2004, p.178) shows each of these dimensions as overlapping but 
not completely contained within each other.  For example, local policies such as tax 
advantages (e.g. societal dimension) and strong relationships with local labour markets (e.g. 
network dimensions) can increase territorial embeddedness.  Similarly, an organisation’s 
territorial embeddedness may encourage the development of further local networks (Hess, 
2004).  
Figure 3: Fundamental categories of embeddedness  
 
Source: Hess (2004) 
Organisations may be embedded across different geographic scales.  For example, 
they may participate in knowledge sharing with other organisations in a local agglomeration 
(Knoben & Oerlemans, 2008), develop systems to suit a new host country’s regulatory 
environment (Coe et al., 2012), and participate in transnational production networks 
(Henderson, Dicken, Hess, Coe, & Yeung, 2002; Hess, 2004).  The scale of analysis in 
studies of embeddedness is often dictated by the researcher’s interest in particular outcomes.  
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This thesis, for example, focuses on the embeddedness of organisations at the local (town) 
scale.  
In addition to being a multidimensional and cross-scalar process, embeddedness 
changes over time as organisations and places change (Brouwer, Mariotti, & van Ommeren, 
2004; Brouwer, 2004).  Geographic proximity tends to facilitate relationship formation, and 
the longer an organisation is in place the more ties it tends to form with other local 
organisations and institutions (Brouwer, 2004).  This may mean that organisations develop a 
competitive advantage as they cultivate local knowledge sharing networks or loyalty from 
local customers, and learn to navigate the local regulatory and social environments.  But 
organisations may also experience a form of spatial ‘lock-in,’ where they become 
increasingly dependent on local resources, relationships, or other attributes in ways that 
constrain their adaptation or movement.  Conversely, as organisations age and grow they may 
expand, develop ties with customers, suppliers, and like-organisations elsewhere, and become 
less anchored in a particular local area (Young, 2010).  
The institutions, infrastructure, and relationships that form an organisation’s local 
environment is generally “characterised by inertia and durability” (Martin, 2000, p.80), but it 
does shift over time.  An organisation’s embeddedness changes and the contexts in which it is 
embedded change requiring adaptation to avoid locking-in to local contexts that are no longer 
conducive to organisational success. 
Geographic embeddedness in practice 
Analyses of, what I broadly refer to as geographic embeddedness, offer useful insights 
into the way organisations differentially connect to places, the way networks of relations 
manifest in space, and the implications of these connections.  Research on the implications of 
organisation’s geographic embeddedness during business-as-usual, may inform how we 
approach embeddedness following disasters. In economic geography, considerations of 
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embeddedness have often focused on the strategic embedding of transnational corporations 
(TNCs) in their operational territories (Coe et al., 2012; Dicken & Thrift, 1992; Yeung, 
1998), as seen in Table 6.  For example, Coe et al.’s (2012) study of the embeddedness of 
foreign temporary staffing firms in their Japanese host-market shows that in order to operate 
in these environments organisations need to achieve legitimacy in a range of social, cultural, 
and institutional domains (Coe et al., 2012).  Other studies have shown that organisations are 
more likely to succeed in different contexts if they are familiar with the local labour market 
practices and attitudes (Amin & Thrift, 1994), are mindful of local social norms in the way 
they operate (Agnes, 2000), and are able to utilise local routines and traditions to enable 
interactive learning and innovation with the organisation (Li, Bathelt, & Wang, 2011).  
These studies also show how organisational networks are influenced by spatial 
proximity.  Even though organisations are increasingly able to form virtual networks among 
others with whom they share a number of organisational characteristics (Copus, Dubois, & 
Hedström, 2011; Knoben & Oerlemans, 2012), being in the same place as network members 
continues to have a major influence on tie formation and exchange content (Knoben & 
Oerlemans, 2012; Knoben, 2008; Oerlemans, Meeus, & Boekema, 2001).  For example, 
Dicken and Malmberg (2001) found that innovation and production flows through networks 
are typically stronger if network relations are local.  The authors also argue that local 
relations facilitate more face-to-face contact, build more trustful relations, and encourage the 
exchange of non-codified and tacit information (Dicken & Malmberg, 2001).
8
  
Geographic embeddedness perspectives are not limited to cultivating organisational 
advantage (though most examples in Table 6 focus on the potential benefits in this respect).  
Organisations operate within social and cultural systems that influence non-rational, informal, 
and moral bases of conduct and cooperation (Baum & Rowley, 2002).  For example, Pallares-
                                                 
8
 Tacit information refers to “disembodied know-how that can only be diffused in personal interaction and face-
to-face contacts” (Hauser et al., 2007, p.76 in Powell, (2008)).    
53 
 
 
 
Barbera et al. (2004) examined the effects of what they termed ‘spatial loyalty’ on territorial 
embeddedness.  The authors found that the usual motivations for economic agglomeration 
and geographic clustering, such as favourable regional policies and intra-industry 
collaboration, were less important than the effect of “territorially embedded links to social 
and cultural events and local institutions” in driving organisational retention and growth 
(Pallares-Barbera et al., 2004, p.636).  
High levels of geographic embeddedness can also have negative consequences for 
organisations.  Additionally, Hess (2004) discussed the anchoring in place that can limit 
organisations’ adaptive options.  Organisations that are closely tied to a place or a particular 
social network (both proximate and dispersed) may be more vulnerable to path dependent 
lock-in (Dicken & Thrift, 1992).   
Lock-in means that previous decisions or actions determine the following decisions 
and actions, and such that organisations may become trapped in potentially negative cycles 
that decrease their real or perceived adaptive capacity (Hassink, 2010).  Lock-in or high 
levels of spatial inertia potentially tie organisations to places that are no longer optimal for 
their health.  An organisation with a large number of local partners in its network or a large 
proportion of its strong ties within a particular location may experience greater spatial inertia 
if its knowledge and resource availability are likely to be compromised by relocation 
(Knoben, 2008). 
Some organisations are deeply embedded through economic and social ties in a place, 
while others have a greater capacity to operate in multiple places but have limited access to 
local economic and social capital in specific locations (Dicken & Malmberg, 2001).  The 
nature and degree of an organisation’s local embeddedness has potentially significant 
influence on organisational decisions, capacities, and outcomes.   
  
54 
 
Table 6: Geographic embeddedness in the literature 
Citation Definition Influence on organisation 
Dicken & 
Thrift (1992) 
“The interaction between the specific 
cognitive, cultural, social, political and 
economic characteristics of a firm’s ‘home 
territory’ [...], those of its geographically 
dispersed operations and the competitive and 
technological pressures which impinge upon 
it” (p.287). 
Corporations are able to, “mobilize cognitive, 
cultural, social and political resources in a 
search for security as well as profit […]  
These resources enable them to ‘bend’ their 
environments in numerous ways to their 
product and competitive advantage” (p.283). 
Pallares-
Barbera et 
al.(2004) 
Organisational links to social and cultural 
events and local institutions. 
Leads to ‘spatial loyalties,’ influences 
relocation decision, and drives local activity 
and growth 
Coe et 
al.(2012) 
Transnational corporations’ (TNCs) 
knowledge of host market business networks 
and external business environment that shape 
institutional experience.  Includes 
considerations such as awareness of laws, 
regulations, how to achieve local 
‘organisational legitimacy,’ labour market 
cultures etc. 
Affects TNC’s success in a host market. 
Hess (2004) 
The extent to which actors are ‘anchored’ in 
particular territories or places (p.178).  
Includes localised manifestations of broader 
networks. 
Affects the relocation behaviours of the 
organisation.  
The organisation absorbs and can be 
‘constrained by’ the economic activities and 
social dynamics in their territory or place. 
Knoben & 
Oerlemans 
(2008) 
A firm’s ties within a region’s collective pool 
of knowledge, institutional structures, and 
social conventions. 
The number and strength of a firm’s localised 
innovative inter-organisational relationships 
Higher levels of relational embeddedness and 
a greater number of direct innovative inter-
organisational relationships in a place can 
make an organisation less likely to relocate 
(i.e. ‘spatial lock-in effect’). 
Yeung (1998) 
Organisations are reproduced through 
ongoing networks of social relations 
embedded in both society and space, i.e. the 
socio-spatial nexus. 
Enables access to markets, and can influence 
organisation’s strategic advantage in contexts 
where they are embedded in well-positioned 
networks. 
Copus et 
al.(2011) 
Number, strength, and frequency of firm’s 
relationships within a local area –region – 
(within and across sectors).  Specifically 
focusing on non-market relations. 
Can guide place-based economic 
development to reflect a balanced awareness 
of the importance of both “local ‘embedding’ 
and global engagement.” 
Improved communication and transportation 
technology influence transaction and non-
market interaction. 
Embeddedness and post-disaster trajectories  
Disasters disrupt geographic and relational space, making recovery a process of 
disorientation and reorientation. Individual and collective identities, relational networks, and 
relationships with place often need to be reconstructed along with buildings and 
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infrastructure. Place plays an essential role in shaping the discourse and practice of disaster 
recovery and resilience (Cox & Perry, 2011).   
From a social-ecological systems perspective, each scale of analysis in the resilience 
definitions in Table 2 is part of embedded systems which produce vulnerability and 
resilience.  Organisations, for example, are integral components of a community’s capacity to 
function, and this is explicitly recognised in several of the community resilience or resilience 
of place models and metrics that have evolved within the last decade (e.g. Zhou, Wang, Wan, 
& Jia (2009), Norris et al.’s (2008), and Mayunga (2007)).  These place-based models of 
resilience tend to characterise organisations as embedded components of a community.  
Organisations, in these models, are instrumental to the creation of resilience in the places they 
operate.  
For example, Cutter et al.’s (2008) Disaster Resilience of Place (DROP) (Figure 4) 
model examines the linkages between place-based vulnerability and the social factors that 
contribute to the resilience within a specific geographic domain (Cutter, et al., 2008).  In this 
model resilience is an inherent property emerging from the antecedent conditions produced 
by the interaction of the social, built, and natural systems, and an adaptive property 
developed through improvisation and social learning.   
Cutter et al. (2010) operationalised the DROP model as a place-based resilience 
index, allowing for comparisons of the resilience of various geographic units (e.g. census 
blocks, counties, states).  The five subcomponents that compose this index are: social 
resilience, economic resilience, institutional resilience, infrastructure resilience, and 
community capital. 
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Figure 4: Schematic representation of the disaster resilience of place (DROP) model 
 
Source: Cutter et al. (2008, p.208) 
Organisations are implicitly and explicitly considered in several components of 
economic, institutional, community, and infrastructure resilience.  For example, an indicator 
of institutional resilience is municipal services.  Infrastructure resilience relies, in part, on the 
medical system, and economic capacity on businesses.  These components rely on 
organisations that are able to resist the negative impacts of a disaster and continue 
functioning (optimally stepping-up their functionality) to facilitate rapid community response 
and recovery.  
Bruneau et al.(2003) and Tierney and Bruneau (2007) distinguish organisational 
resilience as its own domain of resilience, among their four domains: technical, 
organisational, social, and economic.  The organisational domain refers to the capacity of 
organisations to reduce community vulnerability and impacts, while economic refers to the 
capacity of economies generally and business firms specifically, to limit and absorb 
economic losses as a result of a disaster.  
These approaches, depict organisations as part of the wider social system, and are 
supported by empirical research in disaster-affected communities that demonstrate how 
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organisations contribute to community resilience.  Studies such as, Airriess et al.(2008), 
Chamlee-Wright and Storr (2011), and Cox and Perry (2011) found that organisations play a 
fundamental role in facilitating social network development and enhancing the sense of place 
that is considered central to rebuilding communities.  Organisations in these and other works 
are considered explicitly as providers of goods, services, spaces of interaction, and jobs, as 
post-disaster responders and drivers of recovery, and implicitly as part of healthy and 
functioning social systems and economies.  
The literature specifically addressing organisational resilience often acknowledges 
that “having more resilient organisations is a key component of achieving more resilient 
communities because it is organisations that deliver essential services and provide 
employment for a large proportion of the community” (Dalziell & McManus, 2004).  There 
is, however, limited consideration of how social, community, and place-based resilience 
influence organisations’ adaptive capacities.  
Extrapolating from studies conducted during business as usual, we begin to see the 
implications of embeddedness for organisational resilience and post-crisis adaptive resilience.  
For example, embedded relationships produce higher quality information exchange and help 
firms manage uncertainty (Uzzi, 1996).  This also reduces the need for formal contracts and 
governance mechanisms, thereby increasing the flexibility and adaptability of the 
organisation (Uzzi & Gillespie, 1999).  Resource allocation, high quality information, and 
adaptability are all implicated in models of organisational resilience.  
By considering the way interaction and social structures influence the development of 
organisational resilience, embeddedness perspectives can lead to more participatory and 
inclusive disaster recovery and infrastructure planning (Iversen & Armstrong, 2008).  Iversen 
and Armstrong (2008) claim that researchers examining Hurricane Katrina recovery from a 
systems perspective, social vulnerability approach, or a mix of the two were implicitly 
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moving toward embeddedness approaches, by emphasising the social production of the 
disaster, the historic path-dependence, and social structures.  I extend this logic, to argue that 
studies of organisational post-disaster trajectories and resilience can be improved by applying 
an embeddedness framework. 
 
2.4 Conclusion  
At the start of this chapter I presented four propositions that I have attempted to 
justify through critical analyses of the resilience and embeddedness literature.  To conclude I 
will review these propositions in the context of that analysis.  The first proposition referred to 
the under-socialised and under-spatialised nature of current approaches to organisational 
resilience.  
Proposition 1: Current approaches to organisational resilience do not adequately 
consider an organisation’s interactions with its context and networks. 
As discussed in the chapter, organisations have neither sharply defined boundaries nor are 
they boundary-less.  They are constantly interacting with the contexts and networks in which 
they are embedded directly and indirectly through porous organisational boundaries.  Yet, 
current approaches to organisational resilience (a) conceptualise the organisation as only 
vaguely connected to an environment and (b) employ a very limited conception of that 
environment treating it either as a source of inputs and outputs or as a source of change and 
disruption. 
Organisations (firms) and territories are mutually constitutive.  They are inherently 
spatial and territorial (Dicken & Malmberg, 2001) in that they respond to geographic distance 
and variations in resources and business opportunities. They are shaped by relations with 
territorial entities, and through interaction they derive some of their characteristics from and 
deliver some of their characteristics to specific territories and places (Dicken & Malmberg, 
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2001, p.355).  Organisations “internalize social space, and they do so 
differently…Organizations, therefore, do not simply produce geographies; they are, rather, 
infused with them” (Del Casino et al., 2000, p.524).  Organisations cannot be adequately 
understood separately from specific geographic contexts and the social processes that create 
those contexts.  
Organisations become embedded in networks of relations that anchor them in places 
and connect them to resources and information far beyond their local areas.  There is an 
extensive and growing body of literature linking organisational networks and social capital to 
organisational advantage and adaptation.  Advancing our understanding of how networks and 
social capital contribute to organisations’ capacity to anticipate negative changes, adapt, and 
capture opportunities in dynamic social environments has great potential for enhancing 
approaches to organisational resilience.  
Second, work on community resilience provides an approach that considers the co-
production of resilience through interaction.  
Proposition 2: The field of community resilience offers useful conceptual 
resources for developing more contextual approaches to organisational resilience.  
The literature on community resilience characterises organisations as important 
providers of goods, services, and spaces of interaction and social capital creation.  
Community resilience, in part, depends on organisations that are able to resist the negative 
impacts of a crisis and respond and recover quickly in the aftermath.  In the organisational 
literature, however, resilience tends to been seen as cultivated internally and all of these 
interactions are either reduced to discrete exchanges with external networks, considered as 
potential sources of instability, or not considered at all. 
As indicated in the third proposition, contextualised approaches to organisational 
resilience can explain more of the variability in post-disaster outcomes, by considering the 
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ways embeddedness shapes organisational capacities.  Embeddedness perspectives take into 
account organisational place-rootedness and their spatial connectedness, and explore the 
social and institutional processes that restrict or enable organisations’ adaptive options.   
Proposition 3: Developing a contextualised understanding of organisational 
resilience can improve our ability to explain organisational outcomes post-
disaster. 
Embeddedness perspectives more closely align with theoretical developments in modelling 
place-based community vulnerability and resilience (e.g. Cutter, Boruff, & Shirley (2003); 
Cutter et al.(2008); Norris et al.(2008); and Burton (2012)) and ecological models of 
individual and household resilience (e.g. Norris (2008b; 2009)).  These models were 
developed from epistemologies that view disasters as socially constructed and consider the 
role of historic processes and social structures in households’ and communities’ capacity to 
respond and recover.  
Considering organisations’ relationships to their social and geographic contexts in a 
dynamic post-disaster environment can foster a deeper understanding of the interconnected, 
extra-organisational components of resilience (Proposition 4), and help us draw closer links 
between community resilience and organisational resilience.  The desire to manage resilience 
and develop positive interventions has driven much of the current research that seeks to 
measure and model organisational resilience.  The final proposition indicated that approaches 
to organisational resilience that incorporate elements of embeddedness have practical 
implications.  
Proposition 4: A contextual approach to organisations can also provide practical 
guidance for researchers and practitioners aiming to measure and build resilience 
in organisations. 
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Embeddedness approaches can supplement current approaches that focus on the endogenous 
properties of the organisation in three ways.  First, by examining network embeddedness, 
organisations can develop a better understanding of how trust based and reciprocal exchanges 
facilitate access to generalised support and create resilient relationships that can survive and 
adapt in dynamic environments.  Second, organisations that are geographically embedded are 
better equipped to interpret and navigate their local environment.  If we do not consider 
organisational ‘environments’ as places it is impossible to guide organisations toward 
approaches that allow them to cultivate the positive elements of geographic embeddedness.  
Finally, by integrating organisational and community resilience approaches we can better 
understand how extra-organisational actors (e.g. community members, governments, business 
associations) can work to co-produce resilience with organisations.   
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Chapter Three: Research Design  
 
3.1 Introduction  
In this research, I evaluated how context influenced organisational trajectories 
following the Canterbury earthquakes.  I approached organisational context from two 
perspectives.  First, I considered the way organisations became differentially rooted in places, 
and how their forms of ‘geographic embeddedness’ shaped organisational responses in the 
post-disaster context.  The second approach examined how organisations accessed resources 
from their support networks to aid recovery, including the ways networks adapted and were 
managed in the aftermath of the earthquakes. 
This chapter explains my philosophical and methodological approaches to the 
research.  I begin by explaining how I arrived at the research topic, and discuss how my 
ontology (understanding of what exists in the world) and epistemology (how we know about 
the world) shape my methodology and guide this investigation.  I then outline the various 
data collection methods I employed throughout the research, including surveys, semi-
structured interviews, field observations, and participant aided sociograms (PAS).  Finally, I 
discuss the way I analysed the various data sources and note how I synthesized the data to 
facilitate comparative cross-case analysis.  
 
3.2 Ontological & Epistemological Approach 
An important factor that contributed to the shape of this research is my lived experience 
of the events about which I am writing.  I moved to Canterbury two months before the initial 
September 2010 earthquake, and have remained a Canterbury resident throughout the 
earthquake series.  I, therefore, conducted my research not as a distant observer but as an 
inhabitant of the contexts I was investigating.  Prior to beginning this study, I had explored 
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the processes that shape exposure, vulnerability, and resilience in other contexts, 
investigating volunteer emergency response teams in the U.S. Midwest (Flint & Stevenson, 
2010), flooding and associated damage to the built environment in the United Kingdom, and 
residential recovery disparities after Hurricane Katrina devastated the U.S. Gulf Coast in 
2005 (Stevenson, Emrich, Mitchell, & Cutter, 2010; Stevenson, 2010).  
Being on the ground during the response and recovery following the Canterbury, 
however, allowed me to experience the emotional, sensory, and physical process of the 
disaster, response, and recovery in a way that I had not previously.  These experiences made 
me conscious of the way we create knowledge about lived realities through research.  Our 
attitudes and assumptions about what knowledge is and our ability to access it shape the way 
that we structure questions about hazards, disasters, and related social processes.  These 
attitudes and assumptions influence the methods researchers choose, how we interpret the 
data we collect, and how we seek to apply (or not) these interpretations (Stefanovic, 2003).  
Observing the way communities, government responses, and the physical environment were 
influencing organisations’ post-earthquake experiences shaped my formation of an integrated 
epistemology and methodology that embraced this complexity. 
I have taken a critical realist approach to my research.  Critical realists propose that it 
is possible to gain knowledge about phenomena through observation and empirical research, 
but that there is an important distinction between the real world and the accounts of it that are 
available or constructed through research (Ackroyd, 2010; Bhaskar, 1976).  From this 
perspective, all accounts created through research are both partial and shaped by the 
interaction between the “knower and the known” (e.g. in this case, the researcher and the 
apparent reality of an organisation) (Peters, Pressey, Vanharanta, & Johnston, 2013, p.338).  
Critical realist perspectives in disaster research are informed by constructionist 
ontologies.  Constructionists argue that disasters and their impact are socially constructed and 
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are the product of the broader forces that shape society (Tierney, 2007).  There is a two-way 
interaction between human entities and the biophysical environment, as well as a process of 
cultural and political framing that contributes to disasters, vulnerability, and resilience.  
Researchers working from constructionist perspectives have, for example, examined the role 
inequality and power play in the development of vulnerability and risk (e.g. Klinenberg, 
2002; Oliver-Smith, 1996; Pelling & Uitto, 2001; Wisner, 2003). 
From this perspective causal relationships cannot be reduced to empirical 
observations of cause and effect. Critical realists instead locate causal relationships at the 
level of ‘generative mechanisms’ which are produced through the interactions between 
human agency, social structure (e.g. the roles and routines enacted within and between 
people, households, organisations, communities, and the state), and the environment (Given, 
2008; McLaughlin & Dietz, 2008). 
Critical realist approaches embrace complexity (instead of trying to reduce systems to 
their component parts), but also “desire to render complexity intelligible” through research, 
“strong conceptualization,” and “rigorous description” (Given, 2008, p.169).  Research in the 
critical realist approach should, therefore, be an iterative process that explores the 
relationships between outcomes and causal mechanisms in the social contexts in which they 
occur (Ackroyd, 2010).  
Although critical realism is not associated with any particular methodology, case 
studies are a valued approach to knowledge generation in this tradition (Ackroyd, 2010; 
Elger, 2010).  Case studies allow the researcher to progressively clarify the relationships 
between events, causal mechanisms, and the contexts or structures that produce the causal 
mechanisms (Yin, 2009).  Case studies tend to deploy mixed methods of data collection and 
analysis (Yin, 2009), facilitating iterative and multi-layered explorations of a subject 
(Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004).  Further, the critical engagement encouraged by case study 
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methods allows researchers to consider voids, absences (e.g. what kinds of support were not 
received), and non-linear relations that are not directly observable but may still have 
important implications for the phenomena being researched (Elger, 2010; Stefanovic, 2003).  
In this study, I conducted 32 case-studies of organisations affected by the Canterbury 
earthquakes.  Case studies allow the researcher to examine the relationship between causal 
mechanisms, outcomes, and the different contexts that enable various mechanisms to exist 
(Ackroyd, 2010).  By exploring organisational case studies in the post-earthquake Canterbury 
environment, I set out to generate knowledge that could add nuance, critical reflection, and 
in-depth insights about the contexts and causal mechanisms shaping events and outcomes for 
organisations in a post-disaster environment.  
 
 3.3 Research Questions 
The questions that guided this research address several issues identified in the previous 
chapter.  As noted earlier, current approaches to organisational resilience do not adequately 
consider organisational interactions with context and networks (proposition 1).  The research 
questions use an embeddedness lens to improve our current under-spatialised and under-
socialised approaches to organisational resilience.  
The research questions consider organisational embeddedness from two perspectives.  
The first question addresses an organisation’s geographic embeddedness.  
RQ1: How does an organisation’s embeddedness in its local context influence its 
post-disaster trajectory?  
The next questions address organisational relational embeddedness within the context of 
post-disaster support.  
RQ2: What is the nature of an organisation’s post-disaster support network?  
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RQ3: What is the relationship, if any, between the organisations’ post-disaster 
trajectories and the nature of these support networks? 
The second and third questions are informed by House’s (1981) fundamental question 
about the nature of social support networks: “Who gives what to whom regarding which 
problems?” (p.22).  Exploring the nature of organisational social support networks may help 
explain the variable post-disaster outcomes of organisations with more or less resources and 
information (Hurlbert, Haines, & Beggs, 2000; Renzulli, Aldrich, & Carolina, 2005).   
Each of the research questions is concerned with the causal mechanisms that 
contribute to the organisations’ post-disaster experiences.  Rather than focusing on the way 
the earthquakes impacted the organisations, or on cause and effect relationships between 
organisational characteristics and organisational outcomes, I seek to consider the 
relationships between organisational agency, the structures in which they were embedded, 
and organisational processes and outcomes in a post-disaster context.   
The remainder of the chapter discusses the methods I employed to explore the three 
research questions.  I begin with a brief introduction to my study area and case study 
selection process.  This is followed by descriptions of how I collected and analysed the data. 
 
3.4 Study Context & Sample Selection  
In 2010 and 2011 there were five significant earthquakes in Canterbury, New 
Zealand.  Two of these earthquakes in particular, the September 2010 and February 2011 
events, caused extensive damage and disruption across the region.  Immediately following the 
September 2010 event I became involved in a longitudinal study of organisations affected by 
the earthquakes. This study was run through the Resilient Organisations research programme.   
This aims of the research were to catalogue the earthquakes’ impact on organisations and the 
organisational resources, mitigation techniques, and adaptive behaviours that enabled their 
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recovery.  After the second major earthquake in February 2011, researchers from the 
Resilient Organisations research programme followed up with organisations that had 
completed the first survey, distributing another survey to this group in May 2011.
9
   
The organisations in the Resilient Organisations study were selected using a stratified 
sampling technique. They selected two broad survey samples. The first organisational sample 
was selected from six industry sectors and the second sample of organisations were selected 
based on their geographic location.  The industry sectors were: building suppliers, critical 
infrastructure, fast moving consumer goods, hospitality, information and communication 
technology (ICT), and trucking organisations (for more on these sectors and the industry 
sampling methodology see Kachali (2013) and Whitman (2014)).   
The location-based survey sample was intended to enable comparisons between 
organisations in urban and rural settings and to examine neighbourhood effects on 
organisations in commercial districts.  Organisations in the rural location-based sample group 
were chosen based on their location relative to the Greendale fault (which ruptured during the 
September 2010 earthquake).  The urban sample consisted of organisations located in one of 
three business centres: the Christchurch central business district (CBD), the Kaiapoi town 
centre, or the Lyttelton town centre.   
The earthquakes and associated aftershocks affected an estimated 64 commercial 
centres across the Canterbury region, as well as many organisations outside of business 
districts, and in rural areas (CCC, 2012).  The three centres examined in this study were 
selected because they experienced some of the highest concentrations of commercial building 
damage.  The Christchurch CBD experienced severe damage as a result of both the 
September 2010 and February 2011 earthquakes. Kaiapoi, a town approximately 12 miles 
north of Christchurch, was heavily damaged in the September earthquake.  Kaiapoi was 
                                                 
9
 Social science research related to the earthquakes prior to May 2011 was banned by New Zealand’s Natural 
Hazards Research Platform, which is a multi-party research platform and oversight body funded by the New 
Zealand Government.  
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affected by severe liquefaction and lateral spreading.  Lyttelton, a port town about 7 miles 
east of Christchurch, was seriously affected by the February earthquake, principally as a 
result of shaking damage and rock fall hazards.  
Kaiapoi and Lyttelton are geographically separated from Christchurch (Kaiapoi by the 
Waimakariri River and Lyttelton by the Port Hills) and are distinguished by different historic-
economic drivers of growth.  These differences made comparisons among organisations in 
the three centres more distinct than comparisons among damaged centres of Christchurch 
suburbs.  The earthquake series and study areas are discussed in much greater depth in 
Chapter 4.  
I selected the case study organisations (CSOs) examined in this thesis from the pool 
of organisations that responded to one or both of the surveys deployed in 2010 and 2011.  
Starting with the surveyed organisations was in part selected based on convenience (I already 
had up-to-date contact information for these organisations), but the surveyed organisations 
also offered the benefit of starting each case study with a thorough set of baseline data 
gathered soon after both earthquakes.  As I was interested in the ways organisations 
interacted in town and urban settings, I focused specifically on organisations that had been 
located in either the Christchurch CBD or the Kaiapoi or Lyttelton town centres at the time of 
the September or February earthquakes.  Of the 75 organisations that fitted this criterion, 32 
organisations agreed to participate in the more in-depth case study research.   
Although I was a significant contributor to the broader Resilient Organisations post-
earthquake project, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss contents or results of that 
larger project.  There are several excellent resources that elaborate on the methods and 
findings of that work (e.g. Stevenson et al. (2011b; 2011c), Kachali et al. (2012), Kachali 
(2013), and Whitman (2014), and Whitman et al. (2014)).   
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3.5 Data Collection Overview  
The aim of an organisational case study is to achieve a broad and in-depth assessment 
of phenomena in context. Thus, case studies typically combine multiple, complex data 
sources, and often include both qualitative and quantitative information (Dul and Hak 2008; 
Yin 2008; Voss et al., 2012). In this study, case study organisation (CSO) representatives 
participated in surveys, interviews, and field observations. I also collected information about 
the organisations’ local contexts through a series of key informant interviews with local 
leaders and advocates in the Christchurch CBD, Kaiapoi, and Lyttelton. As shown in Table 7, 
I deployed some of these tools concurrently and others sequentially.  The surveys, interview 
questions, sociogram template and human ethics approvals can be found in Appendices A-I.   
Table 7: Data collection overview 
Data Collection 
Tool 
Description Dates Responding 
CSOs 
Survey 1 40 mostly closed response questions  Nov 2010 – Feb 
2011 
23 (366 total)* 
Survey 2 56 mostly closed response questions  May-Aug 2011 26 (176 total)* 
Key informant 
interviews 
Face-to-face semi-structured interview with 
local leaders and advocates 
May-June 2011 22 
Semi-structured CSO 
interviews 
Face-to-face semi-structured interview with 
organisation owner/operator or senior level 
management.   
 
Mar-Jun 2012 32 
Participant aided 
sociograms 
Interactive social network data generation 
tool. Conducted directly after the interview, 
face-to-face with respondent.  
Mar-Jun 2012 32 
Survey 3 48 mostly closed response questions  Apr-May 2012 15 (62 total)* 
Organisational health 
structured interviews 
(OHS) 
8 questions, with a balance of open and 
closed response formats 
Mar-Apr 2013 31 
Field observations Site visits to the organisation’s operating 
premises during the study period (or 
previous damaged or cordoned location of 
their premises).  Purpose was to obtain a 
sense of the organisation’s physical setting.  
Observations recorded as field notes.  
 
May 2011- Apr 
2013 
29 
*The total counts refer to the number of respondents to the Canterbury-wide survey, including the case study 
organisations.  
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Each tool described in Table 7 contributed something different to the case study as a 
whole.  Questionnaire surveys captured a large amount of simple quantifiable data (e.g. the 
number of days an organisation closed, and whether or not the organisation lost electricity).  
The answers were standardised and therefore easier to compare among respondents.  
Structured interviews provided a similar degree of standardisation in the questions, but 
allowed room for a greater range of answers and interpretations.  Both the data from surveys 
and the structured interviews formed an important quantitative baseline for comparative 
analyses (e.g. gathering standardised revenue figures which determined the organisation’s 
post-disaster trajectory categorisation).   
Semi-structured interviews, on the other hand, proceeded on the notion that questions, 
interpretations, and meanings cannot and should not always be standardised and that the 
relevant questions are not necessarily known before an interview commences (Liamputtong 
& Ezzy, 2005).  Interviews and field observations were much more useful for constructing 
narratives of the events, explanation building, and exploring complex issues, such as the ways 
decision makers felt connected to their towns or how they chose where to relocate.  Finally, 
the participant aided sociogram combined structured and semi-structured interview 
techniques with an interactive visualisation exercise to gather specific information about an 
organisation’s support network.  
After the initial earthquake in September 2010 (prior to beginning my PhD in 2011) I 
began working with the Resilient Organisations, 
10
 a public good research programme based 
in New Zealand.  As part of the Resilient Organisations research group, I aided the 
deployment of a Canterbury-wide organisational survey beginning in November 2010 (Table 
7).  The survey captured perishable data in the near aftermath of the earthquakes, including 
                                                 
10
 For more on Resilient Organisations, including a description of their research agenda and copies of reports 
and publications resulting from the on-going work throughout Canterbury and the rest of New Zealand go to 
www.resorgs.org.nz.   
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the type and impact of disruptions that organisations experienced, their mitigation and 
recovery strategies, and an indicative assessment of organisational resilience based on the 
benchmark resilience tool (see Chapter 2 for more discussion on this tool). 
The CSOs encompass a range of organisational forms and are drawn from numerous 
industry sectors.  They range from micro-businesses, with fewer than five employees, to large 
scale community non-profit organisations with over 100 full-time-equivalent staff.  Although 
this range added a degree of difficulty to the cross-case analysis it also enabled rich insights 
into how very different organisations dealt with similar post-earthquake challenges.  This 
diversity includes instances of what comparative case-study researchers refer to as ‘polar 
types’, in the sense of extreme cases which can be used to highlight contrasting patterns in 
the data (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007).  Although I did not select the cases using the polar 
types’ criteria, by having such a wide range of organisations, I was able to examine the 
extremes of post-disaster organisational fortunes (ranging from complete failure through to 
remarkable improvement). This breadth provided valuable insights. 
  
3.6 Key Informant Interviews 
Before selecting the case studies examined in this research, I gathered baseline 
information on the organisational contexts. The ‘key informant’ (KI) interviews were an 
important part of contextualising and interpreting the broader systemic and institutional 
processes that shaped the CSO’s post-earthquake experiences.  
In the first few months following the February earthquake, decision makers and 
community players developed strategies and policies that would influence the direction of the 
earthquake recovery in these town centres in the months and years to come.  Organisations’ 
long-term functioning and success are inarguably influenced by the strategies and policies 
that help shape the post-disaster environment (Burby, 2006; Olshansky, 2006).  In order to 
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capture various perspectives on these critical processes, I conducted 22 semi-structured 
interviews 
11
 with 24 key informants in the Christchurch CBD, Kaiapoi, and Lyttelton 
business and economic recovery and redevelopment.  The respondents included business 
association representatives, government officials, planners, property developers, and local 
community and business advocates, among others.   
I made initial contact with several interviewees while attending many of the 
earthquake information nights, open business recovery strategy meetings, and town planning 
events that proliferated in the months following the February 2011 earthquake. I initially 
employed a theoretical sampling technique, identifying individuals who possessed certain 
desired attributes (e.g. business association representatives) or who were best situated to 
advance the data gathering and research objectives (Morgan, 2008). I then used non-
probability snowball sampling (Saumure & Given, 2008) to make further connections.  
All of the KI interviews took place between May and June 2011.  The interviews 
lasted between 1 and 3 hours, were audio-recorded, and supplemented by field notes.  I used 
field notes to document unrecorded discussions, observations, and speculative reflections 
directly following the interviews. 
12
  
I used content and thematic analysis to extract and contrast themes emerging from the 
interview data.  As themes emerged from the interviews, I assessed the participant’s 
(re)construction of the events that unfolded during the response and early phases of recovery 
from the February earthquake and their more general characterisations of the town.  Due to 
time constraints, I did not use the more robust constant comparative content analysis 
approach (described in section 3.7.2) for these interviews.  These interviews also provided 
important background on some of the key debates, issues, and various players in each of the 
town centres, which proved useful in later discussions with CSO respondents. 
                                                 
11
 Another PhD student working with Resilient Organisations conducted three of these interviews using a 
slightly modified version of my semi-structured interview guide.   
12
 C.f. Brodsky (2008) on the relevance and purpose of field notes in qualitative research 
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3.7 Case Study Data Collection  
The unit of analysis in this research is the organisation. Organisational case studies, 
however, need to specify a set of conditions or phenomena of interest in order to constrain 
and focus the investigation (e.g. the case may be a business’ decision process leading up to 
and following a merger, as opposed to the case being ‘a business’) (Yin, 2009). In this study, 
I constrain the examination of these particular organisations to a specific period of time 
(2010-2013), to a specific series of events (the Canterbury earthquakes), and geographically 
(to three centres). 
13
  Further, I focused my data collection and analysis on aspects of 
organisational embeddedness and organisational recovery processes following the Canterbury 
earthquakes. 
Cross-case analysis treats each organisation as a separate case but allows evidence 
from each organisation to be compared to produce generalized observations (Yin 2009).  
Through cross-case comparisons, I identified issues and processes that are not generalizable 
to all organisations but illustrative of different relationships between organisations’ post-
earthquake outcomes and the causal mechanisms related to organisations’ social and 
geographic connections.  I collected data from each organisation separately, constructing a 
thorough narrative of each organisation using the methods outlined in Table 7. I describe 
these methods in more detail in the next sections. 
3.7.1 Surveys 
The case study data collection began with Canterbury-wide surveys of organisations 
in 2010 and 2011.  The survey responses of each case study organisation provided a baseline 
of comparable quantitative data for each organisation.  The survey data offered a thorough 
and comparable overview of the organisation’s post-quake losses, mitigation activities, and 
response and recovery strategies.  I collated each CSO’s survey responses into a ‘case 
                                                 
13
 Organisations that are part of a multidivisional enterprise and other complex CSOs responded in their capacity 
as a semi-autonomous unit (their particular Canterbury based local office or branch). 
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profile,’ which I brought with me to in-depth interviews with the CSO leaders.  Survey 3 was 
deployed just after I began interviewing CSOs.  This survey, also part of the larger Resilient 
Organisations research project, continued tracking the medium-term financial and operational 
impacts of the earthquakes, organisational changes, and adaptations (e.g. location of key 
suppliers before and after the Feb 2011 earthquake).   
3.7.2 Interviews and field observations 
Between March and June 2012, I conducted interviews with the CSO leaders (i.e. 
owner/operator, CEO, manager, or equivalent) that would be best positioned to answer 
questions about the organisation’s post-earthquake experiences from a strategic operational 
perspective.  In five cases, this was the CEO or organisation director.  In 22 cases the 
respondent was the organisation’s owner/operator (either a sole proprietor or part of a 
partnership/joint venture).  In one case it was the only employed member of an incorporated 
society (an operations manager), and in four cases, it was a branch or regional manager.  In 
one CSO, the regional manager did not feel capable of giving a comprehensive strategic 
overview of the organisation’s decision-making and financial situation following the 
earthquake, because much of the response was coordinated by the main office in Wellington 
(NZ).  In this instance, I interviewed both the regional office manager in Christchurch and the 
Wellington-based recovery coordinator for the organisation.  
In several cases, another organisational leader or staff member participated in part of 
the interview.  For example, in three of the CSOs owned by partnership, both partners 
participated in at least part of the interview and contributed to the PAS exercise (described in 
the next section).  In three different cases, an employee participated (in an unplanned and 
informal way) in a significant part of the interview.   
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The interviews lasted between 1.5 and 4 hours.  I recorded the interview’s audio with 
the respondent’s permission, and transcribed the audio for textual analysis.  The interview 
structure aimed to:  
 Obtain a general narrative of what happened to the organisation between the 
September 2010 earthquake and the time of the interview in mid-2012.   
 Explore the relationship of the organisation to its local context, and how this 
relationship had changed following the earthquakes;  
 Explore the organisation’s perception of its recovery progress, challenges, and 
ability to adapt to changes in its environment following the earthquakes; and 
 The organisation’s perceptions and utilisation of locational capital (location 
specific resources such as labour market, reputation, and infrastructure that 
were utilised by the organisation for its benefit). 
If the organisation was operational at the time of the interview, I tried to conduct the 
interview at its primary premises during work hours. 
14
  I was able to do this with 19 CSOs, 
and for all but two of the remaining cases I was able to visit the premises on a separate 
occasion. 
15
  
Location was an important consideration for these interviews.  Interview location can 
play a significant role in the way knowledge is constructed during an interview (Elwood & 
Martin, 2000; Herzog, 2005).  It was my view that conducting the interview in the physical 
setting of the organisation could help respondents to answer from an organisational 
perspective.  When undertaken in a work environment, an interview situates the participant in 
                                                 
14
 Four CSOs were not operating and did not have physical premises at the time of the earthquake.  In three of 
those cases, I made a separate visit to the site of either the demolished or closed building.  For the remaining 
case, I visited the organisation after it reopened in a new location about a month after the interview.   
15
 In two instances, I did not visit an operational organisation’s premises. In one case, the premises was a 
workshop and was scheduled for an engineering safety assessment.  As a result, the respondent did not feel 
comfortable conducting the interview there.  The building was later red-stickered and demolished.  In the other 
instance the respondent was only available for an interview on a weekend, and wanted to conduct it at his house.  
Soon after the interview the business relocated to new premises in a new development that I was only able to see 
the outside of during the study period.  
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a space where they routinely interact with others, and in which they will have certain roles 
and identities (Elwood & Martin, 2000).  For example, the respondents in this study were 
asked to answer questions ‘on behalf of’ their organisation.  Yet, the respondents also 
experienced the earthquakes and subsequent recovery as parents, church, club, or community 
members, and homeowners.  
Many of the interview questions explored aspects of space (e.g. the organisation’s 
premises and location) and the ways these affected organisations before and after the 
earthquakes.  The interview setting often acted as an elicitation tool, evoking and sharpening 
specific memories of the respondent’s post-earthquake experiences in the organisation.16  For 
example, cracks in the walls served as a visual prompt for one respondent to discuss their 
anxiety about the degrading condition of the building caused by on-going aftershocks. 
I refer to visits to organisations’ premises, either to conduct the interview or on a 
separate occasion, in Table 7 under the category, “field observations.”  My visits to 
organisations might be considered relatively brief (0.5-4 hours), especially if compared to 
ethnographic case study research where the observer typically embeds herself with an 
organisation for an extended period of time.  Yet, conducting interviews at the organisation’s 
premises during work hours provided an efficient way to observe the organisation’s premises, 
surroundings, and everyday interactions (e.g. among staff, customers, suppliers and others 
visiting the organisation).  Here is an example of a field note written when interviewing the 
owner/operator of a hospitality organisation:  
“[The respondent] transitioned easily from the interview to work and back…He 
had conversations with customers as they entered, recalling a personal detail or 
carrying on some previous conversation with each person that came in” (Field 
Notes, May 2012).  
                                                 
16
 C.f. Dick (2006) for further discussion of visual elicitation techniques in interviews.  
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These field observations allowed me to connect with the sensory experiences that can 
be difficult for respondents to verbally articulate and for the researcher to comprehend.  For 
example, my comprehension of the stress that a respondent attributed to being located near a 
large construction site was enhanced by experiencing the persistent and jarring vibration from 
a nearby pile driver, and by hearing the noise of metal striking metal as I visited the 
organisation’s premises and nearby area.  In the dynamic post-disaster environment, the 
additional degree of information provided through field observations was very useful for 
interpreting organisations’ experiences. 
3.7.3 Support networks & participant aided sociograms  
A social network is composed of nodes – which represent entities such as individuals, 
organisations, and institutions or socio-political units (e.g. governments) – and a set of 
relationships connecting these nodes (Knoke & Yang, 2008; Scott, 2000).  The relational 
structure of the network can be analysed at three primary levels: the individual (egocentric), 
the dyadic (relations between pairs of actors), and the system or whole-network level 
(Mizruchi & Marquis, 2006).  
Egocentric analyses focus on a set of relationships of an individual entity, such as a 
business or a CEO (Burt, 1992).  Egocentric networks are depicted with the ego (focal object 
of study) in the centre with links to all of the nodes with whom the ego has relations.  
Analyses in this study focused specifically on egocentric networks of each case study 
organisation and the dyadic relationships within its networks.  I examined the egocentric 
networks of each CSO separately and compared the CSOs’ networks in the cross-case 
analysis.  
To capture data about each CSO’s ego network, I used a structured survey composed 
of two types of questions or prompts: name generators and name interpreters.  Name 
generators ask respondents the names of actors with whom the respondent has relations, and 
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name interpreters ask the respondent about these actors’ attributes (Burt, 1997; Marsden, 
2002).  
An organisation’s network changes over time and is context dependent.  It was 
therefore necessary to restrict the name generator questions to specific types of interactions, 
periods of time or events, and to specific attributes (Burt, 1997; Hogan, Carrasco, & 
Wellman, 2007).  The name generator I employed in this study (Box 3.1) asked CSOs about 
the entities they found helpful for their recovery following the Canterbury earthquakes.  
Box 3.1 CSO support network name generator 
“Think of everyone that helped your organisation following the Canterbury earthquakes (September, February 
and everything after).  This help could have come from other businesses, charitable groups, friends, or anyone.  
They might have given your organisation resources and information or even emotional support that you found 
helpful for running your business and adjusting to changes following the earthquakes.  Please list those that 
your organisation found helpful on the sheet provided.” 
 
The name generator question was followed by several ‘name interpreters’, questions designed 
to gather more information about the nodes, the attributes of the relationship between the ego 
and the nodes, and among the nodes (i.e. dyadic relationships).  
Gathering and interpreting network data can be time consuming for both the 
researcher and the respondent.  For example, if the respondent lists 15 nodes in her network 
and the researcher uses three name interpreters, then the researcher needs to ask forty-five 
questions following the initial name generator.  It can be difficult to keep respondents 
engaged during this prolonged and repetitive questioning (Hogan et al., 2007).  As a result, 
researchers will often restrict the number of nodes that respondents can list (e.g. ‘the three 
people with whom you discuss your business’s finances most often’) (Marsden, 2005).  The 
effectiveness of this approach may be limited by a respondent’s cognitive biases.  For 
example, respondents tend to recall nodes in social clusters, so they might list people from 
their family one after the other and then list people from work(Brewer, 2000; Marsden, 
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2005). They are also more likely to recall their strong ties and ties to people of higher social 
status (Brewer, 2000).   
In an attempt to counteract some of these limitations, I used participant aided 
sociograms (PAS) to support the generation and interpretation of each CSO’s support 
networks.  A sociogram is a diagram that charts interpersonal relations.  In the PAS 
methodology the study participant creates the sociogram displaying all of the actors that 
supported the organisations and ties among them (see Figure 5). Using the PAS methodology, 
the respondent created a network visualisation during the interview process. I later coded the 
information from that visualisation into a data matrix for further analysis.  
Studies comparing PAS network data collection with other non-visual data-gathering 
techniques show that PAS techniques assist respondents to recall more nodes, producing 
larger networks (Marsden, 2005).  Respondents also tend to find the PAS process visually 
compelling and thus stay engaged for longer when compared to non-visual techniques 
(Bernardi, 2011; Hogan et al., 2007).  Proponents of PAS also believe that it leads to more 
robust results by allowing the participant to review and modify the network in real time 
(Bernardi, 2011; Hogan et al., 2007).  Sociograms are both a mechanism for recording 
information and stimulating conversation and co-analysis between the researcher and 
participant.  
I used a version of the PAS method applied in Hogan et al.(2007) and Carrasco et 
al.(2008).  This method is deployed using a series of sequential steps:  
1. First, I recited the name generator prompt and asked the participant to write actor 
names on a series of note tags.
17
  
2. The respondent filled out the names in order of free recall.   
                                                 
17
 I brought a ‘name template’ to every interview with 50 (~1cm x 3cm) Post-It ™ notes already laid out and 
pre-numbered.   
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3. I then gave the respondents a card with a numbered list of actor groups or role 
categories (see Box 3.2 for the role categories used in this study).
18
  Then the 
respondent wrote the corresponding number on the note tag. 
Box 3.2 
Role response card 
1. Family 
2. Friend 
3. Supplier 
4. Customer 
5. Another part of our organisation (e.g. another store in same 
franchise etc., department in different location)  
6. Competitor in same/similar industry 
7. Non-competitor in the same/similar industry 
8. Business association/Industry group  
9. Community group/Charitable group/Not-for-profit 
10. Other business 
11. Government agency 
12.  Other 
 
4. Next, I presented a large sheet of paper with four concentric circles (the sociogram) 
and gave the respondents three basic instructions: 
a. The circles represent importance 19 (to the organisation following the 
earthquakes), so place the most important people/organisations to your 
organisation on the inner circle and work outward. 
b. Place tags on lines, not between them.  
c. Rearrange the ties until you are satisfied.   
5. The respondent placed the tags appropriately.  Then they drew links between actors 
that knew each other (Hogan et al., 2007) and circles around actors where everyone 
knew each other (also described as cliques).
20
  
Figure 5 presents a schematic diagram of the PAS. 
  
                                                 
18
 The idea of using role categories came from Hogan et al., (2007), but I adjusted the categories to suit 
organisational networks and refined the wording during the pilot interviews (discussed later).   
19
 Following Bernardi (2011), “The meaning of the term importance purposefully was not specified; the aim was 
to explore the borders of this dimension from the point of view of the respondents” (p.794) 
20
 Drawing allowed the participant to identify dyad ties without being asked repetitive questions about which 
alters know each other, significantly shortening the network data collection process. 
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Figure 5: Participant aided sociogram components 
 
 
 
The final sociogram contained information about the names and roles of the nodes, their 
relative importance to the organisation, and which nodes knew and interacted with each 
other.  The sociogram has already ‘interpreted’ information about the nodes and their 
relationships without the need for repeat questioning.   
After constructing the sociogram, I then followed up with additional name interpreter 
questions.  In the interest of the respondents’ time and patience, I only asked name interpreter 
questions for up to fifteen nodes,
21
 following the sampling algorithm from Hogan et al. 
(2007). 
I asked seven name interpreter questions about each node (so for a network with 15 
nodes, I asked a total of 105 questions).  For five of the seven questions, I provided response 
cards with closed responses.  This standardised the responses which eased coding and 
                                                 
21
 Manfreda et al., (2004) found that respondents completing an online network-interpreter abandoned the task 
after fifteen nodes.  I used this finding as a guideline for my sampling procedure. 
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improved answer speed if the respondent chose to use them.
22
  Table 8 summarises the name 
interpreter questions and closed responses included on the response cards.  
Table 8: Name interpreters and response card answers 
Question Possible answers 
How long has your organisation known 
or worked with this person/ 
organisation? 
Less than 6 months 
Less than 1 year 
1-5 years 
6-10 years 
More than 10 years  
Unknown 
What kinds of support did your 
organisation received from this 
person/organisation following the 
earthquake? 
 
Open response 
About when did your organisation 
receive this support? 
Following the September 2010 
Earthquake 
Following the February 2011 
Earthquake 
1 – Almost immediately 
2 – Within a few days 
3 – Within a few weeks 
4 – More than a few weeks 
5 – Almost immediately 
6 – Within a few days 
7 – Within a few weeks 
8 – More than a few weeks 
9 – Other (please specify) 
What kinds of support was your 
organisation able to offer this 
person/organisation?  
 
Open response 
Where (geographically) was this 
person/organisation located before the 
earthquakes?  
1- In same town as your organisation 
2- Outside of town, but in same region 
3 -Outside of region, but in New Zealand 
4- Outside of New Zealand 
5- Unknown 
Where (geographically) was this 
person/organisation located after the 
earthquakes? 
1 - In same town as your organisation 
2 - Outside of town, but in same region 
3 - Outside of region, but in New Zealand 
4 - Outside of New Zealand 
5 - Unknown 
What is/was the primary form of 
communication? 
1 – Face-to-face 
2 – Telephone 
3 – Personal email 
4 – Mass communication (e.g. post, email)  
5- Other 
                                                 
22
 Most respondents used the response cards initially and then anticipated the questions with comprehensive 
answers covering all or most aspects of the name interpreters without the need for constant repeat questioning.   
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Networks possess both interactional and structural attributes (Coviello, 2005).  This 
means that both ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ data are necessary for a complete network analysis.  
Qualitative network data generated through discussion of the PAS were especially valuable 
where “rich, deep, process-based network information is required” (Coviello, 2005, p.43).  
Qualitative interpretations helped me avoid falling into static interpretations and 
oversimplification of CSO networks, a possible risk if relying solely on the statistical outputs 
produced by the network analysis software package (Coviello, 2005).  Although network 
generators and interpreters form a structured interview process, the interaction facilitated by 
the PAS created room for discussion and engagement.  I audio recorded the entire exercise, 
which always directly followed the semi-structured interview, and included the discussions 
that occurred during this exercise as part of the interview transcripts.    
Following the main network generation and interpretation exercise I finished with 
several questions to evaluate network absences, gaps, and what might be called support 
hindrances (i.e. “important in a negative sense” (Bernardi 2011, p.795)).  I included two 
boxes on the right hand side of the sociogram, and respondents identified and discussed: 1) 
“People or organisations who were important to your organisations before the earthquakes, 
that you did not associate with after the earthquakes [for any reason]” and 2) “People or 
organisations that have been unhelpful, damaging, or disruptive to the recovery of your 
organisation.”  I finished the reflection by asking the respondent about unfulfilled 
expectations of support and what the organisation needed before it would be fully recovered.   
Both the semi-structured interviews and the PAS exercise enabled participants to 
produce explanations and evaluate their own practices.  By using questions that did more than 
ask participants to recall events, I was able to engage in active dialogue and collaborative 
learning with them. 
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3.7.4 Organisational health structured interview 
The interview and PAS data collection period ended in June 2012, approximately 16 
months after the February 2011 earthquake.  During the interviews, many of the respondents 
discussed impending moves, reopening, and other major changes that were planned in the 
coming months.  As a result I decided to follow-up with each organisation again in early 
2013 to broadly assess the organisation’s financial health, 23 operational and recovery status, 
and other organisational changes that may have occurred in the intervening months.  
To decrease respondent burden, I conducted this final follow up as a brief structured 
interview.  I sent the survey as a Microsoft Word document and followed up over the 
telephone.  I provided included a link to an online survey engine (Qualtrics) for organisations 
that preferred not to follow up by telephone. All but one CSO completed the final structured 
interview. 
24
  
3.7.5 Integrating multiple methods  
There are four general reasons for combining multiple methods in case studies: 
complementarity, development, triangulation, and initiation (Wolfram & Hassard, 2010).  
Each of these reasons played a part in my decision to collect quantitative and qualitative data 
using the methods described above.  The first, complementarity, refers to methods that 
explore overlapping and deviating aspects of a phenomenon.  For example, in the initial 
surveys, respondents noted that they had relocated all or parts of their organisations for 
varying lengths of time.  A substantial part of the in-depth interview in 2012 unpacked the 
process of organisations’ relocation, expanding on these different forms and processes of 
                                                 
23
 CSOs reported their revenue between financial years 2008 and 2012 on a scale with the options of excellent, 
good, satisfactory, poor, very poor or N/A.  Revenue refers to the income generated by the organisation (from 
sales, capital and assets) before deducting costs and expenses.   
24
 I was able to answer many of the questions for the remaining respondent by conducting a final unobtrusive 
site visit.  This confirmed that the organisation was still open and operating in the same temporary location that 
they had been during the interview.   
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relocation.  Similarly, field observations added a layer of depth and description to phenomena 
recorded in surveys and interviews.   
The next reason, development, describes the use of one research method to develop 
another (Wolfram & Hassard, 2010).  The in-depth interviews and preliminary analysis of 
those interviews guided the development of the final follow-up structured interview in 2013.  
The third reason, triangulation, in this study refers to data source triangulation and 
triangulation of methods.
25
  I captured information about the same phenomena (e.g. the 
effects of building damage on the organisation) in different forms using multiple methods: 
surveys, interviews, and field observations.  Integrating data sources allowed me to 
corroborate evidence received in another form (e.g. quantitative or qualitative) or collected 
using a different method (e.g. interviews and field observations).  Collecting data with a 
number of different tools provided different layers of evidence about the same phenomenon 
(Yin, 2009).  
Finally, initiation is the process of analysing qualitative data using quantitative 
methods and vice versa (Wolfram & Hassard, 2010).  For example, it includes analysing 
interview results qualitatively and then reanalysing the same data quantitatively to draw out 
different components.  I utilised this approach at several points in the cross-case analysis.  
For example, I quantised qualitative data about the types of support that organisations 
mobilised from their network data by coding the data and counting frequencies and 
proportions of the various types of support.  Similarly, after quantitatively analysing the 
network data, I also visually analysed the network structures and used information from the 
interviews to explain network properties.   
Two additional factors influenced my choice to integrate the survey data with the 
interviews, network data, and field observations.  First, surveys were less intrusive, more 
                                                 
25
 There are two other types of triangulation in addition to data and methodological; these are investigator 
triangulation and theory triangulation (Wolfram & Hassard, 2010).  
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flexible, and quicker to deploy than interviews.  This was important in the immediate 
aftermath of the earthquakes in 2010 and 2011.  Organisations were often significantly 
disrupted and most respondents expressed a preference to do the survey on their own time at 
their own pace, as opposed to conducting it in person or over the telephone.  The relative 
speed of deployment meant that I was able to capture standardised data about disruptions and 
earthquake-induced changes while it was still relatively recent in the respondents’ experience.  
Second, surveys and the structured interviews provided an efficient way to capture a 
large amount of data from a greater number of case study organisations, and to have that data 
in a format that was relatively easy to analyse, acquiring data depth while avoiding 
unnecessary data bulk (Voss, Tsikriktsis, & Frohlich, 2002).  By capturing a significant 
amount of basic data about the organisations and their immediate earthquake impacts and 
recovery strategies (i.e. insurance status, whether they were accessing grant funding), I was 
able to better target the interviews and focus on developing a depth of explanation and 
understanding. 
3.7.6 Confidentiality 
All research participants (both CSO representatives and key informants) signed a 
confidentiality agreement that guaranteed that their name and any uniquely identifiable 
information would be omitted from any future use of this study’s results.  In this study, 
confidentiality was the default option.  Only one of the 32 CSOs, God Save the Queen in 
Lyttelton, opted out of the confidentiality agreement and allowed their organisation’s name to 
be used in reporting.  I assigned all of the other organisations pseudonyms, and only refer to 
the research participants by their general organisational position description (e.g. regional 
manager, owner).   
There are benefits and drawbacks to confidentiality in case study research.  
Confidentiality is the dominant paradigm in social science research, advocated by researchers 
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as a way of reducing potential risks to participants and of facilitating more open conversation 
between the researcher and the participant (Guenther, 2009).  Conversely, naming research 
participants can be empowering, allowing the participant to have a more active voice in the 
research (Baez, 2002; Guenther, 2009), and incentivises more sensitive and nuanced 
portrayals of study subjects (Guenther, 2009).  In this instance, I felt that the potential loss of 
access to organisations and my desire to respect participant concerns about how they or their 
organisation might be portrayed in a rapidly changing environment outweighed the potential 
benefits of using organisations’ names. 
Similarly, for key informants, I use only very general positional and organisational 
descriptions.  Some of the interviewees are prominent members of their communities and 
may be easily recognised in the descriptions with even small amounts of affiliation 
information.  Although the ramifications of identification are likely quite minimal for the 
respondents, I prioritise the promise of confidentiality over specificity of description. 
  
3.8 CSO Analysis  
The same features that make case studies useful and interesting (e.g. different 
methodological perspectives, the richness and depth of data, and the temporal scope) also 
make case studies difficult to analyse and interpret.  Case study analysis depends heavily on 
the interpretive skills of the researcher (Yin, 2009).  Cross-case analyses are even more 
challenging because they require two forms of analysis: 1) data have to be synthesized within 
each case study to produce a meaningful analysis of the mechanisms driving organisational 
outcomes, and 2) data have to be synthesized across the case studies, allowing the research to 
make links between different contexts (situations, circumstances, environments) and the 
causal mechanisms that influence organisations’ outcomes.   
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The following discussion of my analytical process begins with a reflection on validity 
and reliability in cross-case analyses.  I consider the challenges and theoretical considerations 
that I accounted for in my analyses and interpretation of the data, and the strategies put in 
place to achieve validity in this research.  I then outline the specific procedures I used to 
process and interpret the CSO data.  
3.8.1 Validity, reliability, situated knowledges, & positionality 
There are limits to any researcher’s ability to reliably represent reality or even 
respondents’ constructions of reality.  Yet, in keeping with critical realist approaches to 
research, through a process of reflexivity and rigour, it is possible to gain valuable 
information about social worlds through case study methods, including in-depth interviewing.  
The participants in this research were almost exclusively organisational leaders, 
responding to the best of their ability from the perspective of the organisation.  Accessing 
information from one or two organisational representatives (as opposed to interviewing 
multiple organisation members occupying different levels of the organisation) narrows the 
scope of perspective.  No one can offer an objective rendering of an organisation or present 
the omnipotent “view from nowhere”; all information is a “view from somewhere” 
(Haraway, 1988).  
By targeting upper level organisational representatives, I did not presume that leaders 
had the only or even the most complete or accurate perspectives.  Leaders do, however, tend 
to be well situated to provide a strategic overview of an organisation’s operations and 
decision making.  At the same time, they may be more invested in portraying their 
organisation in a positive light, though I attempted to reduce this effect by providing 
confidentiality.  Although focusing my efforts on organisational leaders provided a limited 
view of the organisation, this approach allowed me to gather comparable data from a 
relatively large number of case studies which offers its own analytical benefits.  These 
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benefits include, for example, being able to observe the way a mechanism influenced 
organisations in different contexts and to consider the different processes that organisations 
of different sizes and in different industry sectors employed to achieve similar goals.   
As the researcher, I entered a relationship with research participants “who [were] 
themselves embedded in a nexus of relationships” both inside and outside of the organisation 
(Bradbury & Lichtenstein, 2000, p. 560).  Our relative positions in various social structures 
not only influenced the way knowledge was reported by the interview respondent but also 
how I interpreted and reported it.  For example, my position as an ‘outsider’ in a number of 
regards (e.g. as an academic not a business owner, a relatively recent immigrant to New 
Zealand, and as young in comparison to respondents whose average age was between 40 and 
50 years old), may have caused respondents to approach exchanges with me differently than 
they would with someone else, such as another business owner from their town.  Conversely, 
respondents often asked me about my experiences with the earthquake and that sense of 
common experience often opened doors to further conversation.    
Research participants produce knowledge through interaction with the researcher 
which the researcher then interprets, situates in the context of a relevant body of literature, 
and uses to generate questions for further enquiry (see Brogden (2010) for more on the 
concept of the double hermeneutic in case study research).  As a researcher, I cannot 
completely control, standardise, or even recognise the implications of these multi-layered 
interactions, but it is still possible to produce useful knowledge about the world.  As Miller 
and Glassner (1997, p. 99) argue, “two persons can communicate their perceptions to one 
another, [while] knowing full well that there are both structures and pollutants in any 
discussion.” 
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There are several strategies for improving validity and reliability in case study 
research.  I employed two particular strategies to improve the internal validity
26
 of my case 
study processes: triangulation and respondent validation.  First, triangulating multiple 
methods, as discussed earlier, enables researchers to integrate their research participants’ 
situated knowledges by capturing different aspects of the same phenomenon (Bowker, 2001).  
The second method for improving validity is respondent validation, and it involves presenting 
results and analyses to research participants, soliciting feedback, and incorporating this 
feedback into the ongoing case interpretation process.  I was able to do this at two points in 
the data collection process.  First, I discussed CSOs’ survey responses during the interview 
process.  Second, during the PAS exercise participants could see the picture of their network, 
manipulate and explain it to aid the network interpretation process.  The PAS provided 
immediate visual feedback as a basis for ongoing discussion.  Furthermore, at the conclusion 
of this research process I will send the participating case studies copies of the reports and 
publications (including this thesis) produced from this research.  Although it does not 
improve the validity of the research presented here, it is an important part of maintaining 
accountability and continuing the collaborative learning process with CSOs. 
Finally, by creating and following a case study protocol and analytical procedure I 
sought to standardise those aspects of my interactions with research participants that I was 
able to control (Yin, 2009).  The details of these efforts are described in the next two sections.  
Establishing reliability means that another investigator following exactly the same procedures 
would arrive at the same or similar conclusions.  It requires the researcher to establish a chain 
of evidence and maintain a case study database (Yin, 2009).  The case study database ensures 
that raw data are systematically stored and catalogued, ready for examination by an 
independent investigator.  Although my data was collected under confidentiality agreements, 
                                                 
26
 Internal validity is especially relevant to explanatory case studies as it is concerned with demonstrating causal 
relationships between variables where causes cannot be directly observed.  This is different from external 
validity which is concerned with gernalisability to a larger population (Yin, 2009).  
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I have maintained copies of all the raw data, including surveys, field notes, audio files, 
transcripts, and PAS diagrams in locked storage (for hardcopies) and password protected files 
(for electronic data).  My chain of evidence links the final theorisations in this thesis to a 
body of evidence in the case study database.  The production of evidence is clearly linked to 
the case study protocol (justification for case studies and records of the processes involved in 
developing the study and data collection – recorded in an ongoing review document).  And 
these are then clearly linked to the original guiding research questions in the final 
comparative case study results. 
Construct definitions  
I utilise a number of constructs in this research, some of which I explore theoretically 
and others that I measure and compare among the CSOs.  In this section, I outline several key 
constructs, providing definitions of the specific concepts as they relate to the objectives of the 
study (Yin, 2009), and where applicable, I outline the ‘operational measures’ used to evaluate 
the concepts.  The process of tightly specifying the constructs assessed in the research not 
only increases validity in case studies, but enhances reliability by outlining systematic 
measures to ensure that I am measuring and analysing the constructs consistently for every 
case (Yin, 2009).  
Construct 1: Organisational post-disaster trajectory 
The term trajectory refers to the path of an object moving through time or space.  In 
this study, I use the term trajectory to refer to the path that an organisation’s health has taken 
between the 2008 and the end of 2012.  The term trajectory suggests any measure of an 
organisation’s post-disaster health is a point on a longer temporal trajectory.  In the two years 
of disruption that occurred between 2010 and 2012 organisations experienced downturns and 
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temporary surges, and will likely continue to experience shifts as the recovery process 
continues. 
In the organisational health survey (OHS) conducted in March and April 2013, CSOs 
reported their revenue each year for a five year period (between 2008 and 2012) on a scale 
from very poor to excellent.  If the organisation did not feel that revenue was an appropriate 
measure (e.g. for non-profit organisations), they reported their assessment of “the financial 
resources available to support your mission for each financial year.”  
The trajectories, as depicted in Figure 6, are divided into three general categories.  If 
the organisations experienced sustained improved revenue into 2012, they were placed in the 
developmental change category.  If they experienced sustained revenue worse than before the 
earthquakes, they fell into the degenerative change category.  If the organisation experienced 
no change or a temporary decrease or increase followed by readjustment, they fell into the 
restoration of pre-disaster trends category. 
The categories are based on, Bates and Peacock’s (1989, p.353) categories of post-
disaster community recovery.  Each category is defined more broadly as follows: 
1. Developmental change: Positive adaptive changes leading to reduced 
vulnerability of the system or a sustained and obvious improvement in revenue 
following the earthquakes (also categorised as a ‘resilient’ response) 
2. Restoration of pre-disaster trends: No sustained increase or decrease in revenue 
beyond pre-disaster trends 
3. Degenerative change: Negative changes that increase vulnerability, sustained 
and obvious decrease in revenue 
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Figure 6: Examples of CSO financial trajectories 
 
 
In order to verify that the revenue trajectory corresponded with the CSO leader’s 
assessment of the organisation’s general situation, in the OHS CSOs also indicated whether 
they felt their organisation was significantly better off, slightly better off, the same, slightly 
worse off, or significantly worse off compared to before the earthquakes.  Respondents 
further explained this response in an open follow-up question.   
There were four cases (out of 32) where the subjective self-assessment and the 
revenue trajectories did not match. In all of these cases, I deferred to the self-assessment.  As 
in all of these cases, self-assessment reflected a change that the very general revenue 
categories could not.  For example, one retail CSO consistently reported ‘good’ revenue from 
2009-2012, but reported that the business was ‘slightly better off’ compared to before the 
earthquakes explaining in an open response question in the 2013 structured interview:  
“Just getting the population influx now from [new residential developments]… 
Lots of shops pulled down around us, on our own, makes us stand out quite 
conspicuous” (Owner, Amherst Retail). 
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They also predicted further improvement due to their new location near a complementary 
business, which was likely to generate further income for their organisation.  Thus, in this 
instance and others where the qualitative assessment differed from the financial indicator, I 
deferred to the opinion of the respondent. 
Construct 2: Organisational social capital 
In this study, I needed to consistently define what constituted organisational social 
capital.  Social capital can be understood as the resources, information, social support and 
acceptance created and mobilised through relational networks.  A basic premises of social 
capital is that investment in social relations yields a return (Lin, 2001).  
Organisational social capital comes from two sources.  First, organisations as a 
collective entity engage in networks of relations.  Through a history of interaction, which can 
outlast or exceed the capacity of any single member of staff, the organisation builds 
reputational resources and accumulates expectations and obligations of support from other 
people and organisations.  Staff members can then mobilise this social capital on behalf of the 
organisation when needed.  Second, people working within the organisation can mobilise 
resources from their networks formed both inside and outside of the organisational context to 
aid the organisation.  This latter form refers to the concepts of social capital aggregation and 
appropriable organisation (where networks formed in one context are used in another), as 
discussed in Chapter 2.  
In this study, it was difficult to clearly distinguish between personal and 
organisational forms of social capital.  The earthquakes blurred the boundaries between 
people’s personal and professional lives in ways that made clear distinctions between 
personal and professional irrelevant.  For example, in many cases, people literally had to 
move their businesses into their homes.  Similarly, organisations were often navigating 
unfamiliar territory while under serious time and resource constraints after a disaster, 
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necessitating quick decisions and improvisation when resources are unavailable through 
traditional channels.  In many cases organisation members accessed support from friends and 
family members to meet organisational needs.  Yet, particularly in small firms, this can be a 
viable adaptive strategy for organisations post-disaster.  
I therefore define organisational social capital as the benefits accruing to the 
organisation through inter-organisational and inter-personal networks.  In the CSO analyses, 
I removed any reference to support that was not directly or obviously beneficial to the CSO.  
In instances where a supporter only provided personal support to the respondent, I removed 
the node from the network generated in the PAS exercise.  For example, a CSO respondent 
representing a building supply firm reported that a district council member helped them 
obtain building consents for their earthquake damaged church.  In this instance, I removed 
both the reference to the support and the node from the network as it was unrelated to the 
building supply firm’s recovery.  
Construct 3: Geographic embeddedness 
As I considered research question 3 about an organisation’s relationship to its local 
context, I assessed the degree to which organisations become embedded in places and the 
mechanisms that drive this differential embedding.  As I developed theories about these 
mechanisms and their consequences, I referred back to three definitions of geographic 
embeddedness discussed in the previous chapter, to ensure a consistent interpretation of this 
phenomenon.  For the purposes of this study, geographic embeddedness encompasses:  
1. Organisational links to local social and cultural events and institutions (Pallares-
Barbera, Tulla, & Vera 2003). 
2. The number, strength, and frequency an organisation’s relationships within a local 
area or region within and across sectors, specifically focusing on non-market relations 
(Copus, Dubois, & Hedström, 2011). 
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3. The extent to which actors are ‘anchored’ in particular territories or places. This 
includes localised manifestations of broader networks (Hess, 2004, p.178). 
These elements provided guidance for analysis and interpretation of the organisational 
geographic embeddedness. 
3.8.2 Analytical procedures  
Comparative case study research requires a process of constant reflection and analysis 
(Yin, 2009).  It would be impractical and compromise the quality of the research to gather all 
of the case study data and analyse it at the very end of the process.  My analytical procedures 
were not only concerned with producing the final cross-case theoretical results, but with 
guiding the progress of the research.  For example, early key informant interviews, field 
observations and survey analysis informed my decision to examine organisational 
connectivity in the first place.  Analysis of the knowledge gaps in the survey data following 
the September 2010 earthquake guided the selection of case study methodology to provide 
more in-depth understanding of the causal mechanisms we were not able to capture with 
purely quantitative approaches.   
Similarly, the sequential development of the data collection techniques required 
preliminary analysis of the data to inform the development of the next step.  The survey 
results informed the development of the interview questions.  I then piloted the interview 
questions and the PAS with three volunteers representing three different organisations in 
March 2012.  The participants provided feedback immediately following the process on what 
they liked, disliked, and wanted to add or change.  I then sent them analytical notes including 
a digital visualisation of their network and some preliminary results, and again requested 
feedback from the pilot participants.  I conducted each pilot interview in turn, incorporating 
changes as appropriate before piloting the altered version with the next participant.  
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During the interview and PAS data collection period, I collected and analysed the data 
in parallel.  My approaches have their foundations in a modified grounded theory approach 
referred to as constant comparative, which requires an iterative process of data collection, 
reflection, and refinement (Charmaz, 2003; Saldaña, 2011).  I conducted interviews a few at a 
time, read the transcripts and field notes, and revised the process allowing ‘early leads’ to 
shape the subsequent data collection (Charmaz, 2003, p.318).  Although the core content of 
the interview guide remained mostly unchanged, I identified questions to rephrase, concepts 
to follow-up in greater depth, and began forming questions and assertions for later analyses.  
The field notes I recorded directly after each interview were an important part of this 
reflective process (Mason, 1998).  They allowed me to document my reaction to the 
respondent and the situations I observed, provide a fresh interpretation of what I had seen and 
experienced, and to identify themes that felt significant in the moment.   
Finally, data gathered using one tool often needed to be analysed to allow further 
analyses and cross-case synthesis.  For example, the last data collection tool deployed, the 
OHS, was essential in determining the comparative quantitative measure of the CSOs’ 
recovery trajectory.  These trajectories formed the basis for comparing organisational and 
support network trends derived from the interview and PAS data. 
Survey analysis  
In this study, the survey data does not form a representative sample of Canterbury 
organisations from which meaningful generalisations can be derived.  Rather, these data form 
the quantitative backbone for the cross-case analysis, aiding in the process of systematic 
pattern recognition.  Additionally, data gathered from the OHS formed the basis for 
allocating organisations to particular trajectory groups. 
Unlike interview data, structured surveys with closed choice, numerical, or short 
answer responses were not subject to further interpretation and engagement.  Data was taken 
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as a reflection of the respondent’s situated experience of the world.  An advantage to the 
sequential data collection process in this study, however, is that I was able to achieve a 
slightly greater level of depth in the interpretation of the survey results by asking for 
clarification or elaboration of survey responses during the interviews (e.g. “You mentioned in 
the survey you filled out last year, that you had to make two staff members redundant after 
the February earthquake.  Can you talk a little more about that?”). 
Participant aided sociogram analysis  
Interpreting the support network data required blending and cross-analysing the 
interview and PAS data.  The quantitative analyses considered several types of variables 
including: organisational attributes (e.g. size, age) gathered using the surveys, dyad variables 
(e.g. duration of relationships, description of support transferred), and structural network 
attributes (e.g. density of ties in the ego network) gathered using the PAS.   
After gathering the network data in its paper form in the field, I coded the data into 
matrices in Microsoft Excel in a format that was compatible for import into UCINET 
27
 and 
IBM SPSS Statistics 19 (SPSS).  UCINET (and its ego network analysis sub-programme 
ENet) is capable of executing some statistical and multivariate analyses (Borgatti, Everett, & 
Freeman, 2002).  I visualised the networks in the compatible program NetDraw (Borgatti et 
al., 2002).  I completed the more advanced statistical analyses in SPSS (i.e. correlations, Chi-
squared, and Kruskal-Wallis).  Additionally, as participants completed the PAS exercises, I 
recorded, transcribed, and coded qualitative responses (e.g. descriptions of support types) in 
QSR NVivo 9.  Open responses to name generator questions as well as other discussions that 
were prompted by the PAS exercise aided interpretation of the network results.  
 
                                                 
27
 UCINET is a comprehensive programme for analysing social network datasets.  It also has a companion 
programme (ENet) which is helpful for summarising and comparing data from multiple egocentric networks 
(Halgin & Borgatti, 2011).  
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Interview analysis 
The constant comparative methods I employed in this research consisted of a set of 
inductive strategies for analysing data (Charmaz, 1995).  I started with individual cases and 
developed progressively more abstract conceptual categories to synthesize, explain, and 
understand my data and to identify patterns relationships among the cases.  The procedure I 
followed is presented as a sequential algorithm in Figure 7. 
Familiarisation with the data and reflection on its production is a critical first step in 
the analysis (Mason, 1998), thus pre-coding begins by reading the full body of data including 
survey results, field notes, and transcripts.  Then, following Yin (2009), I generated 
preliminary assertions and questions by inductive means.  I processed the data in a series of 
steps, based on constant comparative approaches that constantly compare small units of data 
through iterative coding, form categories based on patterns and interrelationships between the 
codes, and abstract the findings to form theories about the underlying processes being 
examined (Maykut & Morehouse, 2005; Saldaña, 2011).   
The procedure outlined in Figure 7 required three different forms of coding.  First, 
open coding focuses on the actions and interactions in each line of text.  This step provides 
the initial evidence that allows reassessment of the original assertions and questions.  This is 
followed by full coding of the interviews with a set of codes defined and categorised in a 
codebook.  Finally, as part of the cross-case analysis, I coded the analytic memos produced 
from each CSO interview.   
This last coding iteration was necessary because I had two lines of inquiry.  I wanted 
to be able to theorise about the causal mechanisms driving the events and outcomes for each 
CSO and to identify emergent themes across the cases.  This dual approach created the need 
to produce additional analytic memos and comparisons.  
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Figure 7: Iterative analysis procedure for semi-structured interviews 
 
By focusing on a detailed description of the data before attempting to produce more 
general theoretical statements, I was able to generate theories that were firmly based in the 
data collected (Liamputtong & Ezzy, 2006).  Although it is impossible to remove researcher 
bias from the interpretation of data, people employing these methods approach the analysis 
with an open mind and avoid pre-formed theoretical assumptions or hypotheses (Martin & 
Turner, 1986).  In the final step, I reframe the assertions made in step 2 (Figure 7) as part of 
an interpretive narrative supported by the data analysed and generated during the coding 
process.  Throughout this rigorous procedure, the explanations and theory were “fashioned 
directly from the emerging analysis of the data” (Mason, 1998, p. 142). 
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3.8.3 Cross-case synthesis & interpretation 
Thematic cross-case analysis is an approach that treats each organisation as a separate 
case but allows evidence from each organisation to be compared to produce generalized 
observations.  This analysis produced elements of both explanation building and hypothesis 
generation (Yin, 2009).  The process I used for this thematic analysis is very similar to the 
constant comparative approach described in the previous section.  Burns (2010) adapts Glaser 
and Strauss’ (1967) constant comparative approach to cross-case synthesis and interpretation.  
I followed the approach described by Burns (2010) as I analysed the cases.  
My study includes a relatively large number of cases for comparison.  Although I did 
not have the depth of information that might be typical of a single case or two case 
comparative approach, I did have a large body of data gathered using a number of data 
collection tools over a 2-3 year period for each organisation.  To integrate this data and aid 
cross-case thematic analysis I developed a template to systematically synthesize the data that 
I gathered on the case studies.  As a result I produced 32 standardised case study reports.
28
  
Using the analytic memos from the in-depth interview analysis and the case study 
reports I identified several major themes (e.g. “communication/information technology 
adaptations”).  Following the process described in Burns (2010), I compared various 
incidents where the theme occurred in the cases and compared different aspects of each 
occurrence across the cases.  I then integrated the themes and their different associated 
properties, noting variations within and across the categories and cases or across different 
types of cases.  For example, “When does an organisation implement changes to its 
communications/IT systems and under what conditions? Are there differences between 
organisations that had positive versus negative financial trajectories?”  I then delimited the 
                                                 
28
 Due to the high degree of specific information about each organisation in these reports, after some 
deliberation, I decided that the risk of breeching confidentiality meant that they could not be included as 
appendices.  
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theory, combining patterns of relationships across the different categories to develop broader 
theories that answer my central research questions.   
For each of my case study organisations, I wanted to understand the way relational 
and geographic embeddedness manifested in the post-earthquake environment.  I examined 
extra-organisational networks to understand the ways organisations mobilised support after 
the earthquakes and discussed other aspects of intra- and inter-organisational relationships 
into the ways CSOs managed and accessed social capital.  I also examined the way the CSO 
respondents understood the relationship between the organisation and its location prior to the 
earthquakes and the way this relationship evolved post-earthquake.  This allowed me to 
construct theories about the mechanisms that influence geographic embeddedness, how these 
mechanisms evolve as a result of the earthquakes, and how these mechanisms influence post-
earthquake organisational recovery outcomes including: relocation decisions, capital 
reinvestment in an area, and adaptations that the organisation implemented to cope in the 
altered post-disaster environment.   
 
3.9 Conclusion  
Building a bridge between two fertile areas of disaster research — the political-
ecological and SES community resilience literature and systems approaches to organisational 
resilience — requires a method that facilitates in-depth contextual analysis.  The multiple 
comparative case study approach described in this chapter enabled me to examine the 
complex social and geographic interactions that influenced organisations’ post-disaster 
trajectories.  
A defining feature of case studies is that they allow the researcher to explore a 
phenomenon in context.  The contextualised, complex, and longitudinal perspectives 
facilitated by case studies were important to advancing the central aim of this study: to move 
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beyond abstracted and atomised perspectives prevalent in current organisational resilience 
thinking, and to find ways to consider the implications of an organisation’s embeddedness.  
The final step in cross-case analysis is to take all of the data and analyses produced 
throughout the study period and place them in our current understanding of organisational 
resilience to create new theoretical territory.  In the next three chapters, I attempt to build a 
robust and engaging narrative that draws on the richness of the longitudinal comparative case 
studies and key informant interviews, while capturing the strengths of the standardised and 
comparable quantitative survey and network analyses.  The intention is to shed light on the 
contextual and relational determinants of organisational resilience.   
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Chapter 4: The Canterbury Earthquakes and Post-disaster Contexts  
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter has two purposes.  First, it provides background information about the 
earthquakes and the damage and disruption they caused in Canterbury.  The earthquakes were 
critical pivot points that now punctuate Canterbury’s development timeline, forming the ‘pre- 
and post-’ boundary around which many of the organisational changes discussed in this thesis 
have occurred.  Second, the chapter provides information about the regional and local 
institutional, economic, and social contexts in which organisations were pursuing recovery.  
In organisational case studies, context refers to the environmental conditions that 
enable or constrain organisational processes (Tsang, 2013).  ‘Context’ is composed of the 
layered social-economic (e.g. labor-market trends), cultural (e.g. cultural expectations of 
reciprocity), physical (e.g. urban layout or infrastructure availability), and institutional (e.g. 
tax incentives or development policies) environments in which organisations are situated at a 
particular time and place.  Contextualised studies capture the complexity and interaction that 
shape organisational processes better than those that focus on organisations in isolation, 
offering more complete explanations of organisational outcomes (Tsang, 2013; Yin, 2009).  
The case study organisations (CSOs) that I examine in this thesis were situated in one 
of three commercial districts in Canterbury: the Christchurch CBD, the Kaiapoi town centre, 
or the Lyttelton town centre.  Each of these centres has a unique history of development and 
provided different environments for the CSOs as they established and grew.  These three 
centres sustained among the highest concentrations of damage in Canterbury (CCC, 2012).  
Even if the CSOs’ buildings and stock were unaffected, the significant environmental 
changes from the earthquakes shaped where, how, and with whom they operated after the 
105 
 
 
 
earthquakes.  Studying organisations in these centres offers unique insights into 
organisational responses to major contextual shifts.  
Prior to the Canterbury earthquakes, each of these town centres was developing and 
changing.  The earthquakes interrupted and altered these development trajectories, while also 
shaping the post-earthquake environments for organisations in this study. 
The discussion in this chapter draws on a combination of primary data from 
interviews with key informants (KIs) and field observations, and secondary data from reports, 
planning documents, and published literature.  The contexts are presented here in the form of 
narrative reflections on the changing environments in Canterbury and the study town centres. 
They are intended as background for the in-depth contextualised analysis of the case studies 
which follow in chapters 5 and 6. 
  
4.2 The Earthquake Events 
During 2010 and 2011, Canterbury experienced five large earthquakes and thousands 
of aftershocks (the approximate location of the epicentres for these events are shown in 
Figure 8).  The earthquake series unfolded with separate faults rupturing at different points in 
time, creating an uneven landscape of disruption and recovery.  Prior to 2010, experts were 
aware that an estimated 50 per cent of Canterbury’s seismic hazard was due to unknown 
faults (Stirling, Yetton, Pettinga, Berryman, & Downes, 1999).  Public awareness of the 
area’s seismic risk focused on the known and active Alpine fault about 150 km west of 
Christchurch, Canterbury’s largest city.  Canterbury has experienced disruptive earthquakes 
on other faults throughout its recorded history, but before 2010, there had been relatively 
little seismicity for nearly 100 years.  
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Figure 8: Study areas and five major earthquake epicentres 
 
The 2010/2011 earthquakes are by far the most expensive disasters in New Zealand’s 
modern history.  The potential cost of recovery and reconstruction has been estimated at 
about NZ$40 billion, distributed between residential property ($18 billion), commercial and 
social assets 
29
 ($15 billion), and infrastructure ($5 billion) (NZ Treasury, 2013).  The total 
estimated cost of the damage is equivalent to around 19 per cent of New Zealand’s GDP (NZ 
Treasury, 2013).  The following sections describe the main features of each of the five 
earthquake events.  
4.2.1 September 4, 2010 
An M 7.1 earthquake struck at 4:36 a.m. on September 4, 2010.  The earthquake 
occurred on a previously unmapped fault approximately 40 km west of Christchurch at a 
depth of 10 km, in a rural area near the town of Darfield (see Figure 8).  Areas near the fault 
rupture experienced ground accelerations that were 1.26 times the acceleration due to gravity 
                                                 
29
 Social assets include publicly owned buildings and property, for example, schools, libraries, and hospitals.  
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(GNS Science, 2011b).  Due in part to its timing and location, there were few serious injuries 
and no fatalities attributed to the Darfield earthquake. 
The September 2010 earthquake caused a large amount of shaking damage and 
significant but localised liquefaction damage.  Damage was especially extensive in low-lying 
areas such as historic waterway channels and wetlands, particularly in Christchurch and 
Kaiapoi.  Most of the damaged buildings were unreinforced masonry buildings and 
residences with foundations in areas experiencing ground failure (Wood, Robins, & Hare, 
2010).  Liquefaction and lateral spreading caused region-wide disruptions to buried 
infrastructure (including water and wastewater pipelines and some power and 
communications cables) and transportation infrastructure (road, bridge, and rail).  Between 
September and December 2010, Canterbury homeowners lodged 142,635 claims with the 
Earthquake Commission, New Zealand’s national insurance provider for damage caused by 
geophysical events (Wood et al., 2010).
30
  The total estimated damage to buildings from this 
event was approximately NZ$4 billion, with an additional NZ$1 billion in lifeline utility 
damage (Bascand, 2011; Eidinger, Tang, & Rourke, 2010). 
4.2.2 December 26, 2010 
More than three months after the initial event, on Boxing Day 2010, a swarm of more 
than 32 shallow aftershocks (the largest of which was M 4.9), occurred on a fault almost 
directly below the Christchurch CBD.  This is traditionally one of the busiest shopping days 
in New Zealand, and many Christchurch retailers were having sales and promotions to 
encourage customers to return to the CBD after the September event.  As a result of the 
earthquake, a number of streets in the CBD were cordoned off, many areas temporarily lost 
power, and buildings experienced further damage.  This event served to exacerbate people’s 
                                                 
30
 Specifically, EQC insures residential property and contents against earthquakes, landslips, volcanic eruptions, 
hydrothermal activity, and tsunami (EQC, 2013).   
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perception that the central city was dangerous, and continued to negatively impact retailers 
and hospitality businesses in the following months. 
4.2.3 February 22, 2011 
Approximately six months after the September 2010 earthquake, a separate fault 
ruptured in Canterbury leading to a much different set of effects.  On Tuesday February 22, 
starting at 12:51p.m., two relatively shallow and intense (M 6.3 and M 6.1 respectively) 
earthquakes occurred on a fault under the Port Hills near Lyttelton, approximately 10 km east 
of the Christchurch CBD.  The energy release from this fault rupture was highly directional, 
with the horizontal East-West shaking effectively ‘pointing’ at Christchurch.  The M 6.3 
earthquake produced peak ground accelerations (PGA) of 2.2, which were significantly larger 
than those during the September earthquake, despite the February earthquake’s lower 
magnitude (GNS Science, 2011b; Kam, Pampanin, & Elwood, 2011).  
This earthquake again triggered widespread liquefaction, especially in central and 
eastern Christchurch, and damaged an estimated 46 per cent of greater Christchurch’s road, 
water, and sewage infrastructure (CERA, 2012).  This event also resulted in substantial 
rockfalls and landslides in the Port Hills to the south and east of the city, and high intensity 
shaking caused extensive building damage throughout Canterbury.  Unlike the September 
earthquake, there were 185 fatalities (NZ Police, 2012).  The majority (133) of the deaths 
occurred in two major building collapses in the Christchurch CBD (the Canterbury Television 
and the Pine Gould Corporation buildings). 
4.2.4 June 13, 2011 
On June 13, 2011, Canterbury was struck by an M 5.6 earthquake and about 80 
minutes later by a more powerful M 6.3 aftershock (GNS Science, 2011a).  These 
earthquakes were centred approximately 13 km southeast of Christchurch.  There were no 
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fatalities, but an estimated 46 serious injuries and further damage to property.  These 
aftershocks aggravated existing damage and caused some new damage to buildings and 
infrastructure in parts of Christchurch that had not been badly affected by earlier shocks 
(Taylor, Chang, Elwood, Seville, & Brunsdon, 2012).  These earthquakes again caused 
widespread business interruption and affected the psychosocial well-being of the population.  
This had significant effects on organisations operating in disrupted areas, exacerbating strain 
among co-workers, leading to higher error rates at work, and resulting in staff and customers 
relocating from the area due to the on-going nature of the disruptions (Stevenson, Vargo, 
Seville, Mcnaughton, & Powell, 2011). 
4.2.5 December 23, 2011 
The last major earthquake occurred on December 23, 2011.  Three aftershocks, the 
largest of which was M 6.0, occurred just after 3 p.m. and were centred near Lyttelton (GNS 
Science, 2012).  This event caused localised liquefaction in places that had already been hit 
multiple times and caused further damage to infrastructure.  Many shops and buildings were 
closed for engineering inspections, and the Christchurch cathedral, which had been severely 
damaged in the February earthquakes, sustained further damage. 
  
4.3 Post-disaster Environments 
The 2010/2011 earthquakes significantly altered the regional and local contexts for 
the case study organisations in this research.  The earthquakes caused widespread damage to 
the built environment, but also catalysed social and institutional responses that had major 
implications for Canterbury organisations.  Organisations navigated and adapted to the post-
disaster environments differently.  Some successfully rebuilt in Canterbury, others left the 
region, and still others closed, never to reopen.  In the next sections, I provide an overview of 
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the pre-earthquake development trajectories and post-earthquake disruptions for the 
Canterbury region and the Christchurch, Lyttelton and Kaiapoi town centres within it.  
4.3.1 Earthquake impacts on the Canterbury region 
Situated on the eastern side of New Zealand’s South Island (Figure 8), Canterbury is 
the country’s largest region by land mass and the second-largest by population, bordered by 
the Pacific coast in the east and the Southern Alps in the west (Dalziel & Saunders, 2012).  
The governance of the region is divided into 10 councils: the Christchurch City Council and 
nine District Councils.  
Although the region’s development roots were based in agriculture, which remains an 
important part of Canterbury’s economy, Christchurch city and the surrounding suburban 
area is now the region’s economic engine.  Most of the region’s land area remains rural, but 
341,400 (over 60%) of the estimated 539,433 people in Canterbury lived in Christchurch in 
2013 (Statistics New Zealand, 2013a). 
At the time of the earthquakes the Canterbury regional economy was relatively strong 
and growing.  ‘Business and property services’ and ‘wholesale and retail trade’ were the top 
two industry sectors in terms of contribution to regional GDP and contribution to regional 
employment (Infometrics Ltd., 2012).  Like the rest of New Zealand, Canterbury experienced 
increased unemployment during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008 and 2009, but the 
region enjoyed stronger GDP growth during that period than New Zealand on average (CDC, 
2013). 
The 2010/2011 earthquakes occurred relatively close to Christchurch and, therefore, 
close to the highest concentrations of businesses and infrastructure in the region.  
Interestingly, after the earthquakes, between 2010 and 2012, the total number of people 
employed in Canterbury increased, but the total number of businesses decreased (Table 9).  
This growth in employment, but decline in business numbers is due in part to companies in 
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post-earthquake growth sectors (e.g. construction and critical infrastructure) taking on 
additional workers to meet the reconstruction demands while businesses in other sectors 
remained closed or relocated.  The greatest employment reductions occurred in the retail and 
hospitality sectors (Statistics New Zealand, 2012). 
Additionally, the badly damaged centres of Christchurch, Lyttelton, and Kaiapoi 
experienced both reduced employee and business numbers between 2010 and 2011 (Table 9).  
Following the February earthquake business numbers experienced a net decrease in 
Canterbury.  Kaiapoi, however, which was relatively unaffected by the February event, 
experienced a net increase.  
Table 9: Business and employee counts by geographic area
31 
 
 
 
2001 2006 2010 2011 2012 
Canterbury 
Businesses 49,926 61,986 64,894 64,405 63,471 
Employees 219,370 253,880 254,400 254,610 256,560 
       
Christchurch 
CBD 
Businesses 5,584 6,139 5,983 5,705 3,731 
Employees 49,690 52,500 51,370 47,460 29,250 
       
Kaiapoi  
Businesses 436 518 535 521 512 
Employees 1,330 1,660 1,715 1,600 1,760 
       
Lyttelton 
Businesses 288 388 407 416 394 
Employees 1,440 1,430 1,230 1,180 1,170 
Source: Statistics New Zealand (2013a) 
Overall, as of August 2013, there were still more businesses migrating out of Canterbury to 
other parts of New Zealand than arriving into the region (CERA, 2013).   
Between June 2010 and June 2012, earthquake affected parts of Canterbury 
experienced a population reduction (estimated at -2% for the Greater Christchurch area)
32
 
                                                 
31
 Businesses in Statistics New Zealand (2013) counts include “individual, private-sector and public-sector 
enterprises that are engaged in the production of goods and services… which generally includes all employing 
units and those enterprises with GST turnover greater than $30,000.” 
32
 The Greater Christchurch area is defined by drawing a line around Christchurch City that takes in the 
communities within the 'commuter belt' (approximately half an hour drive from the Central City).  Greater 
Christchurch therefore includes the urban area of Christchurch City and Lyttelton, the area of Selwyn District 
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(Infometrics Ltd., 2012).  After nearly two years of decline the trend started to reverse, with 
June 2013 estimates showing net population growth for the region as a whole (Table 10).  
Table 10 also shows that in areas that were more heavily impacted, including the 
Christchurch CBD, Kaiapoi, and Lyttelton, residential populations had not returned to pre-
earthquake levels by 2013.   
Table 10: Residential population by area  
 
 
 
 
Organisations anticipating positive outcomes from reconstruction, and a return to pre-
earthquake levels economic growth have had to wait longer than initially projected following 
the earthquakes (NZIER, 2012).  Real GDP growth for the region between 2010 and 2012 
was steady but dampened by a weak global economy, central government deleveraging to 
reduce the debt to GDP ratio (e.g. asset sales at the national level), and financial and 
regulatory uncertainty about the rebuild (exacerbated by recurring earthquakes, which 
repeatedly set back progress) (NZIER, 2012).  
Despite the slow pace of recovery, the overall effect of the earthquakes on the 
regional economy has been relatively subdued, with employment and business numbers 
stabilising through 2012 and 2013.  A reassessment of the Canterbury Regional Economic 
Development Strategy (CREDS) in 2012 concluded that the development strategies adopted 
prior to the earthquakes remained a useful framework for guiding Canterbury’s recovery and 
future development (Dalziel & Saunders, 2012).  At the time of writing it is still difficult to 
know what the full impact of the earthquakes will be in these areas.  Even though the last 
                                                                                                                                                        
north of the Selwyn River and east of Kirwee, and Waimakariri District south of the Ashley River and east of 
Swannanoa (including the towns of Rangiora, Waikuku, Woodend/Pegasus and Kaiapoi) (GCUD, 2012, p. 1).  
 
2001 2006 2013 
Canterbury 481,431 521,832 539,433 
Christchurch CBD 7,269 7,653 4,905 
Kaiapoi  6,885 7,554 6,900 
Lyttelton 3,042 3,072 2,859 
Source: Statistics New Zealand (2013) 
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significantly damaging earthquake was in 2011, it may be some years before the full extent of 
the impact and outcomes of the recovery process are evident.  
4.4.2 Canterbury’s post-disaster institutional environment 
Several national and regional level institutional responses significantly influenced the 
post-disaster environment for Canterbury organisations.  The development of new legislation, 
new agencies, and new power-sharing arrangements to facilitate the unprecedented response 
and recovery process altered the physical, regulatory, and resource environments for 
Canterbury organisations.  Here, I focus on three changes that had substantial impacts on 
organisations in this study: changes to formal institutional structures, changes to commercial 
accommodation, and residential land zoning.  
First, changes to formal institutional structures initiated through post-disaster 
legislation meant that organisations had to learn to navigate new bureaucracies, but some of 
the changes also enabled access to new support resources.  Less than two weeks after the 
September earthquake, Parliament passed the Canterbury Earthquake Response and Recovery 
(CERR) Act, which facilitated central government response and recovery activities in the 
affected region.  The CERR Act 2010 was accompanied by the appointment of a Minister for 
Canterbury Earthquake Recovery, a position with special powers to coordinate the recovery 
and reconstruction activities on behalf of the central government (CERA, 2013).  
After the far more disruptive February 2011 earthquake, the government declared 
New Zealand’s first ever ‘state of national emergency,’ which lasted two months (Brookie, 
2012) and gave the national Director of Civil Defence special powers to coordinate the 
earthquake response (New Zealand Parliament, 2011).  In March 2011, Parliament passed the 
Canterbury Earthquake Recovery (CER) Act 2011 and created the Canterbury Earthquake 
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Recovery Authority (CERA).
33
  CERA is a national government department responsible for 
coordinating recovery activities with the Christchurch City Council, the Selwyn and 
Waimakariri District Councils, the Regional Council known as Environment Canterbury 
(ECan),
34
 and Te Rūnanga o Ngai Tahu (TRoNT)35 (Brookie, 2012).   
The involvement of the national government increased the availability of financial 
resources for both public and private organisations in Canterbury.  The national government 
entered cost-sharing agreements with Christchurch City, Selwyn, and Waimakariri District 
Councils to help finance recovery costs as well as infrastructure and building repairs.  The 
government also created the Earthquake Support Subsidy (ESS), administered by Work and 
Income New Zealand (WINZ), to aid small and medium businesses affected by the 
earthquakes.  The ESS helped employers continue paying wages while owners of earthquake-
affected business made decisions about the future (Fischer-Smith, 2013). 
The large scale response and recovery required by the earthquakes catalysed 
unprecedented collaboration among existing organisations and institutions in Canterbury, 
which provided support and resources for businesses.  For example, two business associations 
the Canterbury Employers Chamber of Commerce (CECC) and the Canterbury Development 
Corporation (CDC) combined to form Recover Canterbury in March 2011.  Recover 
Canterbury sent out mobile business recovery centres, hired business recovery coordinators to 
advise businesses, ran workshops and networking events, and administered the Canterbury 
Business Recovery Trust Fund which provided grants directly to organisations in need 
following the earthquakes (Stevenson, Kachali, et al., 2011).  
Despite these benefits, at times following the earthquakes, poor coordination between 
CERA, local authorities, and their various partners led to stagnated reconstruction, redundant 
                                                 
33
 This law simultaneously repealed and replaced the Canterbury Earthquake Response and Recovery (CERR) 
Act, which was passed in September 2010 (Brookie, 2012).  
34
 ECan is responsible for environmental resource management and emergency management in Canterbury. 
35
 The tribal council established by the Runanga o Ngai Tahu Act 1996  
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planning and other processes, and miscommunication in ways that challenged organisations 
trying to pursue recovery.  For example, miscommunication between CERA and local 
representatives in Lyttelton about who was responsible for the cost of building demolitions 
ordered by civil defence led to several building owners pursuing demolition under the false 
premises that the cost would be covered by CERA.  Owners were billed for the demolition 
work, and the matter required arbitration by national government representatives.  Ultimately, 
the Civil Defence National Controller issued a statement acknowledging this misleading 
communication and clarifying that in cases where insurance did not cover the demolition 
work: “… a lien over the property will be taken, to be settled on subsequent sale of the 
property or the land” (John Hamilton, as quoted in Turner (2011)).  For the affected building 
owners, however, the miscommunication was costly both financially and emotionally, and led 
to an increased sense of uncertainty for Lyttelton building owners and tenants. For some 
owners, it acted as a disincentive against actively pursuing reconstruction in the area. 
The second issue affecting organisations, reduced availability of commercial 
accommodation, was the combined result of earthquake damage and subsequent regulatory 
decisions.  The CER Act empowered CERA to mandate the demolition of buildings ‘deemed 
dangerous,’ and required all commercial buildings to have detailed post-earthquake 
engineering evaluations (DEEs).  As of May 2012, engineers had completed around 300 
DEEs out of the approximately 7,000 required.  Of those inspected, roughly one third had 
been closed by building owners as a result of the DEE recommendations (Taylor et al., 2012).  
In some cases, this has led to the sudden closure of entire blocks of commercial 
accommodation, significantly disrupting some organisations while also creating opportunities 
for those that remained open.  
These changes to commercial accommodation shaped organisations’ relocation 
options following the earthquakes. Due to the high demand on an increasingly limited 
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building stock, commercial tenants had less bargaining power after the earthquakes.  As a 
result tenants were more likely to agree to premium rents and sign up for leases with lengthy 
initial terms (4-5 years) (Robertson, 2012).  
Finally, organisations across Canterbury were affected by CERA’s June 2011 
decision to implement a zoning system for all residential land in Christchurch (CERA 2011).  
Affected residential areas were initially divided into four colour-coded zones:  
1. Red: not suitable for continued residential occupation without extensive land 
remediation,  
2. Green: suitable for continued residential occupation,  
3. Orange: mapped areas in which engineers needed to undertake further 
investigation, and  
4. White: unmapped or non-residential land.  
As part of this announcement, the central government declared it would purchase 
insured residential homes and land in the red-zone.  As a result of these earthquakes, 7,857 
residential properties (in some cases large parts of entire neighbourhoods) were red-zoned, 
and approximately 10,000 required rebuilding or significant foundation repairs (Statistics 
New Zealand, 2013b).  
Institutional responses in Canterbury both challenged and enabled organisational 
recovery.  Government systems continued functioning and adapted to suit the altered post-
disaster environment, drawing on competencies established before the earthquakes and 
creating new avenues and partnerships in the aftermath.  For many organisations, however, 
the responses to the earthquakes were just as, if not more, disruptive than the earthquakes 
themselves.  Regulatory changes and long-term planning often complicated organisations’ 
short-term recovery goals.  For organisations wanting to continue operating in the dynamic 
Canterbury environment, a combination of vigilance and adaptability was required.  
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4.4.3 Town centre contexts  
Organisations’ post-disaster experiences were also shaped by the distinctive pre-
earthquake trends and post-disaster environments of their town centres.  In the decade leading 
up to the earthquakes, the Christchurch CBD, Kaiapoi, and Lyttelton were all experiencing 
moderate levels of population and economic growth, and were all to varying degrees viable 
commercial centres.  At the same time, the Christchurch CBD and Kaiapoi had experienced a 
degree of ‘hollowing out’ over several decades, as industry activity abandoned the town 
centres and retailers increasingly struggled to compete with suburban malls and peripheral 
shopping centres.  Both the Christchurch CBD and Kaiapoi were struggling to maintain 
relevance as economic and social centres for their respective communities, and were in the 
midst of planning revitalisation initiatives.  The realisation of these initiatives, however, was 
constrained by aging buildings and infrastructure in each place.  
At the time of the earthquakes, the Christchurch CBD was characterised by a high 
level of vacant commercial buildings, a relatively old and low-quality building stock, and 
depressed rental prices when compared to other major cities in New Zealand (Ernst & Young, 
2012).  This was largely a result of the ongoing process of hollowing-out, and of office 
building development that had outpaced demand in the 1960s and 1970s.  This over-
development had been exacerbated by the stock market collapse of 1987 and the deregulation 
and subsequent recession of the early 1990s.  Between 1990 and 2007, only one office 
building was constructed in the Christchurch CBD, and only three high quality ‘A+ grade’ 
commercial buildings were built between 2007 and 2012 ( Ernst & Young, 2012).  Kaiapoi 
was characterised by a similar situation of low quality buildings, but had lower commercial 
vacancy rates than the Christchurch CBD at the time of the earthquakes (Property Economics 
2010). 
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Lyttelton, on the other hand, had experienced lesser degrees of population and 
economic growth in the 2000s compared to Christchurch and Kaiapoi.  This difference was in 
part due to the lack of space to expand in Lyttelton, in view of its steep surrounding 
topography and sea boundary.  However, this lack of expansion meant that the Lyttelton town 
centre remained both fairly concentrated and relevant as the retail and entertainment heart of 
the community.  Nevertheless, like the Christchurch CBD and Kaiapoi, Lyttelton had 
initiated a gradual revitalisation process for its built environment.  In the years prior to the 
earthquakes, several historic buildings in the centre had been converted to retail and 
hospitality venues to serve the growing young, white collar residential population and an 
increased number of visitors to the area.  
In summary, each town centre provided a unique set of benefits and challenges to 
organisational operations prior to the earthquakes. At the time of the earthquakes, the 
Christchurch CBD’s residential population was growing, but retail and hospitality businesses 
struggled to compete with growing suburban areas. Similarly, Kaiapoi’s residential 
population was also growing steadily, but the town centre had lost significant anchor 
industries over previous decades, and local retailer struggled to compete with other nearby 
areas.  The CBD and Kaiapoi were at different stages of urban revitalisation projects meant to 
counteract some of the negative trends and retain these centres’ relevance as social and 
economic hubs.  Lyttelton’s anchor industry the Lyttelton Port Company of Christchurch, on 
the other hand, was performing well before the earthquakes and the town centre was 
becoming an increasingly vibrant hub for local residents and visitors. 
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Christchurch CBD, post-earthquake 
The Christchurch CBD (Figure 9) was both the geographic centre of Christchurch 
and, for most of its history, the economic and social heart of the city as well.
36
  The 
Christchurch CBD had experienced employment and business growth between 2001 and 
2006, though growth contracted slightly during the GFC.  In 2009, the Christchurch CBD had 
an estimated 6,135 businesses or employing organisations with nearly 51,300 employees 
(Stats NZ 2013b).  
Figure 9: Christchurch Central Business District  
 
As a result of extensive damage to the built environment and the imposition of a 
central city cordon, the post-earthquake Christchurch CBD assumed a very different form and 
function.  In total, nearly 1,600 commercial buildings (an estimated 70% of the total) will 
                                                 
36
 The three census areas that comprise the Christchurch CBD (Hagley, Cathedral Square and Avon Loop) are 
bound by four major avenues (Deans Ave., Moorhouse Ave., Fitzgerald Ave., and Bealey Ave) and crossed 
diagonally by the Avon River. 
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have been totally or partially demolished at the end of the Christchurch CBD’s reconstruction 
(Brownlee, 2012).
37
  Several major cultural and visitor amenities in the CBD were 
demolished or closed long term.  These demolitions or closures included the Christchurch 
Cathedral (around which the city was initially planned), the central Bus Exchange (through 
which an estimated 25,000 people travelled each day prior to the earthquake), and several 
large entertainment venues, including the AMI Stadium and The Christchurch Convention 
Centre (CCC, 2006).   
Following each of the major earthquakes, the CCC and the Ministry of Civil Defence 
and Emergency Management erected a fence and barriers around all or parts of the CBD.  
The decision to cordon the CBD in this way was a defining feature of the post-disaster 
environment in Christchurch.  A CBD cordon was in place for approximately one week 
following the September 2010 earthquake, and again briefly after the 2010 Boxing Day 
aftershock.  After the February 2011 earthquake, the cordon was again erected around almost 
the entire area contained within the four avenues (Figure 9), and substantial parts remained in 
place for nearly 2.5 years.  In March 2011 the Christchurch City Council progressively 
allowed people with businesses into some zones of the cordon, so that they could access their 
organisations, but some people never regained access to their buildings.  
The decision to cordon the CBD was officially characterised as a safety measure, but 
in the KI interviews local business advocates and economic development officials also 
characterised it as a strategic decision.  The cordon eased demolition management, making it 
faster and cheaper to proceed with a large number of demolitions.  The cordon also, 
according to a local business association leader, made the buildings within the cordon “the 
insurance companies’ problem”.  Building occupants were not required to pay rent or pursue 
                                                 
37
 Many of these demolitions occurred not because the buildings were dangerous or beyond repair, but because 
they were deemed not economical to repair (Brown, Seville, & Vargo, 2013).  The high level of insurance 
coverage in New Zealand means it is sometimes cheaper and more appealing to demolish and use insurance 
money to reconstruct a new building than to try to remediate an existing building (Muir-Wood, 2012). 
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repairs while their buildings were cordoned, and they often qualified for business interruption 
insurance if they could not access their building.  Another respondent reported that without 
the cordon there may have been pressure to reoccupy buildings in areas that were not 
conducive to work or safety.  
For some CSO respondents, their inability to access the cordon caused a symbolic loss 
of ownership over that space and this seemed to promote further disengagement from the 
CBD.  A local business advocate expressed concern in an interview that unclear timelines 
around the reduction of the CBD cordon prompted people to sign long-term leases elsewhere, 
for instance.  Without proper management, this interviewee believed the cordon had the 
potential to “kill the city centre” long-term.   
In the short term, the cordons, extensive building demolition, and loss of anchor 
businesses and attractions accelerated the pre-existing trend of urban decentralisation and 
further undermined the CBD’s potential to function as the economic and cultural heart of the 
city.  After the 2011 earthquakes, more than 80 per cent of the businesses in the CBD were 
displaced.  Due to relatively high vacancy rates in the near suburbs, however, many of the 
businesses quickly relocated and unemployment in greater Christchurch did not rise 
significantly after the earthquakes (Dalziel & Saunders, 2012; Ernst & Young, 2012). 
38
  
Following the earthquakes, the CCC and business and city advocates proactively 
implemented programmes to minimize the disruptive effects of the damage and cordons, and 
to encourage people to continue interacting with the CBD.  These responses can be placed 
into three categories: 1) promotion campaigns, 2) temporary spaces of economic and social 
engagement with the city, and 3) planning focused on re-establishing anchor attractions in the 
CBD.  Following the September 2010 earthquake, the Central Christchurch Business 
                                                 
38
 A study completed by CERA in 2012 found that of the CBD commercial tenants responding to their survey 
that had to relocate, nearly a quarter of these respondents relocated to the near northwest suburbs of 
Addington/Middleton and Riccarton (Ernst & Young, 2012). 
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Association (CCBA) and hospitality and retail organisations worked with businesses on 
promotion campaigns for the central city.  For example, after the Boxing Day aftershock the 
CCBA coordinated the Boxing Day Replay Sale on February 12, 2011, with the aim of 
encouraging a nervous public back into the city.  Other campaigns, such as the Canterbury 
and Christchurch Tourism’s “Pop Up City Christchurch” website, have sought to promote the 
CBD and local businesses as the city progressively reopened.  
The second type of response, creating spaces of engagement with the city, also sought 
to draw people back into the city as the cordons were progressively removed.  Within a 
month of the February 2011 earthquakes, business advocates and members of the CCBA 
started the Restart the Heart Trust
 39
 to establish a central retail hub in shipping containers 
populated by well-known or iconic Christchurch CBD retail and hospitality businesses.  The 
Cashel St based ReStart Mall opened in October 2011 and, at least initially, served as a major 
draw for people to maintain contact with the city centre.  Other groups including, Gap Filler 
and Life in Vacant Spaces, played an important role by working with community groups and 
people in creative industries, to establish temporary projects in vacant sites throughout 
Christchurch.  These initiatives helped maintain some ongoing citizen engagement with the 
city.  
Finally, planning in the CBD after the earthquakes focused on anchor projects and 
fostering industry agglomerations as important strategies to encourage medium and long-term 
return of businesses to the CBD.  These plans attempt to remedy past issues with urban 
sprawl and the oversupply of commercial space.  The plan developed by Christchurch Central 
Development Unit (CCDU) 
40
 includes several sector-specific precincts (e.g. retail, health, 
                                                 
39 
The project was funded largely though sponsorship from ASB Bank and the Christchurch Earthquake Appeal 
Trust, an independent charity responsible for allocating money raised by the Christchurch Earthquake Appeal.  
40
 In April 2012, CERA established the Christchurch Central Development Unit (CCDU) which was tasked with 
laying out a plan for the CBD.  Many raised concerns that the CCDU was not established collaboratively with 
the Christchurch City Council and in some ways trumped the effort put into the planning and consulting process 
the CCC had undertaken.  Some Christchurch leaders, however, felt that the CCDU was necessary to “overcome 
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and performing arts), and “The Frame” (pictured in Figure 10), a border of green space 
around the city designed to “contain the Core” of the city (CCDU, 2012, p. 31).  
Figure 10: Diagram of proposed developments for the Christchurch CBD 
 
 Source: CCDU (2012, p.6) 
With over 2,200 fewer businesses in 2013 than 2010 (a 38% reduction) and over 
2,700 fewer residents compared to 2006 (a loss of about 36% of the 2006 population), the 
Christchurch CBD is still one of the worst affected areas in Canterbury.  The Christchurch 
CBD’s recovery is characterised by a complex web of interactions between actors that 
represent different levels of government as well as private organisations and citizens.  In the 
aftermath of the earthquakes, the CBD is characterised by greatly reduced commercial 
accommodation and disrupted patterns of interaction between organisations, residents, and 
                                                                                                                                                        
the number of small land titles and the complexities of existing use-rights, as well as to create confidence in the 
CBD through the siting of major [anchor] projects” (Taylor et al., 2012, p.14).  
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other visitors to the CBD; as well as efforts to counteract the hollowing-out of the central 
city.   
Kaiapoi, post-earthquake 
Kaiapoi is a small town located in the Waimakariri District of North Canterbury, 
approximately 20 km north of Christchurch. The town sits just over two metres above sea 
level and is built on alluvial soils, deposited by the Waimakariri and Kaiapoi Rivers, 
rendering it vulnerable to both flooding and earthquake liquefaction. The town centre itself 
straddles the Kaiapoi River (Figure 11).  
Despite a number of challenges that include progressive loss of industrial anchor 
organisations over the last several decades,
41
 between 60-70 per cent of residents working 
elsewhere, and an “aging and generally poor quality built environment” (Property Economics, 
2010, p. 24), Kaiapoi experienced a moderate level of economic growth in the decade 
preceding the earthquake.  The number of businesses and employees in Kaiapoi had increased 
fairly steadily between 2001 and 2010 (WDC, 2012).  Similarly, the population of the town 
and nearby residential areas of Pines Beach and Kairaki grew throughout this period, 
reflecting a general trend of residential development in the Waimakariri District (WDC, 
2012).  
The September 2010 earthquake severely impacted both Kaiapoi’s commercial and 
residential areas.  As a result of the September 2010 earthquake, the Kaiapoi town centre lost 
a significant portion of its buildings, including several locally significant heritage sites.  Like 
Christchurch, the initial response involved cordoning parts of the main street for nearly a 
week to assess buildings for safety (Vallance, 2013).   
                                                 
41
 The Kaiapoi Woollen Mills operated in Kaiapoi between 1860 and the 1972, and the North Canterbury Sheep 
farmers’ Cooperative Freezing Works operated in Kaiapoi between 1917 and 1991.  The closure of both of these 
companies caused large scale layoffs and prompted some people to question the town’s economic viability 
(Shepherd, 2004; Wood, 1993). 
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Figure 11: Kaiapoi town centre (area designated in Kaiapoi town plan 2010) 
 
This temporary closure directly affected 25% of local businesses.  Earthquake damage also 
led to the demolition of one of Kaiapoi’s main supermarkets, its anchor department store 
Blackwell’s, and many community facilities. 
Early assessments conducted by the local development trust, Enterprise North 
Canterbury (ENC) and the local business association, Kaiapoi Promotions Association (KPA), 
in 2010 revealed that up to a fifth of businesses in Kaiapoi had either closed or felt that they 
would close in the near future.  Similarly, the ‘leakage’ that Kaiapoi experienced prior to the 
earthquakes was likely to worsen, due to a further reduction of consumer choice and the 
unpleasantness and safety concerns associated with damaged buildings in the town centre.  
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In November 2010, ENC received funding from the central government for a recovery 
coordinator and to support Kaiapoi businesses and promote Kaiapoi.  KPA used the 
promotions money to launch two campaigns geared toward promoting Kaiapoi businesses to 
local residents, a coupon book, and the Shop Kaiapoi competition, where people received 
raffle entries for shopping at local businesses. 
These promotions echoed the social pressure that existed prior to the earthquakes to 
support local businesses.  This pressure was enforced through dense local networks 
(especially among business owners) in Kaiapoi.  Interview respondents repeatedly returned to 
the importance of ‘shopping local’ and ‘supporting local businesses’ despite many 
respondents noting that it was often impractical or inconvenient to do so.  Similarly, many of 
the business recovery coordinator’s activities focused on strengthening intra-local systems of 
support, including coordinating networking events for local business owners and working 
with clusters of businesses on co-promotion. 
Kaiapoi’s recent history of struggle to retain industries and retail spending shaped 
some of the development attitudes post-earthquake.  Some saw the February 2011 earthquake 
as an opportunity for Kaiapoi, especially after experiencing increased patronage by people 
displaced from the Christchurch CBD and disrupted suburbs, while others wanted to pursue 
the recovery within Kaiapoi’s historic limitations.  
A local economic development advocate discussed the great potential for office 
development as part of the centre redevelopment:  
“Kaiapoi will never have another opportunity to drag white collar employees out 
to a town like this if it hadn’t been for the second earthquake.” 
To an extent, this was true.  In the year following the February 2011 earthquake, at least 16 
new businesses started in Kaiapoi, some of which were “quake-displaced companies from the 
city” (WDC, 2012, p.8).   
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Yet, discussion of Kaiapoi’s economic future by respondents was often tempered by 
restraint:  
“At the end of the day, it’s actually probably never going to compete with 
Rangiora, or what goes on in Christchurch … it’s probably going to focus on its 
key values, which is a wee service town” (WDC employee). 
And,  
“Things were pretty tough for Kaiapoi, so you’re not going to turn it around, are 
you?  To becoming an economic powerhouse and all the rest of it… it’s not a 
retail destination.  It’s a service town” (Kaiapoi economic development 
advocate). 
Despite these concerns, the new plan adopted in June 2011, shifted away from emphasizing 
Kaiapoi’s historic river town past, toward promoting new development. 
Along with the release of the new plan, the WDC announced a $28 million dollar 
recovery funding shortfall that would be met by increased rates (Vallance, 2013).  Despite 
sounding like a setback, the rates increase that accompanied this announcement allowed the 
WDC to pursue community facility improvement projects that would have been improbable 
before the earthquakes.  For example, the loss of the Kaiapoi museum and library created the 
opportunity to redevelop an integrated service centre, library, museum, and art gallery space 
paid for, in part, by increased rates.  This facility is intended to be a substantial centre and 
“anchor for pedestrian activity” in the town centre that did not exist prior to the earthquake 
(WDC, 2012). 
After adopting the plan, new obstacles emerged that challenged Kaiapoi’s recovery.  
The June 2011 aftershocks caused further liquefaction and damage to the infrastructure.  This 
event was closely followed by the residential red zone decisions for the area (Vallance, 
2013).  Over 1,000 homes (more than a quarter of the total) in Kaiapoi were red-zoned and 
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several hundred more in Kairaki and Pines Beach (considered part of Kaiapoi’s residential 
catchment) (Vallance, 2013).  Relocations in response to the red zone decisions have caused 
significant depopulation in Kaiapoi.  The WDC responded to this disruption by implementing 
new processes to facilitate the rapid and concurrent approval of several residential 
subdivisions to the West and later North of Kaiapoi, enabled by changes under the CER Act 
(Vallance, 2013).  
The trajectory of Kaiapoi’s town centre involved both loss and renewal in the phase 
extending through 2012 and 2013.  Overall, in 2013, Kaiapoi’s town centre had 23 fewer 
businesses (Table 9) and over 650 fewer residents than in 2006 (a reduction of 4% and just 
under 9% respectively).  On the other hand, damage to Kaiapoi’s building stock helped the 
town begin to overcome previous planning challenges.  The older building stock that 
challenged Kaiapoi’s development in the past is being progressively replaced by new 
buildings.  Similarly, the new service centre and developments around the river will likely 
slow the sprawl and fragmentation of the pre-earthquake centre. 
Kaiapoi’s post-earthquake environment was shaped by strong collaborative leadership 
of WDC, ENC, and the KPA who worked closely with local business owners on economic 
recovery.  Pre-existing relationships among these actors, strengthened by the planning 
process initiated in 2008, facilitated these relationships post-disaster.  Local trends, reframed 
in light of the earthquakes provided a foundation for building strategies for the future.  
Lyttelton, post-earthquake 
Lyttelton is a coastal town southeast of Christchurch (Figure 12).  The town emerged 
around Lyttelton’s seaport, which served as the gateway to Canterbury’s colonial 
development.  Historically, most of the other businesses and organisations in Lyttelton 
(Figure 12) emerged to support the port and its workers.  The port continues to be important 
to both the Lyttelton and Canterbury economies (Rice 2004).  
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In the 1990s and 2000s, Lyttelton became an increasingly fashionable place to live for 
artists and young professionals attracted by relatively cheap property prices and the town’s 
harbour setting.  Along with this new population came an increasingly broad and active base 
of community organisations, such as the Lyttelton Harbour Business Association (LHBA) 
and Project Lyttelton, an active grassroots community organisation, in addition to long-
established organisations like the Lions and Rotary Clubs.  
In the few years prior to the 2010/2011 earthquakes, Lyttelton was also gaining 
popularity as a destination for visitors from Christchurch and beyond.  The local farmer’s 
market (initiated by Project Lyttelton) attracted hundreds of visitors to Lyttelton each 
weekend, and the 2009/2010 cruise season brought 50 ships and an estimated 100,000 
passengers to Lyttelton (LPC 2010).  The town centre was composed of primarily retail trade, 
accommodation, and food services geared toward both residents and visitors (CCC, 2012). 
The port company, however, was and is still by far the largest employer in the area with 
approximately 500 workers at the time of the earthquakes. 
The September 2010 earthquake had fairly minimal direct effects on Lyttelton.  Some 
buildings experienced shaking damage, and a few heritage buildings were seriously damaged.  
The port sustained an estimated $50 million of damage to wharves and other infrastructure, 
but was operational within 48 hours of the earthquake (LPC, 2010).   
The February 2011 earthquake, however, was centred in Lyttelton at a depth of only 5 
km.  The earthquake seriously damaged over a third of the buildings in the town centre, 
including a large proportion of the heritage buildings and social hubs.  Like Christchurch and 
Kaiapoi, Lyttelton’s town centre was also temporarily cordoned for approximately a week 
following the earthquakes, and areas around several damaged buildings were cordoned for 
longer.  
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Figure 12: Lyttelton town centre (area designated in Lyttelton town plan 2011) 
 
The earthquakes significantly reduced Lyttelton’s connectivity to Christchurch and 
other nearby areas, with infrastructure damage cutting the town off from a number of 
economically important traffic flows.  The road tunnel connecting Lyttelton to Christchurch 
through the Port Hills closed temporarily, and one of the rail tunnels closed longer term.  
Almost all cruise services to Lyttelton ceased immediately and were indefinitely rerouted to 
Akaroa, a relatively undamaged tourist town on Banks Peninsula.  Additionally, due to rock 
fall, the Sumner Road closed and remained closed through 2013.  This road connected 
Lyttelton to its nearest neighbour Sumner, a popular beach town and source of visitors to 
Lyttelton.  The closure also meant that vehicles from the port that could not use the tunnel 
(e.g. trucks transporting dangerous goods) needed to use an alternate route, which was more 
difficult and time consuming for drivers.  A local business association representative felt that 
the alternate route potentially made Lyttelton “less attractive” for certain kinds of shipping.   
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Like Kaiapoi, the Lyttelton Harbour Business Association (LHBA) received funding 
from the CCC to promote Lyttelton following the February earthquake.  Unlike Kaiapoi, 
however, a significant number of businesses in Lyttelton remained closed for prolonged 
periods following the 2011earthquake.  This made it difficult to use the funding for 
promotions when, according to a local business advocate: 
“We’ve got so little to shout about at the moment [September 2011], compared to 
what we did.  What is that campaign going to look like?  Telling people to come 
to Lyttelton, yeah great, but come to Lyttelton and do what when you get here?” 
Although locals continued to support businesses in the township, several key informants and 
CSO respondents referred to the need to achieve a ‘critical mass’ of businesses to make 
Lyttelton economically viable.   
At the same time, as in Christchurch and Kaiapoi, community groups and business 
associations played an active part in keeping local people engaged and connected to the 
Lyttelton town centre.  For example, local community groups made a makeshift theatre and 
staged a play on the site of a popular bar that had been demolished, and found a way to 
reinstate the farmer’s market in a new area to keep visitors coming into town. 
To a greater extent than the Christchurch CBD and Kaiapoi, Lyttelton is contained by 
its physical topography (with steep hills forming a semi-circular amphitheatre around the 
port) in ways that limit new development and for the possibility of relocating around the 
periphery of the damaged centre.  As a result, many local leaders’ actions have focused on 
expediting the demolition and town planning processes.   
The CCC adopted the Lyttelton town plan in June 2012.  The plan reflects some of 
Lyttelton’s fairly recent progress toward becoming a trendy, arts- and entertainment-focused 
centre.  The introduction of the plan states “Lyttelton will be a rebuilt and prosperous niche 
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centre” alternately referring to “boutique businesses,” “spaces for creativity,” and the 
inclusion of “local art in public spaces” (CCC, 2012).  
Lyttelton had 213 fewer residents in 2013 than in 2006 and 60 fewer businesses in 
2012 than in 2010 (reductions of about 7% and 5% respectively).  It is now more isolated 
than it was prior to the earthquakes, due to the loss of the Sumner Road and reduced traffic 
through the road tunnel (as a result of construction and people’s perception that it is unsafe).  
Similarly, fewer visitors are coming by sea, as cruise ships had still not returned to the port as 
of late 2013.  Many heritage buildings that drew tourists have been demolished.  Lyttelton’s 
recovery plan, however, builds on the strengths that were emerging in Lyttelton just prior to 
the earthquake, particularly the growth of the creative class, the prevalence of community 
groups, and the development of Lyttelton as a niche entertainment destination. 
  
4.4 Conclusion 
The impacts of the Canterbury earthquakes were unevenly distributed spatially and 
across sectors of the economy.  Organisations across Canterbury have sought to recover in an 
environment defined by a sustained sequence of disruptions over a period of years.  In 
addition to the earthquakes, institutional responses, such as the detailed engineering 
evaluations (DEEs) required for all commercial buildings and CERA’s decision to red zone 
thousands of residential properties, have shaped the post-disaster environments in which 
organisations pursued recovery. 
The three town centres in this study have had to redefine their image in light of 
drastically changed built environments, including the loss of historic buildings and social and 
cultural spaces.  Planners from the Christchurch CBD and Kaiapoi are using the 
redevelopment opportunity to re-establish their centre’s relevance as a social and economic 
hub for their communities.  Lyttelton is emphasizing and building on its newly emerging 
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identity as an arts and entertainment destination.  These plans, however, will take years to 
finish.  In the interim, community members and organisations have worked to overcome the 
disruption of social and economic ties.  They have also sought to stem the loss of engagement 
with the town centres and other spaces where those ties are formed and reinforced.   
Prior to the earthquakes, the case-study organisations, which I analyse in-depth in 
Chapters 5 and 6, were located in these town centres.  Although several of the case-study 
organisations relocated elsewhere, and a small number closed permanently, their real and 
perceived range of options and what constituted a good investment or a potential source of 
support were linked to their changing built and social environments.  Organisations operating 
in these town centres following the earthquake were recovering in communities that for the 
most-part wanted them to recover, that implemented programmes to aid economic recovery 
and that worked to support local businesses.  These interactions influenced how organisations 
pursued recovery.  In the next chapter, I examine the ways organisations are differentially 
connected to their local contexts, how these connections were reshaped by the earthquakes, 
and how these connections influenced organisations’ post-disaster outcomes.  
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Chapter 5: Geographic Embeddedness and Contextual Resilience 
 
5.1 Introduction 
How does an organisation’s embeddedness in its local context influence its post-
disaster trajectory?  While organisations’ embeddedness in society is understood to confer 
advantage during periods of business as usual, it has yet to be investigated in a post-disaster 
context.  Using 32 longitudinal comparative case studies, I examine the various ways that 
organisations connected to their local contexts, and explore the implications of these 
connections for organisations’ ability to survive and adapt in the earthquake aftermath. 
The chapter is organised into four main sections.  Section 5.2 introduces the case 
study organisations (CSOs) and their pre-earthquake trajectories.  Then, Section 5.3 examines 
the ways that the CSOs connected to their local environments.  Using the case studies, I 
derived a typology, or categorisation system, of local embeddedness.  The typology provides 
a basis for comparing the nature and extent of organisations’ embeddedness in their local 
contexts.
42
   
Next, Section 5.4 considers how a CSO’s embeddedness influenced the impact that 
the earthquakes had upon it.  The degree and type of disruptions that CSOs experienced as a 
result of the earthquakes depended both on the extent of disruption to their local contexts and 
on the ways CSOs were connected to those contexts.  For example, organisations with a high 
proportion of local customers were more severely disrupted by residential red zoning 
decisions than those that had a more geographically dispersed customer base. 
Finally, Section 5.5 examines the relationship between organisations’ embeddedness 
and their capacity to adapt and recover following the earthquakes.  I describe the range of 
                                                 
42
 Local embeddedness refers to the extent that an organisation interacts with, has gained legitimacy in, and is 
tied to its local (town) environment.  
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adaptive actions that CSOs pursued as part of their recovery, and discuss the features of 
embeddedness that hindered or enhanced their adaptive capacity.   
The results and discussion presented in chapters 5 and 6 are divided thematically to 
allow an exploration, respectively, of organisational embeddedness first through a place-
attachment lens and then through a network-specific lens.  Chapter 5 explores the nature of an 
organisation’s connections to place and its local environment.  The analysis focuses on how 
these connections were formed, enacted, and how they influenced an organisation’s post-
disaster trajectory.   
Chapter 5 discusses some aspects of organisational networks as they are an central 
drivers of local embeddedness. However, networks also enable organisations to transcend 
their local boundaries.  Chapter 6 explores the geographically distributed networks that 
organisations drew on for support following the earthquakes and what this meant for them in 
the earthquake aftermath.   
 
5.2 CSOs Pre-earthquake Characteristics  
I examine 32 case study organisations with a range of pre-earthquake characteristics.  
The CSOs were drawn from the Christchurch CBD (12 CSOs), Kaiapoi (11 CSOs), and 
Lyttelton (9 CSOs) areas.  As seen in Table 11, on average the CSOs had just over 7 full-time 
equivalent employees (FTEs) and had been operating for nearly 23 years. 
43
  Lyttelton CSOs 
were on average younger and smaller than CSOs in the Christchurch CBD and Kaiapoi.  
CBD CSOs were the oldest and largest on average.  Five CSOs were part of a broader 
corporate organisation, with offices in other areas.  The variable ‘FTE Corp’ reports the FTE 
for the wider corporate entity (Table 11).  For these organisations the average FTE for the 
corporation was about 137.   
                                                 
43
 To help protect respondents’ confidentiality the duration of operation is presented as range quartiles in Table 
11. 
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Table 11: CSO pre-earthquake (2010) attributes 
44
 
Pre-EQ 
Location 
CSO Pseudonym Industry 
Category 
FTE 
(FTE Corporate) 
Duration of 
Operation (yrs.) 
2008/2009 
Revenue 
45
 
Christchurch 
CBD 
Bond’s beverages 
Manufacturing/ 
Retail/ Wholesale/ 
Hospitality 
6 (190) 26.75+ 0 
Cat’s Cradle Hospitality 5.5 0-3.5 +1* 
Elegance Retail 1.5 12.25-26.5 +1 
Executive Sweets Hospitality 2 0-3.5 0 
Gilbert’s Building 
Supply 
Wholesale 26 (98) 26.75+ 0 
Health Solutions 
Tech & scientific 
services 
37.5 (45) 12.25-26.5 -1 
Kedzie & Sons Retail 3.5 26.75+ -1 
National Service 
Info. media & 
telecoms 
15 (289) 26.75+ -1 
Tech Sense 
Tech, & scientific 
services 
9 3.75-12.0 0 
The Attic Retail 2.5 0-3.5 0* 
Wigwam Retail 3 0-3.5 0 
Wolverine Wares Retail 6 26.75+ 0 
Christchurch 
CSO mean 
  9.8 29.2  
Kaiapoi 
Amherst Retail 
Retail 
 
4.5 12.25-26.5 -1 
Figure Financial 
Financial services 
& real estate 
3 3.75-12.0 0 
Kaiapoi Arts & 
Recreation 
Culture & 
recreation 
0 26.75+ 0 
Kaiapoi 
Assistance 
Social services 20 12.25-26.5 0 
Kaiapoi Corner 
Store 
Retail 1.5 3.75-12.0 0 
Kaiapoi Rental 
Financial services 
& real estate 
13 (61) 3.75-12.0 0 
Kaiapoi Shoppe Retail 7.5 26.75+ 0 
Kaiapoi Society 
Culture & 
recreation 
27.5 26.75+ 0 
Suave46 
Personal care 
services 
3 0-3.5 NA 
Toasty’s47 Hospitality 7 0-3.5 NA 
Timber Craft Manufacturing 1.5 12.25-26.5 0 
Kaiapoi CSO 
mean 
  8.0 27.3  
*Opened in 2009, thus number reflects a truncated trend between opening in 2009 and the first earthquake in 
September 2010.   
  
                                                 
44
 As discussed in Chapter 3, the organisation names used in this thesis are pseudonyms used to maintain 
confidentiality.  
45
 The 2008/2009 revenue figure indicates whether revenue increased (+1), stayed the same or experienced 
steady growth (0), or decreased (-1) between the 2008 and 2009 financial years.    
46
 Suave opened in late 2010 after the September earthquake.   
47
 Toasty’s opened in early 2010, prior to the September earthquake.   
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Table 11: (continued) CSO Pre-earthquake (2010) attributes 
Most of the organisations (22) had steady revenue prior to the earthquakes.  Only two 
experienced an upward revenue shift, and three organisations were too new to report this 
indicator (NA), having only opened in 2010.  The CSOs reported their revenue on a 
categorical scale from ‘very poor’ to ‘excellent’ for each financial year (1 July-30 June) from 
2008 to 2012. 
48
   
Table 11 shows an indicative direction of the self-reported revenue prior to the 
earthquakes (2008-2009), with values of either -1 (decreasing – e.g. from excellent in 2008 to 
good in 2009), 0 (same), or +1 (increasing).  Using this rough indicator, we can see that five 
CSOs experienced a downward revenue trend between the 2008 and 2009 financial years.  
Another organisational characteristic that I explore in this chapter is the ways the 
CSOs were connected to their pre-earthquake locations.  For this I needed to develop a 
typology for assessing organisations’ local embeddedness, which I describe in the next 
section.   
                                                 
48
 For some non-profit organisations, revenue was not an appropriate measure, in those cases they rated “level of 
financial resources available to support the mission” on the same scale. 
Pre-EQ 
Location 
CSO Pseudonym 
Industry 
Category 
FTE 
(FTE Corporate) 
Duration of 
Operation (yrs.) 
2008/2009 
Revenue 
Lyttelton 
Coastal Services 
Financial services 
& real estate 
6.5 12.25-26.5 0 
God Save the 
Queen 
Retail 1 0-3.5 0 
Good Old Pub Hospitality 10 0-3.5 -1 
McCoy’s 
Hospitality 
Hospitality 7 3.75-12.0 0 
Norwich Retail Retail 1 12.25-26.5 0 
Port Retail & 
Craft 
Retail/ 
Manufacturing 
2 3.75-12.0 0 
Pretty Patty’s 
Personal care 
services 
1 0-3.5 NA 
Pumpkin 
Community 
Group 
Culture & 
recreation 
1 12.25-26.5 0 
Star Creek Retail 1 3.75-12.0 0 
Lyttelton  
CSO mean 
  
3.4 8.8 0 
OVERALL 
CSO mean 
  
7.4 22.8  
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5.3 Typology of Local Embeddedness 
This analysis identifies the different ways organisations and organisational decision 
makers became embedded in their local contexts in ways that kept them from moving 
elsewhere, shaped organisational decisions, and constrained and enabled adaptive action.  
The CSOs became connected to their local contexts through a series of mechanisms of 
embeddedness.  Using interviews with organisation leaders, surveys, and field observations, I 
identified these mechanisms for each CSO in this study. 
The mechanisms can be placed in one of three categories of local embeddedness –
cognitive, relational networks, and institutional.  I derived these categories from Zukin and 
DiMaggio’s (1990) description of the four forms of economic embeddedness (cognitive, 
cultural, political, and structural-network).  In the typology in Figure 13, I synthesize aspects 
of political and cultural embeddedness into the larger category institutional embeddedness.  
The different categories of embeddedness in the typology serve to distinguish the distinct 
types of engagement that organisations have within their local environments, including, 
meanings that are formed and shared amongst people in those environments; exchanges that 
occur through formal and informal networks; and the regulations, norms, and social pressure 
that guide behaviour.  Each category of embeddedness (cognitive, network, and institutional) 
was associated with several mechanisms that describe the actions or processes through which 
embeddedness is developed.  The mechanisms, which I derived inductively from the case 
studies, embed the organisations in different facets of their local contexts.
49
   
Each of the CSOs was connected to its local environment by at least one of these 
mechanisms.  That said, it is important to note that the typology reflects the activities of this 
particular set of CSOs rather than for all organisations.   
  
                                                 
49
 Note that one of the mechanisms fell into two categories: “Organisation’s owner/decision makers affiliated 
with local groups” (I6/N6)) 
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Figure 13: Typology and mechanisms of local organisational embeddedness 
 
The next sections briefly define each type of embeddedness in the typology.  In these 
sections, I examine how the mechanisms within each embeddedness category connected the 
CSOs to their local contexts. 
5.3.1 Cognitive mechanisms  
Cognitive embeddedness has two related dimensions.  First, it refers to factors that 
limited organisation decision makers’ ability to exercise economic rationality.  Such factors 
include uncertainty, complexity, the cost of information, and the structured regularities of 
thought (Zukin & Dimaggio, 1990).  The second dimension refers to collective or social 
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cognition and the ways in which shared representations and meanings shaped people’s 
interpretations and decisions (Bakker et al., 2011; Kalantaridis & Bika, 2006; Maskell & 
Malmberg, 1999).  Both of these dimensions influenced the way people (e.g. an 
organisation’s decision makers or community members) select and understand information 
(Dequech, 2003). 
I identified three mechanisms of cognitive embeddedness (Figure 13) that shaped how 
CSOs connected to their local environment.  These were: ‘image alignment with local area’ 
(C1), ‘organisation brand awareness restricted to local area’ (C2), and ‘organisation identifies 
as local’ (C3).  The first two mechanisms address organisational image.  Image refers to the 
way that organisational leaders would like others to perceive their organisation and the 
impressions that others actually form of the organisation (Hatch & Schultz, 2002; Whetten, 
1998). 
Organisational decision makers, often small businesses owners who wanted to 
cultivate a positive local image, appropriated aspects of the town’s image for their 
organisation.  These decision makers relied on people’s common (positive) interpretations of 
place meanings to make certain associations between the organisation and the town.  Some 
respondents, for example, felt that prior to the earthquakes their Christchurch CBD location 
gave them “status”, positioned their product as “higher end,” and facilitated associations with 
“independent” and “unique” businesses in a way that distinguished them from organisations 
in the suburbs and the malls.  Similarly, six of the 11 CSOs in Kaiapoi included the town 
name in their organisation name, 
50
 and this contributed to the image of these CSOs as ‘local’ 
organisations that were drawing on local people’s positive functional and emotional 
associations with Kaiapoi. 
                                                 
50
 This number reflects a general trend in Kaiapoi, of the 40 organisations from Kaiapoi that responded to 
‘Survey 1’ 16 (40%) had Kaiapoi in their organisation name.   
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An organisation’s image is represented in part through its brand (e.g. its name, 
symbols, narratives, and other distinguishing features).  The mechanism ‘Organisation brand 
awareness restricted to local area’ (C2) refers to the extent to which the organisation’s 
identifiers are recognised outside of its local area.  If awareness of the CSO’s brand was 
restricted to the local area, it could act as a disincentive to organisational relocation outside of 
that area. 
The third cognitive mechanism (C3) addresses organisational identity.  Identity refers 
to what people within the organisation understand about its values and characteristics (Gioia, 
Price, Hamilton, & Thomas, 2010).  Some CSOs identified as a local (Kaiapoi, Lyttelton, or 
CBD) business, and this formed part of how they understood, experienced, and enacted their 
organisation.  Respondents explained that being “part of the community” or being a “local 
business” informed the interpretation of their mission or their organisational culture.  The 
owner of Toasty’s, for example, stated that as a Kaiapoi business it was important to them to 
act as “a hub of the community.”  Similarly, the owner of Figure Financial felt that their 
internal culture reflected the “relaxed and cruisy” atmosphere in Kaiapoi, and this congruence 
was part of why the owner chose to stay in Kaiapoi after the September earthquake. 
5.3.2 Network mechanisms  
Relational networks are central to organisational function.  For the purposes of this 
research, I refer specifically to the relational and structural features of a set of dyadic (one-to-
one) organisational relationships.  These relationships are characterised by repeated exchange 
between actors that are mutually acquainted (Podolny & Page, 1998; Zukin & Dimaggio, 
1990). 
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Network embeddedness is arguably the most important form of embedding for 
organisations.
51
  The people and organisations that composed organisations’ networks shaped 
the kinds of information and resources that they could access.  Local network embeddedness 
refers to the number, strength, and frequency of an organisation’s connections to others in the 
local area (Copus et al., 2011; Maskell & Malmberg, 1999; Temple, 2009). 
The CSOs enacted network embeddedness through a number of mechanisms, which I 
differentiate broadly into market and non-market sub-types.  In this research, I use the term 
‘market’ to refer to network relationships that have an element of formal monetary 
exchange.
52
  Local market embeddedness then refers to the strength and frequency of 
interactions between the organisation and its local customers and suppliers; or the level of 
dependence an organisation has on local ties to generate inputs and outputs (Halinen & 
Törnroos, 2005; Kalantaridis & Bika, 2006).  Market embeddedness includes high 
proportions of labour and other inputs from the local area (N2, N3) and the proportion of 
local customers (N1) upon which CSOs rely.  
The third market mechanism refers to interactions among local organisations that 
generate business for organisations (i.e. the local organisational ecology (N4)).  ‘Ecology,’ in 
this context, refers to an environment comprised of a community of organisations.  
Organisations that were embedded in the local organisational ecology, interacted with other 
local organisations interact with each other, often with synergistic effects, and collectively 
shaped their broader environment.
53
  As a result of these interactions an organisation became 
intertwined with and dependent upon the organisations in their local ecology.  In this study, I 
specifically refer to CSOs’ reliance on a community of local organisations to generate 
                                                 
51
 Zukin and DiMaggio (1990) in their seminal work Structures of Capital: The social organization of the 
economy, also emphasise the relative importance of network. They state that, what they refer to as “structural”, 
embeddedness, is “…more important than either cognitive or cultural embeddedness” (p.18).  
52
 It is important to note that embeddedness theory proposes that economic activity is embedded in society, and 
thus there is no such thing as a pure, rational, market relationship. 
53
 C.f. Rao (2002) for more on organisational ecologies  
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business for the CSO, but there are other ecological interactions that may attract and bind 
organisations to an area.  
‘Non-market’ network embeddedness (Figure 13) refers to exchange enacted through 
on-going interpersonal relations.  Repeated interactions between organisational actors or 
between individuals (e.g. community members, other local business owners) and an 
organisation created ties that were reinforced through loyalty, trust, and expectations of 
reciprocity.  As discussed in the literature, these types of ties in some ways transcend market 
rationality (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1996; Zukin & Dimaggio, 1990).  The typology includes 
four non-market mechanisms.  CSOs became embedded in non-market relational networks by 
affiliating with locally based business associations or industry groups (N5) and through non-
market exchanges with other local organisations (e.g. referring customers to one another and 
sharing innovative ideas) (N6).   
Additionally, the personal ties of organisations’ leaders (captured in mechanisms N7 
and N8), in some cases had an important influence on organisational decisions and actions.  
Personal network embeddedness was most common and influential for micro- and small-
businesses in this study.  For CSOs that were part of a corporate structure, decision makers’ 
personal ties were not a significant embedding mechanism.  In corporate organisations, 
decision making tended to occur outside of Canterbury or by owners overseeing a number of 
organisational locations or board members distributed throughout the country.  Yet, for 
smaller, single-location CSOs, the leaders’ personal ties were central to decisions to locate in 
an area in the first place, to keep the business in that location over time, and to reinvest after 
the earthquakes. 
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5.3.3 Institutional mechanisms 
Organisations were also embedded in the “supra-organisational forms” that regulated 
organisational action, such as the state, industry groups, and at the broadest, society in 
general (c.f. Palmer & Biggart, 2002, p. 260).  CSOs that were part of a corporation or other 
complex organisation experienced a form of intra-organisational institutional embeddedness 
(e.g. among branches or within a corporate structure), which “dictate[d] the processes, 
structures, and values that organisations adopt and maintain” (Elsbach, 2002, p. 41).  All of 
these institutions guided and constrained organisational action through either formal (e.g. 
laws, contracts, and property rights) and informal regulatory systems (e.g. sanctions, customs, 
and norms) (North, 1991).
54
  
The first subtype of institutional embeddedness, ‘governance,’ refers to governance 
systems that provide regulatory frameworks which guide organisational behaviour.  Thus, the 
mechanisms under the governance category, in Figure 13, refer specifically to systems of 
formal regulation enforced through hierarchical power (i.e. government or supra-
organisational structures like corporate bodies): ‘Operations restricted within territorial 
boundaries’ (I1) and ‘Organisation formally tied to local government’ (I2).  In total, 10 
CSOs’ operations were focused within particular territories that ranged in size from the entire 
South Island of New Zealand to a town such as Lyttelton or Kaiapoi.  Only two CSOs were 
formally tied to the local government. Kaiapoi Society was funded and managed through the 
Waimakariri District Council, and the Christchurch CBD based National Service was legally 
obliged to assist and coordinate with local, regional, and national authorities in emergency 
situations. 
                                                 
54
 Institutional embeddedness includes an array of interrelated forms of embeddedness that have been identified 
in economic sociology and geography, including ‘political’ (Zukin & Dimaggio, 1990), ‘societal’ (Hess & Coe, 
2006; Hess, 2004; Jessop, 2001), and ‘cultural’ (Dequech, 2003; Hess, 2004; Kalantaridis & Bika, 2006; Zukin 
& Dimaggio, 1990) embeddedness. 
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‘Civil societal’ embeddedness refers to connections to the tacit rules of society and 
collective understandings and norms that guide appropriate action and interaction (Dequech, 
2003; Pallares-Barbera et al., 2004; Zukin & Dimaggio, 1990).  This form of embeddedness 
overlaps with cognitive embeddedness.  It relies on collective identity with a group that has 
an element of social closure (e.g. a local community).  Social collectives benefit from the 
cognitive dimensions of embeddedness through shared goals and trust (Dequech, 2003).  
Members of a collective see their fates as linked, and may forgo self-interest to act in the 
interest of the collective (Coleman, 1988).  Unlike mechanisms in the cognitive category, 
however, the mechanisms in the institutional category refer specifically to the affective (or 
expressive) aspects of cognition, such as the time and resources that organisations invest in 
the social life of the town (I3, I4, and I6). 
Institutional embeddedness captures some of the ways CSO’s engaged with local 
culture.  Some CSO respondents saw their organisations as part of a common local enterprise, 
and part of their role as ‘enhancing community or local welfare’ (I5).  Institutions of different 
kinds (e.g. innovation centres, local authorities, labour unions) provided a basis for trust in 
collective representation or belief in the benefit of co-promoting local interests (Amin & 
Thrift, 1994).  For example, the mechanism ‘Organisational membership in a local business 
association or other local group’ is a type of institutional embeddedness (I6) as well as 
network embeddedness (N7), because organisational membership in local groups (e.g. 
business associations, the chamber of commerce, or marketing/promotions boards) 
demonstrated that organisational actors perceived the local area as a meaningful scale for 
collective engagement. 
5.3.4 Typology conclusion 
The nature of an organisation’s local embeddedness normally changes over time as 
the organisation grows, as it accumulates ties locally and elsewhere, and as the environment 
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around it changes.  An organisation’s adaptability was influenced in different ways 
depending on the nature of its local embeddedness.   
Each of the sixteen mechanisms introduced in the typology can lead to spatial inertia 
for organisations, which in some cases may reduce adaptive capacity.  Many of the 
mechanisms, however, also enabled organisations to better navigate their particular local 
environments.  Local embeddedness gives organisations access to tacit knowledge and helps 
them to operate within the boundaries of acceptable local norms or mobilise local economic 
and social capital. 
It is important to note that the typology introduced in this chapter reflects the 
activities of this particular set of CSOs rather than for all organisations.  There may be other 
mechanisms by which a different set of organisations would connect to their local 
environments.  Additionally, because the typology was derived inductively from the case 
studies, it is almost certain that I have not captured all of the mechanisms which tied the 
CSOs to their local environments.  The typology does, however, demonstrate that not all 
organisations connect to their environments in the same ways.  It shows that organisations’ 
connections have a range of potential implications for organisations decisions, behaviours, 
and outcomes.  It also facilitates the development of a standardised way of measuring and 
comparing local embeddedness.  This is expanded upon in the next section.    
5.3.5 Embeddedness measurement 
To establish a scale that would allow comparisons of the different degrees to which 
CSOs were locally embedded, I recorded a binary score for each of the 16 mechanisms 
discussed in Figure 13 
 
and summed the result to generate a local embeddedness (LE) score 
for each CSO.
55
  The CSO LE scores ranged from 1 to 13 (out of a possible 16).  Although 
                                                 
55
 For each of the market mechanisms (dependence on local customers, local labour, and local suppliers), the 
organisation received a score of 1 if they had an estimated 50 per cent or more local customers, labour, or 
suppliers, and a 0 if they had less than 50 per cent.   
147 
 
 
 
the LE scores do not account for the depth of particular connections or weight any of the 
mechanisms, this relative ‘measure’ of embeddedness enabled comparisons between 
organisations that were differentially embedded in their local contexts.  This relative score 
offers insights into what kinds of organisation are more locally embedded than others and 
whether organisations embed in different places in different ways.   
Local embeddedness varied by industry group, as seen in Table 12.  The “culture, 
recreation, and social services” CSOs had, on average, the highest LE Scores (10.8).  All of 
these CSOs were non-profit organisations and were geared toward providing services for 
their local community (i.e. mechanisms I1 and N1).  In different ways their operations 
enhanced community or local welfare (I5).  Additionally, two had formal relationships tying 
them to the local government (I2). 
Table 12: Average local embeddedness scores by industry category 
Combined Industry Categories CSOs (N) Mean Local Embeddedness Score 
Culture, recreation, & social services 4 10.8 
Hospitality 5 8.4 
Retail 12 7.7 
Professional & Personal Services 5 7.2 
Manufacturing & Wholesale 3 3.7 
Information, Communications, & Technology 
(ICT) 
3 
3.0 
Total  32 7.3 
CSOs in industries that deliver their products or services remotely— online, over the 
telephone (ICT) or offsite (manufacturing & wholesale) — had, on average, the fewest 
mechanisms tying them to their local environments.  These CSOs were less likely to rely on 
local customers and were, therefore, less likely to benefit from intentionally cultivating local 
relationships (e.g. by sponsoring local clubs or participating in local events). 
‘Corporate’ CSOs were tied to their local environments in fewer ways than single-
location, independent CSOs.  Corporate CSOs were part of a larger organisational structure 
and had lower average LE scores (4.2) than single location organisations (7.9).  They were 
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less likely to depend on local customers, suppliers, or labour (N1, N2, and N3).  Corporate 
CSOs were also less likely to pursue image alignment with the local area, to have restricted 
brand recognition, or to identify as local (C1, C2, and C3).  They were, however, far more 
likely than independent CSOs to have their operations restricted within territorial boundaries 
(I1), which greatly restricted their ability to relocate out of damaged areas. 
Local embeddedness also varied among the study areas.  CSOs in Lyttelton had, on 
average, the most mechanisms tying them to their local environments, with an average LE 
score of 8.9.  The Christchurch CBD CSOs averaged a score of 5.6 and Kaiapoi CSOs 
averaged 7.7.  As shown in Table 13, some mechanisms were more prevalent in some centres 
than others.  This suggests that some mechanisms may have been particularly advantageous 
in that town centre context.  Organisations in Lyttelton were most likely to depend on local 
labour (N2) (89% of Lyttelton CSOs depended on Lyttelton residents for labour, 
56
 compared 
to 73% in Kaiapoi, and 33% in the CBD).  The owner of Good Old Pub in Lyttelton 
explained that hiring locals was useful because they tended to have strong friendship 
networks in Lyttelton and that this attracted customers.  In Kaiapoi the most common 
mechanism by far was organisations identifying as local (C3), but a close second was 
‘donations to local entities and local sponsorships’ (I4).  Donating was far more common in 
Kaiapoi than elsewhere.  
Although retail and hospitality CSOs were the most likely to depend on the local 
organisational ecology to generate business in all towns, this was less important for CSOs in 
Kaiapoi.  In Kaiapoi, customers were far more likely to drive to a CSO location for a specific 
product or service.    
                                                 
56
 Local labour counts owners if they work at the organisation. In Lyttelton, several of the CSOs were run by a 
single owner or partnership that lived in Lyttelton.  
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Table 13: Percent of CSOs associated with each embeddedness mechanism by location 
 
 
Pre-earthquake Location  
 ID Town CBD Kaiapoi Lyttelton All Cases 
C1 Image alignment with local area 50% 64% 78% 63% 
C2 Organisation brand awareness restricted to local area 50% 45% 78% 56% 
C3 Organisational identifies as local 25% 91% 56% 56% 
N1 Dependence on local customers 58% 73% 67% 66% 
N2 Dependence on local labour 50% 73% 89% 69% 
N3 Dependence on local suppliers 8% 27% 22% 19% 
N4 Dependence on organisational ecology 67% 36% 78% 59% 
N5 Engages in non-market exchange relationships with 
local organisations 
17% 9% 11% 13% 
N6 Organisation membership in local business association 
or other local group 
33% 18% 33% 28% 
N7 Organisation owner/decision makers have locally based 
personal networks 
33% 27% 56% 38% 
N8 Organisation member’s affiliation with local 
groups/organisations 
17% 36% 67% 38% 
I1 Operations restricted within territorial boundaries 33% 36% 22% 31% 
I2 Organisation formally tied to local government 8% 9% 0% 6% 
I3 Organisation participates in local events 8% 18% 33% 19% 
I4 Donations to local entities or local sponsorships 17% 82% 56% 50% 
I5 Organisation operations intended to enhance 
community or local welfare 
17% 55% 44% 38% 
Kaiapoi CSO respondents were, however, most likely to identify as local organisations (with 
90% of the CSOs noting that their organisational identity was tied to Kaiapoi, compared to 
56% in Lyttelton, and 25% in the CBD).  CBD organisations relied on the local ecology and 
other businesses in the CBD to provide the customer base.  
The typology of local embeddedness facilitated further exploration of the relationship 
between local connectedness and resilience in three ways.  First, understanding how or why 
different kinds of organisations become embedded in places helped explain what motivates 
them to stay or reinvest after a disaster.  Second, the typology facilitated explorations of how 
organisations were affected by disruptions in those places, and by extension, how local 
recovery interventions assisted organisations.  For example, case study organisations were 
highly embedded in the Christchurch CBD’s organisational ecology prior to the earthquakes.  
Yet due to building damage, depopulation, and the cordons most of the organisational 
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ecologies in the CBD were severely impacted and in many places destroyed.  Thus, an 
important intervention in the CBD was to help create organisational communities, such as the 
ReStart Mall.  Finally, exploring the nuances of local embeddedness enabled a richer analysis 
of the relationship between different kinds of local connections and organisation’s adaptive 
capacity.  In the next section, I examine the role of organisational characteristics, including 
local embeddedness, in determining the impact of the earthquakes on CSOs.    
 
5.4 CSO Disruption and Vulnerability 
The earthquakes and the social and institutional responses that followed affected 
organisations both directly and indirectly throughout the study period.  Some CSOs 
experienced high levels of direct impacts, but were able to adapt in ways that enabled them to 
minimise further disruptions.  Others avoided serious disruptions for months after the event 
but later experienced degenerative change as their contexts shifted around them.  The 
earthquakes had direct effects on organisations caused by physical property damage and 
indirect effects caused by increased costs, decreased productivity, and other supply and 
demand side effects.  
5.4.1 Direct effects 
As an indicator of direct disruption from the two main earthquake events (September 
2010 and February 2011), I developed a composite score of the initial impacts to the CSOs’ 
physical premises.  The ‘direct impact score’ is an indicative measure of the physical 
disruptions that would have affected the CSOs’ ability to operate (Table 14).  The final 
‘direct impact score’ for each CSO is the sum of the 5 binary direct impact variables for the 
September 2010 and 5 for the February 2011 earthquake (1= organisation experienced this 
impact, 0 = organisation did not experience this impact).  Lifeline disruption refers to both 
water and electricity disruption for September and February, so organisations can have a total 
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score up to 4 for this variable (Table 14).  CSOs in the Christchurch CBD experienced the 
highest impact scores on average (8.42), as the CBD was heavily disrupted by both the 
September 2010 and February 2011 earthquake.  In comparison, the average impact score for 
Kaiapoi CSOs was 3.36 and for Lyttelton 4.89 (Table 14).
57
 
All but three CSOs closed for some period of time following the earthquakes.  For 
those that did close, the length of time varied from less than a week to more than a year and a 
half.  Table 14 also shows the total number of days that CSOs closed following earthquakes 
(including major aftershock events).  Two organisations, Kaiapoi Arts & Recreation and 
McCoy’s Hospitality in Lyttelton, closed immediately following the September 2010 and 
February 2011 earthquakes, respectively, and never reopened.  In contrast, two CSOs in 
Kaiapoi (Toasty’s and Timber Craft) were for relatively short periods of time following the 
earthquakes, but shut indefinitely in 2013 when detailed engineering evaluations (DEEs) 
revealed serious structural damage to their premises. 
Organisations that experienced greater direct impacts were closed for longer (this 
relationship is statistically significant as shown in Table 15).  However, there were 
substantial variations in the length of time CSOs stayed closed that cannot be explained by 
physical impacts alone.  For example, some organisational characteristics mitigated the 
closure duration, including the size and age of the organisation.  Larger and older CSOs were 
closed fewer days following the earthquakes (Table 15).  Larger organisations were also 
better able to redistribute internal resources, whether financial or human, in the immediate 
earthquake aftermath and so reduced the amount of days they needed to close.  
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 Some CBD organisations reported disruptions from the December 2010 earthquake, and several Lyttelton 
organisations were also impacted by the June 2011 aftershocks. Disruptions from these events are not reflected 
in the direct impact scores.   
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Table 14: CSO impact, closure, and 2013 post-disaster trajectory 
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CSO 
Pseudonym 
Cordon 
Structural 
Damage 
Non-
Structural 
Damage 
Lifeline 
disruption 
Direct 
Impact 
Score (total) 
Days 
closed 
2013* 
Trajec. 
Christchurch 
CBD 
Bond’s 
Beverages 
1 1 2 4 8 4 0 
Cat’s Cradle 2 1 2 4 9 554 0 
Elegance 2 2 2 2 8 132 -1 
Executive 
Sweets 
2 1 2 4 9 155 +1 
Gilbert’s 
Building Supply 
2 2 2 4 10 6.5 -1 
Health Solutions  2 1 1 3 7 35 -1 
Kedzie & Sons 2 2 2 4 10 59 +1 
National Service 1 1 2 2 6 7 -1 
Tech Sense 2 2 2 4 10 11 0 
The Attic 2 2 2 2 8 220 0 
Wigwam 2 2 2 4 10 67 -1 
Wolverine Wares 2 1 2 1 6 49 -1 
Kaiapoi 
Amherst Retail 1 0 1 2 4 4 +1 
Figure Financial 0 1 1 3 5 51 -1 
Kaiapoi Arts & 
Recreation 
1 1 1 2 5 NA 59 -1 
Kaiapoi 
Assistance 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kaiapoi Corner 
Store 
0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 
Kaiapoi Rental 1 1 2 2 6 20 -1 
Kaiapoi Shoppe 0 0 2 2 4 0 -1 
Kaiapoi Society 0 2 2 2 6 13 +1 
Suave 0 0 1 0 1 1 +1 
Toasty’s 1 1 2 2 6 13 -1 
Timber Craft 0 0 0 0 0 3 -1 
Lyttelton 
Coastal Services 2 0 1 0 3 3 +1 
God Save the 
Queen 
2 2 2 2 8 130 +1 
Good Old Pub 2 1 1 2 6 605 -1 
McCoy’s 
Hospitality  
2 1 1 2 6 NA -1 
Norwich Retail 1 1 1 2 5 157 0 
Port Retail & 
Craft 
1 1 2 0 4 90 -1 
Pretty Patty’s 0 1 1 2 4 60 +1 
Pumpkin 
Community 
Group 
1 1 1 0 3 NA 60 -1 
Star Creek 1 2 2 0 5 90 -1 
*Post-disaster trajectories are: +1 = developmental change, 0 = restoration to pre-EQ trends, and -1= 
degenerative change 
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 As detailed in Chapter 3, the CSOs’ 2013 trajectories reflect the direction of the CSOs’ revenue trend between 
financial years 2008 and 2012 and a qualitative self-assessment of the organisation’s health compared to before 
the earthquakes. 
59
 Kaiapoi Arts & Recreation closed immediately following the September 2010 earthquake, and had not 
reopened as of 2013.  McCoy’s Hospitality closed for 7 days following the 2010 earthquake and immediately 
following the Feb earthquake.  The owners eventually chose to close the business permanently in 2011.   
60
 Pumpkin Community Group reduced its operations following the September 2010 earthquake, and had very 
limited functionality after the February 2011 earthquake.  
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Table 15: Correlations between CSO attributes, impact, and embeddedness score 
 F
T
E
 /
 F
T
E
 C
o
rp
 
D
u
ra
ti
o
n
 o
p
er
at
io
n
 
(y
ea
rs
) 
D
ay
s 
cl
o
se
d
 
L
E
 S
co
re
 
D
ir
ec
t 
Im
p
ac
t 
S
co
re
 
FTE / FTE Corp 1 
  
 
 
Duration operation 
(years) 
0.298/ 0.346 1 
 
 
 
Days closed -0.388*/ -0.415* -0.435* 1  
 
LE Score -0.172 / -0.252 -0.187 0.303 1  
Direct Impact Score 0.240/ 0.279 -0.058 0.500** -.229 1 
*Significant difference at p<0.05, ** significant difference at p<0.01 
Despite their potential exposure to local disruptions, organisations with high local 
embeddedness (LE scores) did not close for more days.  
The organisation’s industry sector seemed to influence closure duration, though there 
are not enough organisations in each category to perform valid tests for significant 
differences.  Of the organisations that reopened, hospitality organisations were closed the 
longest (267 days) and retail the second longest (83 days) (Table 16).  
Table 16: Average local direct impact scores by industry category 
Combined Industry Sector CSOs (N) Direct Impact Score (μ) Days closed* (μ) 
Culture, recreation, & social services 4 3.5 6.5 
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Hospitality 5 7.2 266.8 
Retail 12 6 83.2 
Professional & Personal Services 5 3.8 27.0 
Manufacturing & Wholesale 3 6 4.5 
Information, Communications, & 
Technology (ICT) 
3 
7.7 
17.7 
Total  32 5.7 84.9 
*Only includes organisations that reopened during the study period.  
The trajectories CSOs experienced as of 2013 (also reported in Table 14) were not 
predicted by their size, age, or even pre-earthquake revenue trend. 
62
  Overall, 18 CSOs 
experienced degenerative change following the earthquakes, 6 experienced restoration of pre-
                                                 
61
 Two of the four culture, recreation & social services CSOs did not reopen at all during the study period, and 
this artificially depresses the average days closed value. 
62
 I used Kruskal-Wallis tests, the non-parametric version of an analysis of variance test (ANOVA), to assess 
differences among independent samples (trajectory groups).  
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earthquake trends, and 8 experienced developmental change.  An important finding of this 
analysis is that an organisation’s pre-earthquake characteristics were not enough to guide 
them toward positive outcomes.  Insurance status was also insufficient to predict an 
organisation’s trajectory following the earthquakes.  Insurance was a common loss mitigation 
resource for many organisations.
63
  Although receiving insurance pay-outs helped 
organisations buffer the initial impacts of the earthquakes, they were unable to simply absorb 
the indirect effects of the earthquakes.  
The degree of direct impact did influence the number of days that CSOs closed, but 
neither direct impact score nor days closed were also capable of predicting organisational 
trajectories in 2013.  Effects such as population dislocation, reductions in staff productivity, 
and decreased demand had a significant impact on some organisations.  These indirect 
impacts are discussed in more depth in the next section.  The difference between the 
trajectory groups, however, only became apparent when examining the way organisations 
engaged with their contexts and adapted in the aftermath of the earthquakes (Section 5.5).  
5.4.2 Indirect effects 
The earthquakes significantly disrupted CSOs’ local contexts (the Christchurch CBD, 
Kaiapoi, and Lyttelton).  These disruptions were sometimes immediate and obvious (e.g. 
building damage and cordons) and on other occasions were slower to emerge.  The contextual 
changes for each local area are summarised in Table 17 and discussed in detail in Chapter 4.  
These altered contexts indirectly impacted organisations across Canterbury in several 
ways.  For example, costs increased for many CSOs as demand for commercial real estate 
increased.  
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 Of the 32 CSOs, 30 had some form of insurance, and 18 had business interruption insurance specifically. 
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Table 17: Major post-earthquake disruptions and changes to study areas as of 2013 
Area Impact 
Christchurch CBD 
 Cordon (lasting up to 2.5 years in some areas) 
 Traffic rerouted around the city 
 Lost anchor attractions and damage to significant heritage buildings 
(e.g. the Christchurch Cathedral)  
 1,600 commercial buildings to be totally or partially demolished 
 2,200 (38%) fewer CBD businesses in 2013 than 2010 
 2,700 (36%) fewer CBD residents in 2013 than 2006 
Kaiapoi town centre 
 Significant portion of its buildings including several locally 
significant heritage sites severely damaged or demolished 
 Short-term town centre cordon 
 1,000 homes in Kaiapoi’s residential catchment were red zoned  
 23 (4%) fewer Kaiapoi businesses in 2013 than 2010 
 650 (9%) fewer Kaiapoi residents in 2013 than 2006 
Lyttelton town centre 
 Significant portion of its buildings including several significant 
heritage sites severely damaged or demolished 
 Short-term town centre cordon 
 Road tunnel temporarily closed, perception that road tunnel unsafe 
 Lost access via the Sumner Rd.  
 Lost cruise ships that previously brought thousands of visitors each 
week 
 22 (5%) fewer Lyttelton businesses in 2013 than 2010 
 213 (7%) fewer Lyttelton residents in 2013 than 2006 
In the greater Christchurch area, the price of new rental contracts increased by 18 per cent 
between the end of 2010 and 2012, compared with a 7 per cent increase nationwide (Parker & 
Steenkamp, 2012).  Similarly, the cost of quality labour increased and insurers increased their 
premiums in response to revised estimates of seismic risk.  
The indirect effects varied depending on how organisations were connected to their 
disrupted contexts.  If we understand an organisation’s connections to its context as a series 
of pathways – along which things like resources, meaning, or identity are generated and 
exchanged – then we can see how these connections may increase the potential for disruption 
when that context is disrupted.   
I identified categories of indirect effects that CSOs experienced as a result of their 
local embeddedness.  These include: changes to the way people perceived and interpreted 
their local contexts, impacts on demand, and impacts on productivity.  Each of these is 
elaborated below.  
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Image and identity impacts 
The earthquakes changed the images and ideas that people associated with the study 
towns.  These changes had the greatest impact on CSOs that aligned their image with their 
local area prior to the earthquakes.  This type of impact was most pronounced in the 
Christchurch CBD.  In the aftermath of the February earthquakes, CSO respondents were 
unsure whether the CBD even existed and, if it did, in what form.  For some CSOs, the 
“whole heart has been ripped out”; the CBD was “broken”, “gone”, and “barely functioning”.  
The respondent from National Service summarised the debate saying: 
“People talk about the new container mall as the CBD.  People talk about Lincoln 
Road as the CBD, but mostly people refer to the CBD as ‘that big dark hole with 
all those broken buildings’.” 
For many, the CBD was no longer associated with status and prestige, and being located in 
the CBD no longer produced positive meanings by association.  
In Kaiapoi and Lyttelton, CSO owners were more likely to discuss the loss of heritage 
buildings, which had been central to the towns’ characters prior to the earthquakes.  In 
Lyttelton in 2009, large parts of the township had been awarded Category 1 Historic Area 
status by the New Zealand Historic Places Trust.  For Lyttelton CSOs, the loss of the majority 
of the town’s significant heritage buildings not only reduced the attractiveness of the town for 
visitors, but also altered an aspect of the town’s character that prior to the earthquakes had 
been attractive to many business owners.  
Demand impacts 
The emergence of new and sometimes negative place images, including heightened 
perceptions of certain areas as dangerous, had significant impacts on customer numbers.  In 
the CBD, customer numbers decreased following the September 2010 earthquake due to 
people’s fear that tall and unreinforced masonry buildings were unsafe.  A similar fear was 
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also evident in relation to the Lyttelton road tunnel and the main street in Kaiapoi, 
dramatically reducing customer numbers at various points following the earthquakes.  The 
owner of Cat’s Cradle reported significantly reduced customer numbers and revenue 
following the September 4
th
 and Boxing Day 2010 earthquakes:  
“You know, we franticly put up signs saying ‘we were still open’ and stuff, but 
you know it was tough straightaway from that point.  New Year’s Eve’s a good 
example, you know […] we didn’t have anyone come in till half past 12 and then 
it sort of filled up a bit but you know.  We did probably ten or 15 per cent of what 
we’d done the previous New Year’s Eve, and it was just tough because it was 
such a brick building.  That was so obviously a brick building.  I’d see people 
come in to look around, feel uneasy and leave.”  
Predicting the flow of demand also became difficult, as people and other 
organisations relocated from or closed in the affected areas.  Both the CBD and Lyttelton no 
longer had the critical mass of businesses necessary to function as a central hub with the same 
organisational synergies.  Previously dependable patterns of interaction no longer applied.  
For example, before the earthquakes hospitality organisations in Lyttelton could count on the 
theatre and music venues to generate weekend trade, but this was no longer true after the 
earthquakes.  
Conversely, Kaiapoi CSOs that reopened experienced a significant surge of demand 
following the September 2010 quake, as they were operating in an environment with fewer 
competitors.  Some Kaiapoi CSOs also experienced short-term demand increases after the 
February 2011 earthquakes and following the large number of detailed engineering 
evaluations (DEEs) required for commercial building that closed much of the neighbouring 
town Rangiora’s main street in May 2011.  Then in late 2011 and 2012, after the residential 
red zoning announcement, both Kaiapoi and Lyttelton CSOs experienced a sustained 
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reduction in local customers.  Organisations that relied on a relatively high degree of local 
patronage or on the local organisational ecology were more likely to be impacted by such 
developments than organisations that were not embedded in this way.  
CSOs’ with a relatively high proportion of local patronage also reported that disrupted 
customers and clients sometimes required additional (often unpaid) assistance, extended 
credit, or additional products and services in the earthquake aftermath.  
Productivity Impacts 
Organisations experienced impacts on their productivity as a result of both network 
and institutional embeddedness mechanisms.  Labour productivity decreased and intra-
organisational conflict and at-work error rates increased as local staff dealt with the ongoing 
strain of the earthquakes and disruptions to their homes and families.  Managing staff 
wellbeing thus became one of the major challenges and priorities for CSOs following the 
earthquakes.  Although CSO leaders recognised the importance of managing staff wellbeing, 
supporting staff meant giving staff more time off and increased spending (e.g. on getaways 
for staff, lunches, and other items thought to boost staff morale and wellbeing) which was 
difficult for some organisations to manage.  Effects on staff productivity and wellbeing were 
greater for CSOs whose owners and staff lived in areas that were highly damaged, such as the 
study towns.  CSOs also experienced reduced staff productivity due to customers consuming 
staff members’ time discussing the earthquakes.  
Disruption to local suppliers reduced organisational productivity, as organisations 
needed to find alternate suppliers or work around inadequate service.  Ten CSOs permanently 
lost at least one service provider or supplier as a direct result of the earthquakes.  Some 
suppliers, especially those with a high proportion of customers in Canterbury, were 
overwhelmed by increased demand (notably service suppliers, such as insurance brokers and 
I.T. consultants), and this caused delays for some CSOs, hindering their recovery progress.  
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Similarly, changes to the institutional contexts in which CSOs were embedded had ripple 
effects on CSOs.  Local councils and intra-corporate partners were often consumed with 
response and recovery activities and, as a result, were less able to support organisations with 
which they had both formal ties and support responsibilities.  
Organisations that were embedded in local social institutions often faced an increased 
expectation to provide support and services to local people and groups.  For example, CSOs 
which felt that their organisation enhanced community welfare prior to the earthquake were 
more likely to assist with local response and recovery activities following the earthquakes.  
Their contributions included offering their premises as a shelter, providing resources (e.g. 
food and water) and information to affected community members, and doing extra unpaid 
work to assist disrupted clients.  
5.4.3 Earthquake effects overview 
If we use the LE Score as a proxy for potential impact from local disruptions we can 
see that some organisations were far more exposed to these disruptions in their local context 
than others.  In the short to medium-term, these highly embedded organisations had to 
reconsider where their organisation fitted in a redefined context, to deal with fluctuating or 
declining demand, and to address additional challenges to their productivity.  Despite these 
additional challenges, a high level of local embeddedness did not mean that organisations 
were closed for more days following the earthquakes, nor did it significantly influence CSOs’ 
2013 post-disaster trajectories.  Thus, it was important to further examine the way 
organisations mitigated the negative effects of the earthquakes.  
 
5.5 Adaptation and Embeddedness 
Regardless of an organisation’s sector, size, degree of earthquake impact or its ability 
to cover losses with internal resources or insurance, the ability to adapt was crucial to its 
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ongoing existence.  Comparisons among the 32 CSOs showed that the major variables 
differentiating organisations’ post-disaster trajectories was the capacity to (a) identify the 
need to adapt and (b) the ability to effectively implement those adaptations.  Although an 
organisation’s context is always changing, the earthquakes and subsequent social and 
institutional responses caused major shifts, often accelerating or altering local trends.  As a 
result of these contextual shifts, organisations needed a heightened ability to monitor their 
environment for potential disruptions and opportunities.  They then needed to implement 
adaptations throughout the recovery process in order to thrive in an unsettled and uncertain 
environment.
64
  An organisation’s need to adapt, however, is not always accompanied by the 
capacity to adapt.  In different ways organisational embeddedness hindered and enabled 
adaptive capacity. 
The trajectory groups indicate how organisations were performing as of April 2013.  
Table 18 displays the CSOs by pre-earthquake geographic location and trajectory group.  It is 
important to note that CSO trajectory does not indicate recovery speed; rather it reflects the 
capacity of organisations to retain or regain functioning following a prolonged series of 
disruptions.  
Cross-case analysis within and among the trajectory groups revealed important 
commonalities among the organisations that were doing well in 2013 versus those who were 
either doing poorly or no longer operating.    
                                                 
64
 Adaptation is prompted when an organisation detects the need to deal with a novel situation or stressor, when 
existing routines stop working to the benefit of the organisation, or when it becomes apparent that other modes 
or locations for operating will offer greater advantages (Berkhout, Hertin, & Gann, 2006; Gavetti & Levinthal, 
2010).  
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Table 18: CSOs by location and trajectory group 
The key findings were that: 
 Organisations experiencing developmental change each made significant 
operational and location changes throughout the study period (between 
September 2010 and April 2013). 
 Organisations experiencing developmental change were opportunity seeking 
as opposed to restoration or survival seeking. 
 Organisations experiencing degenerative change faced issues of inertia, with a 
series of factors slowing or hindering their ability to change in response to 
contextual challenges.  
CSO that experienced restoration to pre-earthquake trends, like developmental CSOs, 
undertook significant adaptations following the earthquakes.  Overall, however, they 
implemented fewer changes, and were generally focused on restoring and maintaining their 
core operations.  Similarly, some of the CSOs that experienced degenerative change 
implemented changes but often did not evaluate other options.  They neglected to develop 
 Trajectory 
 Degenerative Change Restoration to Pre-EQ Trends Developmental change 
Christchurch 
CBD 
Elegance 
Gilbert’s Supplies  
Health Solutions 
National Service 
Wigwam 
Wolverine Wares 
Bond’s Beverages 
Cat’s Cradle  
Tech Sense 
The Attic 
Executive Sweets 
Kedzie & Sons 
Kaiapoi 
Figure Financial 
Kaiapoi Arts & Rec* 
Kaiapoi Corner Store  
Kaiapoi Shoppe  
Kaiapoi Rental 
Toasty’s**  
Timber Craft* 
Kaiapoi Assistance 
 
Amherst Retail 
Kaiapoi Society 
Suave 
Lyttelton 
Good Old Pub 
McCoy’s Hospitality** 
Port Retail & Craft 
Pumpkin’s community 
group* 
Star Creek  
Norwich Retail Coastal Services 
God Save the Queen  
Pretty Patty’s 
* Still closed as of April 2013, ** Closed permanently 
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feedback processes to incorporate lessons for their long-term success, and sometimes 
struggled to understand how their organisation fitted into the changing local context.  
Organisations that did well following the earthquakes also exhibited several indicators 
of endogenous organisational resilience (i.e. capacities originating from within the 
organisation).  As I discuss in the next sections, however, organisations’ resilience was also 
shaped by embeddedness in their contexts.   
Section 5.5 presents an analysis of organisational post-earthquake adaptation in three 
stages, progressing toward understanding the linkages between organisational resilience and 
their local embeddedness.  Section 5.5.1 provides an overview of CSOs’ adaptive actions 
following the earthquakes.  Section 5.5.2 then shows how CSOs’ embeddedness in their local 
contexts in some cases led to inertia (inability or resistance to change), thereby limiting the 
range of possible adaptive actions.  Finally, Section 5.5.3 presents an analysis of the forms of 
local embeddedness that contributed to CSOs’ capacity to implement developmental change.  
It demonstrates how attention to embeddedness is able to enhance our assessment and 
interpretation of organisational resilience. 
5.5.1 CSOs adaptive actions 
The adaptations that CSOs employed to respond to changes in their local contexts fell 
into two general categories.  They adapted their operations (strategy, structures, and 
processes) and they moved (within or outside of their local area). 
Operational adaptations 
CSOs adapted their structures, strategies, and processes in the aftermath of the 
earthquakes.  The earthquakes prompted some organisations to revaluate the way they had 
been operating.  In some cases, the quakes catalysed innovation or changes organisations had 
considered but not pursued, while in others their effect was to accelerate planned changes. 
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CSOs made many adjustments during the short-term response period (e.g. operating 
for longer hours and using generators), but here I focus on the longer term operational 
adaptations.  These adjustments included: 1) restructuring, 2) combining locations, 3) 
dividing or expanding operations, 4) changing products or services offered, (5) technology 
upgrades, and (6) increasing efficiency. 
Restructuring 
Cooperation and alliance seeking behaviours typically become more frequent in the 
aftermath of disasters (De Alessi, 1975; Koria, 2009). CSOs were spurred by the earthquakes 
to restructure their formal business relationships through mergers, acquisitions, and buyouts. 
These initiatives allowed organisations to transfer and exchange resources and information, 
and to redistribute risk within their organisational systems. Table 19 provides examples of 
organisational acquisitions and mergers that occurred in the earthquake aftermath. The 
acquisitions had the added benefit of allowing the CSOs to move to locations that were 
already associated with the CSOs’ business type.   
Some of the other restructuring responses served the dual purpose of reducing 
organisational costs and increasing efficiencies.  These changes allowed organisations to 
maintain positive cash flow despite decreased revenue and unpredictable demand.  CSOs 
dropped parts of their businesses that were underperforming, rationalised services, and 
reduced costs.  For example, after merging, Bond’s Beverages decided not to reopen part of 
its CBD branch, which had been performing poorly prior to the earthquakes.  Other 
organisations decided to reduce costs in other ways by moving to smaller, cheaper premises 
(e.g. Coastal Properties), renegotiating the terms of their lease (e.g. Kaiapoi Rental), or 
reviewing and reducing non-essential services (e.g. Gilbert’s Building Supplies and Tech 
Sense).  
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Table 19: Post-earthquake organisational acquisitions and mergers 
Type of 
Restructuring CSO Description  
Acquisition  
Bond’s 
Beverages 
Before the February earthquake, the national corporation had 
recently acquired another company.  Within days of the February 
earthquake, the Christchurch CBD office was able to move to the 
suburban based office/warehouse of the newly acquired company.  
This move accelerated the merger process and the rationalisation 
of business assets.  
Partial Merger National Service 
In 2013, National Service split its Christchurch operations, after 
realising it needed to expand but that its post-earthquake premises 
were too small to do so.  A large department within National 
Service merged with the Christchurch branch of another national 
organisation.  The similarities in their operations made it logical 
to combine the two organisations, while allowing the rest of 
National Service to relocate separately.  
Acquisition & Merger Pretty Patty’s 
After losing her premises in 2011, the owner of Pretty Patty’s 
purchased another business in a suburb outside of Lyttelton.  She 
took across the Pretty Patty’s name, but acquired the client list, 
location, and some equipment from the previous business owner.  
She then merged the business with another personal services 
business.  This expanded the range of services offered and 
enabled the business to operate 6 days a week.   
Acquisition  Suave  
After losing her premises in 2013, the owner of Suave purchased 
another business in Kaiapoi in a higher profile site.  She retained 
an employee of the former business and the new employee’s 
associated client base.   
 
Combining locations 
Some organisations temporarily shared premises, or co-located, following the 
earthquakes so they could continue operating while unable to access their premises.  Others 
pursued co-location as a long-term response to reduced commercial property availability, 
increased lease costs, and to distribute the risk and cost borne by a single organisation.  
Longer-term co-locations also allowed some businesses to share customers and attracted 
additional customers who liked having the businesses in the same locations.  For two CSOs, 
the process of co-location – a relatively casual arrangement between two friends – reduced 
costs and the amount of work for both business owners:  
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“We go walking together and she’s one of the friends [I mentioned earlier], and 
you say why don’t you have the back room?  Why don’t you do a couple of days?  
So I go from working four days a week to working three, but open six days a 
week… Open longer and working less!  So I’ve reached shop keeping nirvana, 
because of the earthquakes.”  
None of the CSOs had attempted or planned for co-location prior to the earthquakes, 
yet seven CSOs successfully operated from another organisation’s premises for a period of 
time following the earthquakes.  One CSO leased new temporary premises with another 
organisation, and two CSOs hosted displaced organisations on their premises.  All of these 
arrangements were made post-earthquake (as opposed to a pre-planned mutual aid 
agreement), and in all but two cases the actors making the arrangements from each 
organisation had pre-existing relationships. 
Dividing or expanding operations 
In 2011, three CSOs went from operating in one premises in the Christchurch CBD, to 
operating two premises in different locations.  The CSOs had not planned to expand to a 
second location prior to the earthquake and they consequently struggled to varying degrees to 
adjust to the increased costs and management burden brought about by this organisational 
change.  
Second locations served different purposes for the CSOs.   
 Gilbert’s Building Supplies relocated within a week of the earthquake, signing 
a long-term lease for premises that could only accommodate the wholesale 
division of their organisation.  As a result, they had to acquire a second 
location in another Christchurch suburb to house the retail portion of their 
business.   
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 Wolverine Wares and Executive Sweets were operating relatively successfully 
from permanent and long-term temporary locations, respectively, and opened 
a second location in the Christchurch CBD ReStart Mall. 
The national administration manager for Gilbert’s Building Supplies recalled feeling a sense 
of urgency to acquire commercial accommodation within a day of the February earthquake:  
“So what happened was all the buildings went instantly, and people were thinking 
they had a lease on one and then all of sudden somebody would come along with 
more money […] So on the Wednesday night I found five buildings, of which this 
was one of them […] So [the business owner] said I just want a lease contract 
through today, and I want it signed and sealed and everything.  Because we knew 
people were coming in over the top.  He got to the bank at half past four… and 
got the money in, and he knew once the money was in the bank they couldn’t do 
anything about that.” 
Gilbert’s leaders made a quick decision to lease premises that would not suit all of their 
business needs, in order to avoid missing out completely in an atmosphere of real (though 
possibly exaggerated) scarcity and heightened competition for commercial space.  This 
decision then generated the need to acquire a second location, making coordination and 
management more complicated for the organisation.  It did, however, ensure that Gilbert’s 
was able to operate within days of the February earthquake.  As Gilbert’s business model 
required a physical site, acting quickly to obtain premises was sensible.  
Conversely, Wolverine Wares and Executive Sweets opened their second locations 
with greater strategic deliberation.  These business owners saw the ReStart Mall as a potential 
business opportunity, but also as an opportunity to be part of the recovery of the city.  They 
were unwilling, however, to relocate their organisation completely or to commit all of their 
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resources to the CBD.  In this case, operating two locations allowed these CSOs to hedge 
their investment in the CBD.  
Changing products or services offered 
CSOs adjusted the products and services they offered according to changing customer 
preferences or market circumstances in the earthquake aftermath.  Some organisations, such 
as Amherst Retail and Kedzie & Sons, saw opportunities to capture new markets after losing 
local competitors.  New locations and different customer demands prompted other CSOs to 
alter what they offered. Table 20 summarizes how organisations altered their product 
offerings.  
Table 20: Types of post-earthquake product and service changes  
Type of Change Example  
Offering fewer 
products and services 
Tech Sense limited the range of services they offered to business clients in order to 
focus on their key growth areas.  
Offering more 
products or services 
Due to increased funding and interest in the organisation as a result of their part in the 
response Kaiapoi Support was able to fund new services that they had desired to 
introduce prior to the earthquakes.  
Offering different 
products or services 
Wigwam and Elegance felt that the earthquakes had changed customers’ product 
preferences (e.g. an increased demand for colourful products), and adjusted 
accordingly.  
  
Shifting industry focus 
After losing their premises and a significant amount of stock, Port Retail & Craft 
moved from a majority retail income supported by light manufacturing to relying 
almost entirely on their manufacturing income.   
The owner of God Save the Queen switched from entirely retail, to entirely 
wholesaling her own earthquake related line of products after losing her pre-
earthquake premises, and later relied on a mix of retailing and wholesaling.  
Other organisations made minor changes to their ordering (i.e. Wigwam and Elegance), while 
others shifted their industry focus entirely.  Port Retail & Craft, for example, shifted the 
emphasis of its operations to the manufacturing side of the business.  Prior to the earthquakes, 
the owners had focused on developing the retail portion of their small business, but after 
losing premises and stock, and with significantly reduced foot traffic in Lyttelton, they opted 
to focus more on the light manufacturing side of the business.    
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Technology upgrades  
The earthquakes accelerated the integration of new technologies into CSOs’ 
operational systems.  Organisations integrated innovative technology and techniques into 
their operations, including utilising social media, new IT software, new or improved cloud 
based backup and storage systems, satellite phones, and increased capacity for mobile 
working.  Several specific examples are outlined in Table 21.  
Table 21: Innovations and technological improvements  
Organisation Type Post-earthquake technology adoption 
Figure Financial 
Implemented new cloud computing system to ensure that all client records would be 
accessible in the event of a disruption.  This has given both staff and clients greater 
flexibility and is projected to increase profitability. 
Gilbert’s Building 
Supplies 
Integrating the digital inventory management systems for the organisation’s locations 
throughout New Zealand.  This facilitated inventory sharing, and as a result reduced 
the amount of stock each location needed to order and carry.   
  
God Save the Queen 
After the demolition of the retail shop, the retailer began designing and wholesaling a 
line of earthquake related products to stores and online distributors nationally and 
internationally.  Using low-cost online platforms, a blog and a social networking 
website, the organisation marketed the new line of products and coordinated ordering, 
reducing overheads and greatly increasing sales compared to pre-quake.   
Health Solutions  
Transferred emails and a number of client services to the cloud, and digitally 
replicated data across multiple locations, increasing information redundancy but also 
increasing efficiency and improving the client experience.   
CSOs used blogs and social networking sites to connect with old customers and 
generate interest from new customers.  Two CSO owners even continued to interact with the 
public online during periods of extended closure.  This strategy helped keep customers 
engaged in the organisation’s story of recovery and meant that the organisation had to do less 
work to reconnect with customers after reopening in new locations. 
Technology upgrades helped CSOs manage higher workloads, reduced costs, and 
increased CSOs’ efficiency.  For retail and IT CSOs these developments greatly enhanced 
their ability to reach a larger market outside of Canterbury.  All of these changes improved 
their network resilience in the face of further local disruptions. 
With varying degrees of success, CSOs adapted their operations to their post-
earthquake environments.  Decision makers pursued these adjustments with the intention of 
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improving organisational performance.  Many of these adaptations, however, had the added 
consequence of influencing CSO’s embeddedness in these environments.  For example, some 
organisations’ local embeddedness may have decreased as they connected with a larger 
customer base online and as technologies enabled staff to be more mobile. 
Location adaptations 
CSOs’ also moved elsewhere within their disrupted environments or left them 
altogether.  Many of the CSOs in this study relocated more than once to various forms of 
emergency, temporary, and permanent premises.  They not only had to change where they 
were located, but how they operated and with whom. CSOs that lost their pre-earthquake 
premises pursued responses including: 1) operating from temporary premises, 2) operating 
virtually, with no central physical base, 3) operating from another organisation’s permanent 
premises, 4) relocating to a new or restored ‘permanent’ location, and 5) not moving (i.e. 
operational hiatus during repairs to pre-earthquake premises). 
Relocation was a necessary adaptive response for organisations that lost access to 
their premises or when contextual changes rendered their original locations unsuitable for 
ongoing operation.  Only three of the 32 CSOs did not at any point (between September 2010 
and April 2013) lose access to their premises.  All of these were in Kaiapoi. As a result of the 
September 2010 earthquake, five CSOs’ buildings were red stickered or deemed unsafe for 
re-entry.  Following the February 2011 earthquake, 21 CSOs’ buildings received red stickers, 
and in 2013 three Kaiapoi CSOs (whose buildings were previously unaffected) lost their 
premises following DEEs. In total, 22 CSOs relocated at least once (of those 13 relocated 
more than once).  
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Operating from a temporary premises 
Temporary premises include any location where the employees of the organisation 
worked collectively without the intention of staying permanently.  These premises took a 
range of forms, from booths or other short-term ‘pop-up’ shops lasting hours or days to 
motels and rented houses, and even included the personal residences of employees.  Other 
CSOs operated from purpose built temporary buildings that were in place for years, for 
example, the retrofitted shipping containers in Figure 14 that composed the Christchurch 
CBD ReStart Mall. 
Figure 14: Temporary Premises. Pop-up shop on porch and shipping container shops in ReStart mall 
Source: left image (Rebecca Lovell-Smith), right image (Joanne R. Stevenson) 
For some CSOs, ‘temporariness’ was a strategic adaptation to an environment 
characterised by uncertainty.  While the normal patterns of interaction were disrupted, CSOs 
that depended on their organisational ecology to attract customers utilised mobile premises to 
‘pop up’ at events that generated customers.  For example, Executive Sweets temporarily 
operated their retrofitted shipping container at a multi-week festival in the CBD.  Kedzie & 
Sons sold stock salvaged from their red-zoned shop at a local fair, and the owner of God Save 
the Queen ran a pop-up shop from her front porch during the Lyttelton Farmer’s Market 
(Figure 14).   
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The owner of Cat’s Cradle, a CBD bar and entertainment venue, described the 
mobility of their temporary premises as a ‘self-insurance’ strategy while Christchurch 
reconfigured, saying:  
“We could pack the whole thing down and shift it onto a new site in a week… 
I’m not committing to anything yet.  I know everyone’s saying ‘Addington’s the 
new spot.  Sydenham’s the new spot,’ but I’m just hedging my bets.  And I can 
move to wherever the new spot is.” 
Temporary premises also enabled organisations to return to the Christchurch CBD, prior to 
the finalisation of the city plan.  This allowed organisations to stay connected to the CBD 
while the city was in a state of impermanence and unpredictability.  
Operating as a virtual organisation  
Two CSOs were able to operate temporarily as ‘virtual’ organisations, conducting the 
majority of their business online or over the telephone without the need for a physical base.  
For a period of several months following the February earthquake, Norwich Retail, stored 
stock in the owners’ and neighbours’ homes and used a popular auction website to sell goods 
while the owner waited to learn the fate of their premises in Lyttelton. 
Health Solutions, a larger organisation (37.5 FTE), enabled employees to work from 
home for approximately six months following the February 2011 earthquake, finding spaces 
for collective meetings as needed.  This approach allowed Health Solutions’ management to 
avoid committing to a long-term lease in a suboptimal location. 
Relocating to a new ‘permanent’ location 
By April 2013, 24 of the 32 CSOs were operating from what they considered a 
permanent location.  That said, permanence had taken on a more flexible meaning in the 
earthquake aftermath.  Some CSOs that signed long-term leases in sub-optimal buildings or 
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locations considered these premises ‘permanent for now’ until better options become 
available.  Similarly, with on-going disruptions CSOs also ended up having multiple 
‘permanent’ locations.  For example, Christchurch CBD retailer Kedzie & Sons moved to a 
new location in the CBD after losing its premises in the September 2010 earthquake.  After 
losing the new premises in the February 2011 earthquake, Kedzie & Sons spent several 
months operating from temporary locations, including the owner’s home, before relocating to 
a third permanent location in a Christchurch suburb.  Permanence was often interpreted by 
CSO decision makers through a new lens of uncertainty and contingency following the 
earthquakes. 
CSOs that relocated to permanent premises outside of disrupted areas often needed to 
make fewer operation adaptations.  They did, however, need to expend more effort making 
connections with new customers.  For example, The Attic was the only organisation to 
relocate out of the region.  The decision to relocate to a relatively stable and intact urban 
environment eliminated some of the feelings of uncertainty that Canterbury CSOs continued 
to face.  Aside from disrupting their connections to their local networks in Christchurch and 
needing to establish new relationships in Wellington, The Attic was generally able to continue 
operating in much the same way as they had prior to the earthquakes.  
Not moving – operational hiatus  
Several CSOs closed for a period of months while decision makers considered their 
organisation’s future.  However, only two CSOs completely ceased operations for the entire 
duration of the repair or reconstruction of their premises.  This decision had different 
implications for the CSOs due to the nature of their business.  Kaiapoi Arts & Recreation, a 
non-profit organisation, chose to cease operations indefinitely while its new council-funded 
building was planned and constructed.  Kaiapoi Arts & Recreation relied, almost completely, 
on volunteers and the director did not feel that it was a good use of the organisation’s limited 
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human or financial resources to operate in a temporary capacity.  By contrast, the Good Old 
Pub in Lyttelton, a for-profit business with 10 FTE, was closed for 20 months and forced to 
lay-off all of its employees while waiting for structural repairs on its building.  The owners 
committed to staying in their building based on their landlord’s estimates of repair times, but 
these were greatly prolonged due to building consent complications.  Although the pub had 
business interruption insurance, the hiatus proved financially detrimental for the organisation.  
CSOs needed to adapt to recover and to operate successfully in their altered post-
disaster contexts.  CSOs that were able to perceive the need for adaptation before they were 
negatively affected tended to fare better than others.  Adaptive options, however, needed to 
be adequately evaluated before implementation as they set the path of the organisation going 
forward.  For example, organisations that committed to a sub-optimal lease often needed to 
make further operational changes like splitting the organisation.  Thus, an interesting product 
of the complex and uncertain environment in the earthquake was a new attitude toward 
temporariness.  Some CSOs resisted re-embedding in a new location and implemented 
systems that enhanced mobility and flexibility. 
5.5.2 Embeddedness and inertia  
For organisations to implement change successfully, they had to overcome 
organisational inertia.  An organisation’s inertia, or a resistance to change, increases when its 
embeddedness in some way reduces its capacity to perceive, respond, and adapt to changes in 
its environment (Berkhout, 2011; Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000).  An organisation has high inertia 
“when the speed of reorganization [adaptation] is much lower than the rate at which 
environmental conditions change” (Hannan & Freeman, 1984, p. 156).  High inertia can lead 
to stagnation or degenerative change if organisations are unable to adapt to their changing 
contexts adequately.  Some kinds of inertia, such as resistance to changes that leaders did not 
see as conducive to their organisation’s mission or values, provided guidance and direction 
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for CSOs.  Organisations, however, then needed the capacity to adapt to accommodate these 
‘immovable’ aspects of their organisations.  
The mechanisms that connect organisations to their environments shaped the range of 
adaptations that were available and acceptable to CSO decision makers.  Some of the 
mechanisms through which CSOs connected to their local contexts restricted adaptive action 
more than others.  For a few organisations, their embeddedness led to high levels of inertia 
and degenerative change.  For some, however, embeddedness in local contexts actually 
enhanced their capacity for adaptive responses.   
Challenges of cognitive inertia 
Cognitive inertia, CSOs’ tendency to revert to familiar processes or failure to optimise 
decisions post-earthquake, was often the result of uncertainty, complexity and the cost of 
information.  Cognitive inertia was evident amongst CSOs that continued along a pre-
established path even when their contexts had changed significantly.  Decision makers 
sometimes acted on a mental model of the environment with which they were familiar.
65
  
This was detrimental in an environment characterised by repeated rapid-onset disruptions and 
ongoing, subtle changes.  CSOs had to determine paths for their future in unfamiliar contexts 
dominated by uncertainty.  Many of the normal indicators and assumptions that guided 
decision making prior to the earthquakes (e.g. which areas of the city were developing or 
declining; demand forecasts) were no longer valid.  As a result, some organisational decision 
makers opted for the familiar or the default option when they made decisions.  For example, 
the owners of Good Old Pub, recommitted to the building they had been leasing prior to 
February 2011:  
“Well the landlord said he could get the building fixed, in a shorter time than is 
now happening.  In hindsight if we had known how long it was going to 
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take…but hindsight’s a wonderful thing.  You can’t change that. It was a unique 
event and nobody knew how to react or what to do. If it happened again now, I 
think more people would think differently.”  
Even if the landlord had been able to repair the building in the time allowed, Good 
Old Pub would have been closed for several months.  As a result of delays caused by on-
going aftershocks and issues bringing the building to the current building code, they were 
closed for nearly 20 months following the earthquake.  
CSOs whose owners were near retirement or had planned to sell the business prior to 
the earthquakes also experienced cognitive inertia.  All four CSOs whose owners were 
planning to exit their business prior to the earthquakes experienced degenerative change.  
McCoy’s Hospitality in Lyttelton, lost their building, and did not reopen after the February 
earthquake.  The other three, experienced fairly minimal impacts, but did not adapt 
sufficiently in their changing environments to maintain positive growth.  The decision makers 
in these small businesses were less likely to perceive the need to adapt and did not have the 
desire or “energy” to implement changes once the necessity did become apparent.  
CSOs were not only limited by their ability to process new information about their 
environments, but also by ties between their image, identity, and the town in which they were 
located.  CSO’s whose brand recognition was restricted to their local environment faced 
higher barriers to establishing in a new location successfully.  Relocating in a new town 
where the organisation was unrecognised would mean losing the original investments made 
in establishing a local reputation.  
Of the 18 CSOs that identified as a local organisation (C3), only one relocated 
permanently to another town after the earthquakes.  For organisations that had to consider 
relocation, decision makers (even those that did not live in the same town as the organisation) 
expressed attachments to their organisation’s town in a way that precluded relocating 
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elsewhere.  For example, the owner of Figure Financial felt that the organisation was part of 
the town “I just feel attached and I feel that it [the business] is tied to Kaiapoi.”  
Following the earthquake, CSOs’ identity as part of a local collective (C3 and I5) 
often translated into a sense of responsibility to reopen locally and continue serving the town.  
CSO respondents noted a sense of solidarity among the community members and the 
businesses that reopened, which in many ways deepened the embeddedness of ties that these 
organisations already had in these places.  
Challenges of network inertia 
Network inertia occurred when organisations could not successfully make changes to 
their networks, even when the relationships were no longer optimal or had stopped 
functioning.
66
  As organisations become more embedded in their networks, forming multiplex 
ties with elements of friendship, loyalty, and trust, the barriers to disrupting these networks 
becomes higher.  Network adaptations can include both removing and adding network 
members, but also changing the nature of the relationships.   
Certain market ties were more adaptable than others depending on the nature of the 
relationships and the nature of the adaptation required.  CSOs were limited (or enabled) by 
their suppliers’ capacity to deliver more or different goods and services in response to 
demand changes following the earthquakes.  Organisations that depended on local labour and 
local customers faced similar challenges.  The distance that staff and customers would travel 
to a relocated organisation was finite and depended on the depth of their relationship with the 
organisation and the substitutability of either the job (in the case of staff) or the product 
offered (in the case of customers).  For example, Pretty Patty’s local customer base supported 
the business, in part because it was a Lyttelton business, and the owner recognised that she 
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would lose much of that business when she relocated outside of Lyttelton.  She proceeded 
with the move, but factored this knowledge into her relocation decision making.  
Reliance on the local organisational ecology (e.g. proximity to other organisations to 
generate business) restricted organisations’ relocation options to, for example, areas that were 
undamaged or new agglomerations like the ReStart Mall.  The owner of Wigwam explained 
that even if they could have reopened their retail store in the CBD, without other 
organisations around it would not have been a wise business decision:  
“Nobody would come.  It would be like a random act of business risk.  It would 
be like I’m going to put my business in a field and closing your eyes and pointing 
at a map.  And you would be luckier there than on [our previous site].”  
Yet, the substitutability of organisational ecologies was limited.  Wolverine Wares 
moved from the CBD where it had been situated near other niche independent shops to a 
suburban area near a shopping mall.  They found that not only did mall customers not come 
up the street to the shop, but previous customers from the CBD did not want to “come to the 
suburbs.” 
The personal networks and affiliations for small and micro-organisation owners and 
decision makers were some of the strongest and least flexible mechanisms tying organisations 
to places.  This led to spatial inertia for some organisations.  Owners of five CSOs in this 
study expressed reluctance to relocate their business if it meant that their children would need 
to change schools.  For two small-business owners’, their desire to remain close to their 
extended family was the main reason that they reopened their business in town (despite 
significant obstacles).  This again did not necessarily lead to degenerative change, but 
required organisations to find ways to adapt within these limitations.  
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Challenges of institutional inertia 
Institutional inertia limited the types of adaptive responses that were possible or 
acceptable for some CSOs following the earthquakes.  Ten CSOs were affiliated with a larger 
organisational entity or corporation that restricted their operations to a particular territory.  
These CSOs’ options for relocation were restricted within their operational territory.  For 
example, the General Manager of Kaiapoi Society explained that they could not consider 
relocating outside of Kaiapoi even if they wanted to, because:  
“There’s 14 like businesses within the Christchurch area so you can’t just move up and 
set up next to somewhere else.  You’re all competing for the same customer base, so 
no.  It wouldn’t work; you couldn’t go poke yourself beside Papanui or someone else.” 
Another effect of formal institutional embeddedness was that, like network embeddedness, 
CSOs’ resilience was limited by their institutional capacity to cope effectively with the 
earthquakes. 
Regardless of whether the CSOs had formal ties with the local government, they were 
influenced by the government’s effectiveness in response and recovery.  There were 
differences in perceived institutional efficacy and helpfulness between CSOs under the 
jurisdiction of Christchurch City Council and those under the jurisdiction of the Waimakariri 
District Council (WDC).  About 54 per cent of CSOs in Kaiapoi listed the WDC as an 
important source of post-earthquake support, compared to 19 per cent of CBD and Lyttelton 
CSOs that listed the CCC as an important source of post-earthquake support.  CSOs under 
both councils reported issues with the way their council had handled the response and 
recovery.  However, Christchurch and Lyttelton CSOs (under CCC’s jurisdiction) were more 
likely to report council procedural failures that actually hindered their ability to operate, 
including delays and opaqueness in building consenting processes, “lack of decision 
making”, and “false promises” about the timing of decisions and actions.  Thus, CSOs’ 
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adaptive speed and capacity to recover depended, in part, on the flexibility and adaptive 
capacity of their political institutional contexts.  
Inertia summary 
Organisations tend to resist relocation until it becomes absolutely necessary (Clark & 
Wrigley, 1995).  All but one CSO relocated within Canterbury, and CSOs generally stayed as 
close as possible to their pre-earthquake locations.  Only three CSOs’ premises in 2013 were 
more than 5 km from their pre-earthquake premises.  On average, CSOs moved less than 1.2 
km (excluding one CSO that relocated out of the region).  
Organisations with more connections to their local environments (i.e. higher LE 
scores) tended to find ways to relocate locally despite sometimes significant challenges.  In 
the Christchurch CBD, for example, CSOs had to overcome substantial obstacles including a 
general lack of permanent accommodation, fragmentation, and resistance from the council to 
allow permanent developments while undergoing the planning process.  As of April 2013, six 
of the 12 CBD CSOs were operating from at least one premises in the CBD.  
CSOs’ resilience was nested within the resilience of the cognitive, network, and 
institutional structures in which they were embedded.  Inertia was caused by factors within 
the organisation and by the interaction between an organisation and its local and extra-local 
contexts.  The increased complexity and uncertainty of the post-earthquake environment 
exacerbated cognitive inertia. CSOs performed poorly as a result of cognitive inertia, in cases 
where decision makers lacked the desire to reinvent because they were near retirement and 
where they reverted to familiar decision pathways.  Those that reverted to familiar processes 
often did not adequately understand the linkages between their contexts and their 
organisation.  
Additionally, network inertia limited the range of adaptive options that some CSOs 
could pursue.  Personal networks of owner’s and decision makers were some of the strongest 
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ties to a local area and had a significant influence on an organisation’s decision to stay in a 
local area.  
Finally, institutional inertia restricted some CSOs’ adaptive options and access to 
resources.  CSOs embeddedness in a corporate structure in many ways increased their 
capacity to absorb the negative impacts of the earthquakes, but also served to restrict the 
flexibility and responsiveness of some organisations.  Additionally, the capacity of the local 
government to respond and the choices that the national government made, including 
cordoning and residential red zoning, had major direct and indirect impacts on the CSOs.  It 
shaped the suite of available options they could pursue.  
5.5.3 Embeddedness and resilience 
Resilience allows organisations to absorb impacts, to adapt in ways that may 
minimise the negative impacts of a disruption, and to capture opportunities for organisational 
improvement that may arise.  Stephenson (2010) and Lee et al. (2013) developed and refined 
the “New Model of Organisational Resilience” (discussed in detail in chapter 2) using 
empirical evidence gathered from organisations in New Zealand.  The model proposes that 
organisational resilience consists of two factors: planning and adaptive capacity.  The 
planning factor consists of five indicators of resilience that loosely relate to an organisation’s 
capacity to strategize and plan for crises.  The adaptive capacity factor consists of eight 
indicators that assess an organisation’s ability to detect and respond to crises in a way that 
minimises their disruption.  Table 22 includes the factors and indicators as specified in Lee et 
al. (2013, p.34).  For full definitions, see Chapter 2.  
The model of organisational resilience proposed by Lee et al. (2013) offers a useful 
guide for considering the endogenous factors that enable organisations to adapt successfully 
in the face of stressors.   
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Table 22: Factors and indicators of organisational resilience  
Factor 1: Planning Factor 2: Adaptive Capacity 
Planning strategies 
Minimisation of silos 
Internal resources 
Participation in exercises Staff engagement and involvement 
Proactive posture Information and knowledge 
External resources Leadership  
Recovery priorities Innovation and creativity 
 
Decision making 
 
Situation monitoring and reporting 
Source: Lee et al. (2013) 
However, it does not adequately consider the relationship between an organisation and its 
environment, or conceptualise the porous boundaries between an organisation, the people that 
compose it, and the wider community environment in which it operates.  
The comparative case studies focus on understanding how organisations were 
connected to their local social environments.  The findings suggest that organisations are 
resilient, in part, because they are embedded in resilient social contexts.  Organisations that 
have high levels of endogenous resilience, however, are better able to employ their 
connections to enhance their resilience.  They are also better able to avoid the disruptions that 
flow through these connections, and to take advantage of opportunities as they emerge.  For 
example, organisations that had effective crisis leadership and more internal resources were 
able to see the opportunity created by the loss of competitors and to reopen quickly and 
increase their market share. 
The results discussed in the next section can help move our assessment of resilience 
from an attribute that is solely created and maintained within an organisation to an attribute 
that is also created through interaction with elements outside of the organisation. Resilience 
is co-created through interaction between an organisation, its local context, and its relational 
network.  The boundaries between these elements are porous and overlapping.  Resilience is 
both potentially enhanced and hindered depending on the nature of these interactions and the 
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organisations’ degree of embeddedness.  These external or ‘exogenous’ sources of resilience 
can be conceived of in two, related ways:   
First, contextual resilience refers to the relationship between an organisation and the 
resilience of its physical, social, and institutional environments.  Organisational resilience is, 
in part, derived from interactions with various components of organisations’ context.  While, 
my investigation has focused on organisations’ interactions with place at the local scale, it is 
important to note that contexts are produced at multiple, nested, and interacting scales, and 
the unit of analysis (e.g. organisation) can be embedded in and across different scales (e.g. 
local, regional, and national).  
The concept of contextual resilience accounts for the relationship between community 
and place-based resilience and organisational resilience.  Contextual resilience is created 
through the interaction between an organisation and its contexts.  Through their 
embeddedness in various local, regional, national, and super-national contexts, organisations 
become infused with the contexts in which they operate.  Elements of resilience that permeate 
the contexts in which an organisation is embedded (i.e. high degrees of social capital, strong 
local leadership, strong commitment to place) also permeate the organisation, depending on 
how bound together the organisation is with its context.  In this study, for example, some 
CSOs captured positive externalities by being situated in a community with a strong 
collective identity and norms of shopping locally.  Similarly, CSOs that wanted to relocate 
within their heavily damaged town centres benefitted from community and industry groups 
that implemented programmes to keep people connected with the town centres, such as Gap 
Filler Projects and the ReStart mall. 
The second way of conceiving of and exploring external sources of resilience is by 
specifically focusing on organisations’ networks.  I refer to this as relational resilience.  
Relational resilience is derived from resilient organisational networks.  Relational resilience 
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has three elements: 1) resilience of the networks members, 2) resilience of the connections 
between these network members, and 3) the capacity of organisations to establish and 
mobilise resources from networks (including the willingness of staff members to mobilise 
personal networks).  
Contextual and relational aspects of organisational resilience offer different, but 
complementary insights into the way organisational resilience is shaped through extra-
organisational interactions.  Relational resilience is based on sets of discrete exchanges (as in 
the definition of network embeddedness).  Exchange with other actors in a network of 
relations, however, is part of the way that an organisation engages with its context.  As 
demonstrated in the embeddedness literature, there are a number of ways that an organisation 
may connect with a place that are not adequately accommodated by the network metaphor.  
For example, the cultural norms that regulate organisational action cannot be represented as a 
series of nodes and ties.  Contextual resilience captures the diffuse elements of an 
organisation’s experiences in a place that may improve its capacity for resilience, such as the 
meaning, feeling, and motivation that organisational actors gain from feeling like their 
organisation is part of a place.  It is not enough, however, to be embedded in a resilient 
network or resilient context.  The CSO must also have the capacity to locate, activate, and 
apply the benefits of these external sources of resilience.  
In the final part of this chapter I discuss ways local embeddedness can enhance 
organisational resilience.  I also identify certain organisational capacities that improved 
CSOs’ ability to mobilise contextual resilience.  I again frame the discussion around the three 
categories of embeddedness from the embeddedness typology in Figure 13.  I examine CSOs’ 
relational resilience in the post-earthquake recovery context in-depth in Chapter 6.  
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Cognitive embeddedness and resilience  
Cognitive embeddedness enhanced CSOs’ capacity to recover in three main ways.  
First, if an organisation’s image was tied to the local area (C1), they were more likely to 
benefit from people’s desire to support their town’s recovery.  Second, an organisation’s local 
identity (C3) created a sense of purpose that motivated staff members as they pursued 
recovery.  Third, organisations that were engaged in their communities prior to the 
earthquakes were better equipped to assess the responses of the local people to the actions of 
the business (N5-8, I3).
67
  
Some of the support that organisations received from local people was a positive 
externality of local residents’ desires to support the town.  CSOs were more likely to receive 
the benefit of this form of social capital if their image was tied to the local area.  For 
example, the owner of Port Retail & Craft reopened in Lyttelton after losing their building in 
the February 2011 earthquake.  As they struggled to re-establish and reorient, the business 
was buoyed by local support:  
“I know a lot of local people deliberately tried to buy things from us once we 
were open, just to support local business.  So that was nice, just coming to buy 
something local to keep you here.  So there were quite a few people like that.” 
The regional manager of Bond’s Beverages noted that despite having an office and 
part of their operations based in the Christchurch CBD the organisation did not have a well-
established image as a local organisation prior to the earthquake and as a result they missed 
out on the surge of local support.  
“Everyone is wanting to support the local Christchurch [manufacturers], and we 
[manufacture] in Auckland.  So that’s a barrier which we need to work out 
ourselves.  Because it doesn’t make a difference to the quality of the [product] 
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cognitive embeddedness as a function of embeddedness in cultural institutions.   
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with how quickly you can get stock to and fro. But everyone’s really 
Christchurch, Canterbury focused.”  
The respondent felt that the loss of their building in the CBD allowed them to share 
the Christchurch experience in a way they had not before the earthquakes, and potentially 
begin to develop their local image:  
“R: And now that we’ve got this for Christchurch, and this [new location] is 
actually a driver when we’re trying to drum up business, is that we are local. 
We’ve got a hub.  This is our training centre.  And we can explain this isn’t the 
[…] training centre that we had, we were [in the CBD], as soon as you say that 
they’re like, ‘You know’.  
I: People are a bit more sympathetic?  
R: Yeah, it ties us back into the local community.  So we’re trying to drive that 
angle a bit.” 
Having a pre-established local image allowed organisations to mobilise local social capital 
more effectively in the earthquake aftermath.  
Second, the motivating force of an organisation’s local identity blended mechanisms 
of cognitive (i.e. ‘organisation identifies as local’ (C3)) and societal-institutional 
embeddedness (i.e. ‘organisation operations intended to enhance community or local welfare’ 
(I5)).  Decision makers who had a clear vision or purpose for their recovery, regardless of 
what it was, performed better long-term than those that did not.  For some decision makers, 
their identity as a local organisation and their interpretation of their place in the recovery of 
the town as a whole was part of this vision.  For example, Kaiapoi Society lobbied the council 
to open their building quickly after the September earthquake so that displaced and disrupted 
people “had somewhere to go” for shelter but also hospitality and recreation.  Similarly, 
Kaiapoi Welfare’s identity as an organisation that services the community was instrumental 
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in their motivation to mobilise additional resources, increase staff workload and hours, and 
expand their services to assist community response and recovery following the September 
earthquake.  The owner of Norwich Retail felt that her organisation and the products she 
offered were an important part of Lyttelton, and that motivated her to continue operating 
despite challenging conditions both before and after the earthquake:  
“I just think [what the store offers is] worthwhile and I have a very real sense that 
it puts something into the community that’s somehow good and nourishing; a 
good thing to do.  So regardless of how much money I make out of it, it sounds a 
bit altruistic or flaky, but that kind of thing seems like a good thing to do.  And 
because I live in the community it seems like I’m bringing something to the table, 
and people like it.”  
Finally, CSO decision makers and staff member that were embedded in their local 
community had an interpretive advantage when evaluating adaptive options and anticipating 
local responses to changes.  For example, the owner of Amherst Retail felt that it was 
important to the community to demonstrate commitment to Kaiapoi: 
“R: I wouldn’t move the business, I could buy another one, but in saying that I 
think Kaiapoi’s the sort of place that’s not that easy to be an absentee owner, 
because everyone talks and knows and if you’re not there…  
I: You think that makes a difference? 
R: Oh, hell yeah, because that’s what people expect.  They expect to know. 
Although I mean eventually, I mean, they know the girls and stuff, but you’re not 
there and if you’re here because you’ve gone and bought a [shop] somewhere else 
and you’re spending all this time there…In some ways, it’s a positive. I mean 
small towns are good because, you do good things, word gets round but you do 
other things …which maybe not be ‘bad bad’ from your point of view, but could 
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be slightly negative to other people.  So they’re like, ‘why would we support him, 
now he’s always away?’.” 
This shop owner’s involvement with and knowledge of the community helped him determine 
the kinds of adaptive actions that would work in Kaiapoi without risking damage to the 
organisation’s reputation.  An instrumental part of the adaptive process is evaluation of the 
organisation’s adaptive space, the range of options that are available, and assessing their 
potential influence on organisational outcomes.  Having decision makers or staff members 
embedded in the local community gave the organisation access to tacit understandings of 
local norms and expectations that might in turn influence the success of adaptive actions.  In 
this way cognitive embeddedness could facilitate constructive, situation-specific, sense-
making that helped decision makers overcome their tendency to rely on general or 
programmed explanations.  
Network embeddedness and resilience 
Organisations’ external networks were critical in facilitating adaptation. Inter-
organisational and inter-personal ties were an important source of physical resources and 
information, which increased an organisation’s adaptive options and its ability to enact its 
plans.  In Chapter 6, I discuss, in detail, the role of support networks and the way networks 
expanded organisation’s resource base and response capacity.  
Local networks increased CSOs’ capacity to detect the need for change and to 
evaluate adaptive options.  Networks increased their access to information, enhanced 
organisations capacity for situation monitoring, their capacity to detect the need for change, 
and to evaluate adaptive options.  Network connections can act as environmental ‘sensors.’  
The greater quantity and quality of these network sensors that an organisation had in the 
environment, the more potential access they had to information about that environment. 
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CSOs that proactively sought opportunities in their recovery environments utilised 
their networks for monitoring trends and accessing timely information.  CSOs’ local sensor 
networks included embedded inter-organisational relationships; affiliations with local 
business associations, customers, and owners; and staff member’s personal networks.  Box 
5.1 presents contrasting case descriptions of two CSOs’ different capacities to perceive 
changes in their local contexts and the potential impact of these changes on the organisation. 
The cases in Box 5.1 illustrate how an organisation’s local networks can deliver 
information about the local environment, even if the organisation is not actively seeking that 
information.  Amherst Retail received information about potential shifts in Kaiapoi that might 
affect their business through their local staff and the owner’s active engagement with local 
business support activities.  Kaiapoi Corner Store took advantage of immediate opportunities 
Box 5.1 
Case Comparison: Failure and a success in perception 
 
Amherst Retail, developmental change 
Amherst Retail experienced greater damage and disruption as a direct result of the earthquakes than 
Kaiapoi Corner Store, but was able to implement adaptations that helped them avoid degenerative change in 
the earthquake aftermath.  Amherst Retail’s situation awareness, enabled by local networks, allowed them to 
perceive potential disruptions and opportunities for growth. As a result of this awareness of Kaiapoi’s current 
and future situation the organisation was able to implement two important proactive adaptations. First, 
following the September earthquake, Amherst filled a gap in the retail market by adding new products that 
non-operational local retailers previously offered. Second, even though they did not lose their building they 
opted to relocate to a new development because they felt they could lose their building suddenly due to a 
DEE, future construction on the main street would reduce foot traffic, and new residential developments 
would bring customers in cars that would appreciate a parking lot. Amherst retail had a greater capacity to 
perceive the need for change in part because of their internal and external ‘sensors’ including, a high 
proportion of local staff that were aware of trends and issues concerning local residents. The owner also 
attended post-earthquake business information and networking meetings held by ENC, and participated in the 
local promotions campaigns.     
Kaiapoi Corner Store, degenerative change  
After losing a significant competitor in the September 2010 earthquake, Kaiapoi Corner Store 
experienced a significant increase in business through 2010 and much of 2011. They opened for longer hours 
and coordinated with suppliers to ensure that they could continue serving their customers. Yet in 2013 the 
CSO reported dropping revenue and being “worse off” than they had been prior to the earthquakes, due to the 
significant loss of local customers from nearby residential red zone areas. The owners had not perceived the 
potential impact of this change in their local context on the organisation, and therefore did not pursue adaptive 
action. Their lack of awareness about when and how the red zoning decision would affect their business was 
caused, in part, by the owner’s lack of local networks in the area.  Kaiapoi Corner Store was not a member of 
local business associations or groups. The owner’s personal friendship and kin networks were located outside 
of Kaiapoi, and neither the business nor the owners participated in local events, attended information nights, 
or otherwise engaged with the community.   
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through effective business management practices, but was less able to anticipate future 
changes due to their relative social separation from the Kaiapoi community.  Being part of a 
network facilitates the transfer of thick and tacit information in a way that enhances an 
organisation’s ability to interpret and navigate their environment before and after crises.   
Three of the resilience indicators identified in Lee et al.’s (2013) model enhanced 
CSOs’ capacity to utilise their networks as sensors.  These were ‘situation monitoring and 
reporting,’ ‘staff engagement and involvement,’ and ‘proactive posture’.  First, situation 
monitoring was exercised through organisational practices that promoted vigilance about 
emerging issues the organisation’s internal and external systems.  Second, staff engagement 
expanded their potential sensor networks exponentially.  If CSOs had internal practices that 
involved staff and encouraged staff to feel like they were integral in the organisation’s 
success, staff members were more likely to utilise their own networks not only to gain 
information about their environment but also mobilise resources on behalf of the 
organisation.  Finally, CSOs that practiced proactive posture or a “strategic and behavioural 
readiness to respond” (Lee et al., 2013, p.34) to signs of change in the organisations’ 
environment were more prepared to act on the signals they received from their networks.  
Embeddedness in local networks also enhanced CSOs’ capacity to evaluate adaptive 
actions.  For small business owners, in particular, having discussion networks characterised 
by strong, trusting ties gave decision makers a place to evaluate potential adaptive moves, 
share ideas, and discuss problems as they arose.  Organisations were faced with many 
complex decisions that can determine the path for their recovery going forward.  Micro- and 
small-CSOs were more likely than medium and large-CSOs to seek external advice about 
business and recovery decisions following the earthquake.  
Decision makers were more likely to gather information that they found useful and to 
heed advice if it came from a source that the decision makers knew and trusted before the 
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earthquakes.  The perceived reliability of that advice also increased if it came from others that 
were also going through the recovery process.  The CSOs described in Box 5.2 had very 
different post-disaster experiences, in part, due to their differential capacity to mobilise 
evaluative support from a trusted source.   
In the example in Box 5.2, the divergent outcomes for The Attic and Elegance were 
shaped both by internal resources (in the form of insurance) and the ability to mobilise 
external support.  These organisations also differed with respect to the endogenous resilience 
indicator of ‘leadership’.  For both of the CSOs in Box 5.2, the crisis decision making was 
influenced by the CSO leaders’ connection to a network that could or could not adequately 
support their evaluative process.   
Relationships that are both robust (reinforced through friendship, trust, and 
reciprocity) and adaptable contribute significantly to relational resilience.  Similarly, having 
resilient network members offers elements of stability in the network, speed and quality of 
support, and can generate a willingness to co-enable innovation and adaptation through the 
network. Chapter 6 covers other aspects of relational resilience in greater depth. 
 
Box 5.2 
Case Comparison: Evaluation and adaptation 
 
Elegance and The Attic both lost their retail stores in the Christchurch CBD as a result of the 
February earthquake, and both chose to relocate their business to the North Island in the aftermath. This 
decision nearly bankrupted Elegance, while The Attic successfully established in Wellington and restored to 
pre-earthquake levels of income and growth. There were two main differences that contributed to these 
divergent outcomes. The first was that The Attic had better internal resources in the form of business 
interruption insurance that allowed them to receive some form of income as the business decision makers 
took several months to assess the future of their building in the cordon and consider relocation options. 
Elegance’s business interruption insurance had lapsed between the September 2010 earthquake and 
February 2011 earthquake. The businesses also differed in the way they discussed the relocation and 
evaluated their options. The Attic was owned by business partners with a close trusting relationship that 
facilitated collaborative evaluation and decision making. The owners also discussed matters with a close 
knit group of Christchurch business owners that they knew prior to the earthquakes, seeking advice and 
support as they considered their options for the future. Elegance, on the other hand, was a sole 
proprietorship and the owner sought advice about relocating from a mentor from Recover Canterbury. 
Having never met the mentor prior to the earthquake, the owner was less inclined to trust his advice not to 
proceed with the move to Auckland and ultimately made a series of choices without adequate evaluation 
which had severe and lasting negative impacts on the organisation’s financial and the owner’s personal 
wellbeing.   
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Institutional embeddedness and resilience 
CSOs’ resilience was enabled and hindered by the institutional systems in which they 
were embedded.  The local councils’ and central government departments’ capacity to 
mitigate the impacts of a disruption, to adapt in a complex and uncertain environment, and to 
communicate effectively with stakeholders was critical for CSOs following the Canterbury 
earthquakes.  This was true for organisations embedded in corporations as well. Intra-
organisational institutions can uphold internal structures that normalise and reward 
collaboration and collective action (Kondra & Hurst, 2009).  Thus, the intra-organisational 
institutional norms that guide support-behaviours in addition to the adaptability of the head 
office, board, and other elements of the corporate body enabled recovery and adaptation for 
the earthquake affected portion of the organisation.  For example, other branches of corporate 
CSOs, in some cases, took on additional work to allow the Christchurch-based office to focus 
on recovery or otherwise altered normal operations to facilitate the reduced capacity of the 
earthquake affected part of the organisation.   
Institutional embeddedness could also extend organisations’ time frames for 
evaluating future options and planning a path forward for their recovery.  The earthquake 
support subsidy (ESS), which was administered through Work and Income New Zealand, is 
an illustrative example.  As discussed in Chapter 4, decision makers created the ESS 
following the earthquakes, and nothing like it had been deployed in New Zealand following a 
disaster.  The government’s capacity to perceive the need for this support and implement an 
innovative solution created a recovery environment in which CSOs had access to an 
important resource.  The ESS allowed earthquake affected organisations to continue paying 
staff while they evaluated options for the future.  The ESS, at least temporarily, relieved 
CSOs of some pressure to make staff redundant or to commit to recovery options 
immediately following the earthquakes.  
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Embeddedness in an institution, such as a corporation or a local government body, to 
differing extents also increased the absorptive capacity of some CSOs.  The ability of CSOs 
to access the collective financial and human resources of that institution meant that some 
were able to absorb a higher degree of disruption.  An institution’s absorptive or buffering 
capacity is only helpful to a limited extent as “erecting barriers to protect a firm from 
environmental fluctuation may […] prevent the firm from obtaining the information it needs 
to respond effectively” (Lengnick-Hall & Beck, 2005, p. 741).  Institutional insulation needed 
to be balanced by external sensor networks and an internal culture that was open and able to 
respond to those external signals of change.  
Finally, CSOs that reopened in the CBD, Lyttelton, and Kaiapoi experienced positive 
externalities of functional and supportive societal institutions.  In Lyttelton and Kaiapoi 
especially, relatively high degrees of local social capital had positive externalities for CSOs 
reopening in otherwise challenging environments.  As discussed earlier, social capital 
promoted civic engagement, positively reinforcing people’s support for local businesses.  
CSOs in Lyttelton and Kaiapoi benefitted from strong social pressure to shop local 
and support local businesses.  Local business associations and economic development 
agencies worked to promote community solidarity and to reward those that supported local 
businesses through promotions campaigns and local events.  Similarly, local groups created 
community spaces in damaged urban areas, giving people reasons to stay in contact with the 
CBDs and town centres even when these centres lacked the business ‘critical mass’ to serve 
as a functioning economic hub.  
The sense of community in these places meant that people were more likely to form 
personal connections with the CSOs and CSOs’ staff members, which made these ties more 
resilient in the earthquake aftermath.  When asked about the benefits of operating a business 
in Kaiapoi, the owner of Kaiapoi Shoppe answered:  
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“R: The sense of community. I mean you see the same people, you know what’s 
happening in their lives; you know that maybe their husband’s been diagnosed 
with cancer or they’ve just had a baby, or grandma’s moved in with them.  So you 
can have that ongoing, sense of knowing.  You know people and they know you. 
Our daughter’s just got married not long ago and about half a dozen customers 
have been in asking can I look at the wedding photos?  That sort of thing. 
I: Has that changed at all because of the earthquakes? 
R: No. I think in actual fact it’s got stronger.  That’s one good thing that has come 
out of it – the sense of community is a lot stronger.” 
Similarly, the owners of McCoy’s Hospitality, a hospitality organisation that 
ultimately never reopened after the February earthquake, were supported by locals prior to 
the earthquake and they continued to receive support and encouragement during their 
prolonged closure:  
“Well, it is very community driven. It doesn’t matter how you look at Lyttelton.  
They have some good organisations, and even at Christmas time, a lot of those 
organisations utilise you and stay in their own community to have their Christmas 
parties.  And that’s fantastic, you know, you’d think that some people would go 
further afield, but we have something unique in Lyttelton and they do use that 
[…]  As I said before, the [supportive voicemail] messages from customers [after 
the earthquake. […]  Just last week we were at The Brewery for lunch and there 
was probably 4 or 5 of our customers in the room, that all recognised who we 
were and said how long ‘till we were opening.  And that type of thing does make 
you motivated, and it felt good to want to get back and do what we were doing 
before.” 
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Organisational resilience in these places was buoyed by local social capital.  In these 
communities, social capital included the norms of collective support and civic engagement 
reinforced through reputation and reciprocity (e.g. if local businesses supported the 
community prior to the earthquake, the community tended to support the businesses after the 
earthquake).  The adaptive capacity of CSOs reopening in these towns was enhance by these 
social-institutional features. 
Endogenous resilience and embeddedness  
Extra-organisational sources of resilience improved CSOs’ capacity to adapt in the 
aftermath of the earthquakes.  Yet, in order to successfully process information being 
received about the environment, implement changes, and feed lessons learned back into the 
organisation, CSOs required many of the endogenous indicators of resilience captured in Lee 
et al.’s (2013) New Model of Organisational Resilience.  I identified some of these indicators 
in the discussion above, including situation monitoring and reporting, proactive posture, staff 
engagement, and internal and external resources.  Organisations’ recovery trajectories cannot 
be fully understood without considering how these endogenous, contextual, and relational 
components of resilience fit together.   
Table 23 through Table 25 summarize the adaptations CSOs implemented and the 
factors that enabled or hindered their resilience.  The tables provide succinct comparative 
analyses of seven CSOs (three that experienced developmental change, and four that 
experienced degenerative change).  The tables capture aspects of the in-depth narrative 
constructed through the longitudinal case studies, while distilling points that illustrate the 
processes that shaped post-disaster outcomes.  These cases illustrate the important 
relationship between endogenous, contextual, and relational sources of resilience.  These 
CSOs needed adequate endogenous resilience to mobilise exogenous sources of resilience 
effectively.  Interestingly, however, some CSOs that had relatively high endogenous 
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resilience were unable to thrive in contexts that hindered adaptation, while some that had 
relatively low levels of endogenous resilience could be propped up by high levels of 
contextual and relational resilience.   
The three CSOs described in Table 23 had positive recovery trajectories as of 2013, 
despite having some of the highest direct impact scores out of any of the CSOs.  These CSOs 
had relatively flexible approaches to their operations, and implemented multiple operational 
and locational changes in the post-disaster period.  Each of these CSOs moved their 
organisations a minimum of three times during the recovery period.  These organisations had 
several qualities in common that facilitated successful recoveries.  
First, although each of the owners was personally embedded in their local area and 
unwilling to relocate far from these areas, the CSOs were highly mobile within these 
environments.  Each of these organisations depended to some extent on the local 
organisational ecology to generate business.  They were each aware that in the shifting post-
disaster context they needed to move to ecologies that were intact or newly emerging. 
Second, these CSOs were all willing and ready to change (proactive posture).  
Sometimes CSOs were responding to direct disruptions like the loss of a building.  More 
often, however, they needed to respond to disruptions that were less easy to observe, such as 
gradual population loss.  In these cases the CSOs that coped well were able to recognise the 
need to adapt before experiencing the negative effects of the disruption.  It is important to 
note that proactive posture is not synonymous with response speed. Executive Sweets was 
closed for several months following the February earthquake as was God Save the Queen.  
These organisations were prepared to change, but also took the time to evaluate properly and 
find ways to resource their adaptive actions before committing to them. 
Finally, each of these CSOs was able to tap into strong organisational networks and 
positive aspects of their local contexts to access support that aided their recovery processes.  
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God Save the Queen provides an illustrative case of an organisation with relatively limited 
endogenous resources, but an exceptional capacity to utilise the owner’s networks to recover 
and forge new avenues for the business following the earthquakes.   
In order to continue operating in these challenging environments, all of the CSOs 
discussed in Table 23 needed to implement innovative solutions.  These included operating 
from temporary premises but also connecting with customers in new ways and introducing 
new products.  In each of these cases, innovation was enabled by the effective use of the 
organisations’ and owners’ networks.  Similarly, each of these organisations mobilised some 
support from institutions that were able to adapt and provide specialised assistance to 
businesses in the earthquake aftermath, including WINZ and local business associations. 
As Executive Sweets only had one staff member in addition to the owner, and God 
Save the Queen had none, staff relationships only played a role in Kedzie &Sons’ resilience. 
Kedzie & Sons’ internal culture was characterised by good staff engagement without silos 
separating aspects of the business.  The owner attributed this culture to the fact that it was a 
family business, owned by a father and son, explaining that for all employees: 
“It’s not so much you’re just an employee, it’s like you’re a part of the business.  
At the end of the day we’re only making money if they’re doing their job, and 
doing it well.” 
As a result, staff stayed with the business through its many transitions, and helped 
with the recovery in ways that extended beyond their usual job descriptions.  The owners 
rewarded this loyalty by retaining their employees even after an insurance adjuster 
recommended that they lay people off to reduce operating costs, finding ways to manage 
without sacrificing these relationships.  Thus, as with external networks, internal networks 
were strengthened and reinforced through trust and reciprocity in ways that created resilience 
for the organisation as a whole.  
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Table 23: Cases of highly adaptive and flexible organisations, adaptations and factors of resilience 
Developmental 
CSO CSO overview Factors enabling resilient post-disaster response Post-disaster adaptive responses 
Executive Sweets 
Small hospitality organisation, run by the 
owner and one employee. Prior to the 
earthquake, relied primarily on weekday 
trade from ‘white collar workers’ in the 
Christchurch CBD. Had business 
interruption insurance and was 
experiencing a steady revenue trend prior 
to the earthquake. Lost their building in 
the CBD as a result of the February 
earthquake.  
 Internal resources (good insurance, low debt) 
 Effective partnerships, owner strong local 
personal/professional relationships (external 
resources) 
 Innovation and creativity, situation 
monitoring, proactive posture  
 Strong but flexible leadership 
 Owner’s excellent knowledge of the area and 
local customers’ responses of changes; strong 
local customer support 
 Collaborative agreement with a local 
retailer to operate on part of their property 
in the CBD.  
 Operated from two mobile temporary 
premises, coordinating with CBD events  
 Increased public profile – due to new 
temporary locations and local media 
interest in their innovative approach to 
mobile premises. 
Kedzie & Sons 
Family owned and operated retailer 
based in the CBD for nearly four decades 
prior to the earthquake. Cash flow steady 
between average and slightly above 
average from 2007-2010. They had 
business interruption insurance prior to 
the earthquakes. Lost their building 
following both the September and 
February earthquakes.  
 Good internal culture - breaking silos, staff 
engagement 
 Proactive posture, opportunity seeking, and 
constantly revaluating their options.  
 Situation monitoring, and processes for 
feeding lesson back and adapting organisation  
 Innovation and creativity 
 Effective partnerships, owner strong local 
personal/professional relationships (external 
resources) 
 Able to relocate to intact organisational 
ecology in quickly recovered part of 
Christchurch 
 Operated from temporary locations while 
seeking an appropriate long-term premises 
 Introduced improved “customer 
relationship management system,” 
contacting customers by email  
 Added new product lines to modernise 
their image  
 Ceased operating a time-consuming, lower-
profit service their organisation used to 
offer prior to the earthquakes  
 Updated and improved website to better 
facilitate online sales   
God Save the 
Queen  
Small retail organisation (sole proprietor, 
no employees). Opened in Lyttelton a 
month prior to September earthquake. 
Experienced some growth between 
September 2010 and February 2011.  
Lost building as a result of February 
earthquake.  No insurance.  
 Innovation and creativity 
 Effective partnerships, owner strong local 
personal/professional relationships (external 
resources) 
 Proactive posture 
 Community support of local businesses and 
ability to coordinate with community events 
 Operated from a pop-up shop and co-
located in new premises with another 
displaced organisation  
 Switched from retail to wholesaling a line 
of earthquake related goods designed by 
the owner.   
 Introduced online marketing and sales 
 Expanded supportive relational network of 
like-business  
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Organisations that experienced degenerative change generally did so because of a 
failure to adapt adequately in the earthquake aftermath rather than as a result of the degree of 
impact or preparation.  In Table 24, I summarise two case studies that experienced cognitive 
and network inertia that hindered their recovery.  Both Wigwam and Toasty’s owners were 
anchored in their local contexts through kinship ties, but struggled to implement adaptations 
that would allow them to operate successfully in the dynamic post-earthquake environment.  
For example, both of Wigwam’s temporary relocations had limited success because they did 
not situate the CSO within an organisational ecology that could generate business in the same 
way it had prior to the earthquakes.  
 Toasty’s recovery was also hindered by the owner’s lack of proactive posture 
or planning strategies for the impending DEE, which ultimately led to the loss of their 
building, and by the lack of situational awareness of an important network member.  
According to the owner of Toasty’s, the landlord misinterpreted their insurance policy, stating 
that Toasty’s had comprehensive insurance including loss of earning.  The landlord had not 
put the business owners’ names on the policy, meaning that Toasty’s actually had no 
coverage following the earthquake.  The owners of Toasty’s chose to stay with the lease 
despite this issue, in part because of a personal friendship with the landlord who was 
suffering serious health problems.  This demonstrates the dangers of network inertia.   
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Table 24: Cases of cognitive and network inertia, adaptations and factors hindering resilience 
Degenerative 
change CSO 
CSO overview Factors disabling resilient post-disaster response Post-disaster adaptive responses 
Wigwam 
Retail shop with two locations in 
Christchurch (one CBD and one in a 
near suburb). Experienced declining 
profits as a result of the recession 2009-
2010). Did not have business 
interruption insurance 
 Owners highly personally embedded, did not want to 
relocate the business outside of Christchurch 
 Inadequate internal resources — relatively high level 
of debt prior to the earthquake, which increased 
following the earthquake  
 Good ‘innovation and creativity’ in establishing the 
temporary shop, but relatively poor organisation-
environment fit in new location  
 Poor ‘situation awareness’ – the owners ignored 
clear signals that the recession would limit their 
business before determining to open the CBD shop 
(pre-EQ).   
 Survival seeking in their temporary location 
 Reopened in a novel temporary 
location – as a result attracted media 
attention and initially some curious 
customers 
 Operated from another 
organisation’s shop for 3 months 
 Purchasing different products due to 
changed customer preferences 
Toasty’s 
Small hospitality organisation, run as a 
family business.  Opened a few months 
before the September 2010 earthquake. 
Did not have any insurance (due to 
miscommunication with the landlord). 
Experienced greatly increased business 
and profile after losing most competitors 
in Kaiapoi became ‘community hub’ in 
earthquake aftermath.  Lost building in 
2013 following DEE, and permanently 
closed. 
 Owners highly personally embedded in Kaiapoi area, 
did not want to relocate the business 
 No planning strategies for building closure, poor 
situation awareness, and proactive posture  
 Inadequate internal resources (lack of insurance, and 
lack of energy), did not mobilise external network of 
support despite high degree of community social 
capital and strong (trust, reciprocity based) 
relationships  
 Restoration seeking  
 In anticipation of losing the building 
the owners stopped updating the 
menu or investing money in the 
business to minimise their potential 
losses. 
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Finally, the two organisations described next, in Table 25, were hindered, in part, by 
institutional inertia.  This inertia stopped these organisations from relocating outside of their 
territorial boundary despite serious losses to their clientele and barriers to relocating 
successfully within their respective towns.  Pumpkin’s Community Group was part of a larger 
national organisation, and offered services to the Lyttelton community.  Similarly, Kaiapoi 
Rental was part of a larger corporate body and restricted to the Kaiapoi and near residential 
market.  Pumpkin’s faced an additional relocation challenge because they required specialised 
facilities to accommodate some of their clientele.   
Kaiapoi Rental is an excellent example of an organisation that had a high level of 
endogenous resilience and yet still experienced degenerative change.  The business’ leaders 
implemented significant adaptations, maintained good relationships with its staff, and 
adjusted its internal processes to meet greatly increased customer needs.  They also 
contributed significantly to community efforts, with staff volunteering to shovel silt from 
liquefied properties and engaging in local events and recovery initiatives.  Yet, due to the 
disrupted nature of the local real estate market caused in large part by the widespread red 
zoning of residential property, as of 2013, Kaiapoi Rental was worse off than it had been 
prior to the earthquake.  
Pumpkin’s Community Group had relatively low endogenous resilience, and their 
recovery was further disabled by contextual challenges and poor relational resilience.  They 
were unable to implement adaptive actions successfully while the societal and political 
institutions in which it was embedded struggled to recover.  They had lost community 
support as local volunteers and clients moved away or dealt with their own recovery, and they 
struggled to mobilise adequate support from local authorities that were also resource limited 
and focused on other priorities.   
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Table 25: Cases of institutional inertia, adaptations and factors hindering resilience 
Degenerative 
change CSO 
CSO overview Factors disabling resilient post-disaster response Post-disaster adaptive responses 
Pumpkin’s 
community 
group 
Local Lyttelton branch of a national 
not-for-profit community group. One 
part time employee, but major 
decisions made by committee of 
volunteers. No insurance, rely on grants 
and funding from their central 
organisation. Building damaged 
following September 2010 earthquake, 
reopened for a short time before 
February 2011 earthquake, lost 
building again, operated in very limited 
capacity (essentially closed) through 
2013.  
 
 Not supported by resilient internal or external 
networks  
 No help mobilised from their central organisation 
 Relied on CCC for access to space – delays and poor 
communication from council 
 Poor internal resources - Volunteer members all local 
and dealing with their own disruptions 
 Restricted to territorial boundaries and restricted 
capacity to relocate or operate in some temporary 
spaces - need additional amenities due to the nature 
of their clientele.  
 Survival seeking, did not try to implement 
innovative/creative solutions 
 After September they upgraded computer system 
for inventory management 
 Operated shortly from a substandard temporary 
location provided by another local organisation.  
Kaiapoi Rental 
Small real estate business part of a 
larger corporate entity. Negatively 
affected by recession but steady 
2008/09 revenue trend. Temporarily 
lost building as a result of the 
September 2010 earthquake. Had 
business interruption insurance.   
 Restricted to territorial boundaries 
 Clientele and operating territory heavily affected by 
Red Zoning  
 Houses that were not damaged were near areas with 
“weeds, broken roads still not fixed, messy sites” 
 Rely in part on foot traffic, main street fenced off, 
council’s pedestrian solutions made it difficult to 
walk down the main street 
 Temporarily collocated with like organisation 
 Reduced the cost of the lease 
 Increase workload to meet increased client 
demands (more work for less money) 
 Adjusting processes to continue working in market 
affected by legal, insurance, and financial 
complexities 
 Relocated in 2013 to new development 
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This CSO lacked the internal resources (both in terms of finances and volunteer energy) and 
external resources to aid adaptations or to identify and potential solutions.   
      Due to Pumpkin’s spatial and institutional inertia and limited resources, their 
primary strategy was to enter a state of hibernation to conserve resources while the 
institutions in which they were embedded recovered.  Kaiapoi Rental, on the other hand, a 
for-profit business implemented a number of adaptations to ensure its survival and to position 
it to improve as the local market improves in the years to come.  The organisation worked to 
maintain its relationship with the local customer base, and due to the norms of reciprocity and 
rewarding local loyalty that characterise many of the exchanges in Kaiapoi, these actions 
might be interpreted as an investment in social capital. 
The resilience of an organisation is contingent upon the resilience of its context.  
Organisations experiencing inertia were unable to adapt even if the contexts were no longer 
conducive to their success or were actively hindering organisational recovery.  While some 
organisations found ways to adapt within certain constraints, some organisations, such as 
Kaiapoi Rental, were unable to compensate fully for a lack of contextual resilience with high 
degrees of endogenous resilience.  
5.6 Conclusion 
The analyses presented in this chapter have addressed the question: ‘How do an 
organisation’s connections to its local context affect its recovery trajectory?’  I began this 
analysis by first identifying the ways the case study organisations connected to their local 
contexts.  I identified 16 unique mechanisms through which CSOs became embedded in the 
various social structures that composed their local contexts.  I used these mechanisms to 
calculate a ‘local embeddedness’ score.  
I then examined CSOs’ local embeddedness through three different lenses: 
embeddedness as a conduit for impact, embeddedness as the cause of organisational inertia, 
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and embeddedness as a source of organisational resilience.  The findings indicate that 
although organisations with higher degrees of local embeddedness were potentially exposed 
to more impacts from local disruptions, they were not closed for more days nor did LE score 
relate to the organisations’ post-disaster trajectory.   
Local embeddedness influenced organisations adaptive capacity in a number of ways.  
The nature and degree of their embeddedness influenced whether an organisation relocated 
within its pre-earthquake local context.  Local embeddedness enhanced a CSO’s capacity for 
monitoring its local environment.  Embeddedness in relational networks enhanced CSOs’ 
capacity to discuss and evaluate their adaptive options in their local contexts.  Finally, 
embeddedness in resilient networks and an organisation’s capacity to access local social 
capital improved its access to mobilise resources and support in the earthquake aftermath.  
The most difficult forms of inertia for CSOs to overcome were institutional inertia and 
personal network inertia.  CSOs were less able or willing to relocate if they had high levels of 
embeddedness in governing institutions or if leaders had strong personal ties to the area.  
Findings from the case studies led to the development of two resilience concepts that 
expand our current understanding of where resilience originates in organisations’ systems.  
Contextual resilience, which was ultimately the result of findings presented in this chapter, 
refers to the relationship between the resilience of place and organisational resilience.  
Relational resilience, which I explore in more depth in the next chapter, refers to the 
relationship between relational networks and organisational resilience.  Both concepts 
introduce aspects of organisational resilience that are constituted, in part, by engagement with 
various elements of geographic contexts and a wider network of social relations.  Further, 
elements of an organisation’s endogenous resilience enhance its ability to recognise and 
utilise these collectively held sources of resilience.  
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So how might organisations use this information to enhance their resilience?  There 
are at least three strategies that organisations could adopt to reduce the negative elements of 
embeddedness and enhance the elements of embeddedness that facilitate resilience.  First, 
organisations could buffer themselves (i.e. introduce a degree of separation or protection) 
from potential disruptions to their local environments, by, for example, having ICT systems, 
such as cloud based storage in case of physical disruptions.  They could also buffer against 
local disruptions by developing networks that extend beyond their local area and allow them 
to bring in support from unaffected actors.  For CSOs, however, buffering had mostly short 
term benefits and a limited capacity to alter medium-term recovery outcomes.  Additionally, 
buffering the organisation too much from the local environment meant missing out on 
important signals of change and reducing organisational capacity to capitalise on local 
loyalties and to capture the positive externalities of local social capital.   
The second strategy is ensuring that the organisation is situated in a resilient context 
and connects to others with a high degree of resilience.  For example, there are potentially 
negative implications for an organisation that locates in an area with a poorly functioning 
local government, and this risk is likely to be exacerbated following a disaster.  Similarly, an 
organisation may benefit by locating and embedding in an area that has a high degree of 
social capital (e.g. a large number of active community organisations and business 
associations).   
Finally, organisations can invest in their community before a crisis, so as to enhance 
local resilience.  This is an especially important strategy for organisations embedded in a way 
that precludes relocation in the event of local disruptions.  These organisations may benefit 
from considering their local area as part of their operations, investing in the resilience of that 
area or building resilient connections that will enable them to continue functioning even if the 
area is disrupted.  For example, organisations may want to focus on building connections in 
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their location that promote and allow them to access local social capital.  They may want to 
develop local networks that help identify emerging issues and evaluate adaptive options 
informed by context-specific input. They can continue to reinforce these networks with 
transparent communication and reciprocity.  Additionally, as discussed in the results, 
developing a local identity and image can also help organisations mobilise support and give 
staff members a sense of purpose and motivation to continue operating in these environments 
in the disaster aftermath. 
Explorations of the relationship between organisations and their contexts in this 
chapter are by no means exhaustive.  Rather, this analysis serves as an entry point for further 
investigation of the relationship between organisational connectivity and resilience.  I focused 
specifically on the local environments, but organisations are subject to other fluid, multi-
scalar influences (e.g. global economic trends, national regulatory environments) that shape 
organisations to different degrees.  Further explorations into the relevance of organisational 
embeddedness are important for the advancement of organisational resilience studies.  
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Chapter 6: Post-Earthquake Support Networks  
 
6.1 Introduction 
When disasters disrupt or overwhelm an organisation’s capacity to function 
effectively, its external networks can provide access to resources and information that help it 
to absorb the impact and adapt in the aftermath.  Networks allow organisations to make 
investments in relationships, which they can later ‘redeem’ to avoid bearing the costs of a 
disaster completely on their own.  Network connections can also be formed briefly or 
spontaneously to fill emergent needs that had not been anticipated prior to a disruption.   
This chapter analyses the post-earthquake support networks of the 32 case study 
organisations (CSOs) introduced in the previous chapter.  I address two key research 
questions: What is the nature of organisational post-disaster support networks? And, what is 
the relationship, if any, between the organisations’ post-disaster trajectories and the nature of 
these support networks?  To address these questions, I examine the nature of CSO support 
networks (i.e. the kinds of relationships which comprised them), how organisations utilised 
external support following the earthquakes, and the features of CSO networks and network 
management practices that enhanced their ability to respond and adapt after the earthquakes.  
The chapter layout differs slightly from the thematic structure of the previous chapter.  
Due to the relatively large amount of quantitative data and analyses, I present the descriptive 
and statistical quantitative results first, and then draw out the nuances of this data through 
integrated analyses and discussion of the qualitative case study information.  The three main 
sections are as follows: Section 6.2 provides a general overview of the CSO support 
networks, including who provided support, where supporters were located, and the overall 
network characteristics.  In Section 6.3, I examine the relationships between the 
organisational characteristics, support content, and network characteristics.  I then 
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systematically compare the support networks of organisations with different post-disaster 
trajectories.  In Section 6.4, I integrate the network analysis findings with qualitative data 
from the CSO respondent interviews.  I discuss how network features and organisational 
practices influenced support exchanges and organisational outcomes. 
 
6.2 Support network overview 
Every CSO in this study mobilised some support from extra-organisational actors 
following the earthquakes.  CSO respondents provided information about their organisational 
support networks through participant aided sociograms (PAS).  PAS formed part of the in-
depth interview process with CSO leaders.  Respondents started the PAS exercise by 
reporting all of the people, organisations, or institutions that they recalled supporting their 
organisation’s recovery following the earthquakes beginning in September 2010. 
The focal node (or ego, as shown in Figure 15) within each network is the case-study 
organisation.  For CSOs that were part of a corporation or affiliated group, the office based in 
the Christchurch CBD, Lyttelton or Kaiapoi is the ‘ego.’  Thus, in this study intra-corporate 
networks were included in the analysis of organisational support networks.  
Respondents from the 32 CSOs listed a total of 457 network members, alternately 
referred to as supporters.  These network members included individual or organisational 
actors that provided some kind of support to the CSO following the earthquakes. In the PAS 
exercise, CSO respondents provided information about each network member.  The 
information included their role relative to the CSO (e.g. supplier, customer, or friend of an 
employee) and the importance of the supporter to the organisation’s recovery for all 457 
network members.  Respondents then provided additional information about the dyad (i.e. the 
relationship between the CSO and the supporter, also depicted in Figure 15) and the support 
exchanged for up to 15 supporters in their network. 
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Figure 15: Network components 
 
Before I explore the relationship between organisational networks and their post-
disaster trajectories, I present the general characteristics of the CSOs’ support networks.  
First, Table 26 presents the aggregate characteristics of the CSOs’ networks.  Suppliers were 
by far the most common source of support reported by CSOs following the earthquakes.  
Supplier is a broad category that includes suppliers of material goods as well as suppliers of 
services including accountants, insurers, and contractors.  CSOs also frequently received 
support from other formal relationships including government and community groups or non-
profit organisations. 
CSOs sourced most of their support from people or organisations in Canterbury and 
with whom they had long-term relationships.  About 70 per cent of supporters were located 
within Canterbury, and CSOs had a relationship for a year or longer with 80 per cent of 
supporters.   
Support networks also included a substantial amount of relationships formed in the 
earthquake aftermath (nearly all of the 17 per cent of relationships with a duration of 6 
months or less were formed post-earthqake).    
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Table 26: CSO support network characteristics 
Some of these include relationships with groups that did not exist prior to the earthquake, 
such as CERA and Recover Canterbury, or were connections made to fill needs that did not 
exist prior to the earthquake (e.g. accessing the CBD cordon).   
The timing of initial contact with supporters differed following the two major 
earthquakes in September 2010 and February 2011 (‘Sep 2010 Timing’ and ‘Feb 2011 
Timing’ in Table 26). The support accessed following the September earthquake tended to be 
front-loaded, with nearly 80 per cent of initial contact with supporters made within a few 
days of the earthquake.   
 
Supporter/Relationship 
Attribute % of Supporters 
Role of Supporter 
(N=457) 
 
Location of Supporter 
(N=372) 
 
Duration of Relationship 
with Supporter 
(N=372) 
 
2% 
5% 
5% 
6% 
8% 
8% 
10% 
10% 
10% 
14% 
23% 
Other
Part of Organisation
Organisation in same industry
Family
Customer
Other business
Friend
Business Association
Community Group/ Non-profit
Government
Supplier
4% 
24% 
30% 
41% 
Outside of NZ
In NZ
In same region
In the same town
1% 
1% 
8% 
18% 
25% 
47% 
Unknown
Less than 1 year
6-10 years
Less than 6 months
1-5 years
More than 10 years
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In contrast, support following the February earthquake was distributed over a longer period.  
This in part reflects the additional time organisation leaders needed after the more disruptive 
February earthquake to address family and personal disruptions and to determine recovery 
priorities before mobilising support.  
Support came in a number of different forms.  Respondents also provided open 
descriptions of the various kinds of support each network member provided.  The only 
restriction imposed on the type of support that respondents described was that the support had 
to, in the respondent’s opinion, aided the organisation’s response and recovery.  The final 
coding of these open responses contains six mutually exclusive categories of organisational 
support (Table 27).  These categories capture all forms of support that CSOs mobilised from 
Table 26: CSOs’ support network characteristics (continued) 
 
Supporter/Relationship 
Attribute % of Supporters 
Importance  
(N=457) 
 
Sept 2010 Timing 
(N = 149) 
 
Feb 2011 Timing 
(N = 297) 
 
12% 
28% 
28% 
32% 
1 – Least important/helpful 
2
3
4 – Most important/helpful 
8% 
14% 
33% 
45% 
More than a few weeks
Within a few weeks
Within a few days
Almost immediately
22% 
23% 
26% 
27% 
Within a few weeks
Within a few days
More than a few weeks
Almost immediately
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their networks throughout the recovery period.
68
  CSOs received everything from supplies 
and accomodation to administrative assistance and emotional support from their post-
earthquake networks. 
Table 27: Types of organisational support 
Type Description 
Advice & 
information 
Advice or information offered to the CSO whether general or specific (e.g. business 
mentoring; legal and financial advice; information about where to apply for aid).  
Assistance & 
services 
Services, assistance, and labour provided to the CSO (e.g. retail shop assistance, 
construction work, doing taxes, physically assisting with relocation, cleaning) 
Bridging & 
advocacy 
Social influence exerted by the tie. Includes bridging (socially ‘horizontal’) or linking 
(socially ‘vertical’) CSO to a wider range of people and/or organisations.  Also includes 
advocacy on behalf of the respondent organisation.   
Emotional 
support 
Support given with the intent of aiding the emotional coping of people within the CSO 
(e.g. “checking in,” offering sympathy, sending supportive emails or calls). 
Financial 
support 
Monetary and financial related support given to the CSO or staff (e.g. loans, donations, 
and grants, purchasing from the respondent organisation, insurance pay-out, employee 
wage subsidy, bank overdraft, debt forgiveness, extended credit or discounts). 
Physical 
resources 
Non-monetary physical (tangible, material) resources (e.g. location to operate from - 
includes co-locating, storage space, transportation, equipment, furnishings, and office 
supplies, food and drinks, housing for staff). 
Supporters could provide any combination of these support types.  Some of the 
exchanges were simple one-off transactions, while other interactions were multi-layered and 
repetitive, with supporters offering different kinds of support at different periods throughout 
the recovery process.  ‘Assistance and services’ was the most common support type, while 
‘bridging and advocacy’ was the least common.  Approximately 37 per cent of supporters 
provided some form of assistance or services, 31 per cent provided emotional support, and 30 
                                                 
68
 This period includes any time between the September 2010 earthquake and when the data was collected in 
mid-2012. 
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per cent provided financial assistance.  Slightly less common were physical resources (25%), 
advice and information (23%), and bridging and advocacy (10%).
69
  
Finally, respondents indicated whether support was bi-directional (i.e. whether 
support was in some way reciprocated during the study period) and which network members 
interacted with each other.  This information provided insights into the structure of the ego-
networks. 
CSO networks also had various sizes and structures.  Table 28 presents the average 
characteristics of the CSOs networks: network size (the number of supporters with whom the 
CSO connected), network density (proportion of supporters that know each other), and 
reciprocity (proportion of supporters to whom the CSO provided support post-earthquake).  
The external-internal (E-I) index calculates the degree of network heterogeneity, which, in 
this instance, refers to the proportion of the network that consists of supporters from outside 
of the CSO’s industry sector. 70  E-I index ranges from 1 (all of the support came from 
outside of the CSO’s industry sector) to -1 (all of the support came from inside the CSO’s 
industry sector).  So the CSOs in this study tended to get a majority of their support from 
others outside of their industry.  
Table 28: Structural network attributes (N=32)  
Variable Mean Standard deviation 
Network size 14.3 8.3 
Network Density 0.2 0.1 
Reciprocity (%) 35.4 19.7 
E-I index 0.7 0.4 
Supporters outside of 
Canterbury (%) 
26.7 20.9 
                                                 
69
 Bridging and advocacy was likely under-reported as it was not always perceived by respondents as support.  
Instead CSOs likely saw it as an interim step in connecting with others from whom they could access support. 
70
 E-I Index is calculated as (((Network Size – (∑Homophilous Ties))-((∑Homophilous Ties))/Network Size) or 
in other words ((E-I)/(E+I)).  Homophilous ties in this study refer to organisations in the same industry sector as 
the CSO).  So ‘E’ refers to group-‘external’ ties, and ‘I’ refers to group-‘internal’ ties (Hanneman & Riddle, 
2005).  
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CSOs received support from an average of 14 network members (ranging from a 
minimum of 4 to a maximum of 43).  Network density ranged from a minimum of 0 (i.e. 
none of the supporters in the network knew each other) to a maximum of 0.6 (60% of the 
supporters knew each other).  Density, or the connectedness of the ego’s network, can affect 
what is exchanged and how (Borgatti, Mehra, Brass, & Labianca, 2009).  For example, 
having network members that do not know each other (i.e. structural holes) can mean that an 
organisation is in a better strategic position to negotiate with some network members and is 
able to access unique resources (Burt, 1992).  
Finally, reciprocity indicates how much the CSO was involved in ‘giving back’ to 
their network during the study period.  CSOs returned some form of support to over a third of 
their network members following the earthquakes.  Ritchie and Gill (2007) refer to ‘specific’ 
and ‘generalised’ forms of reciprocity — where “specific reciprocity involves an arrangement 
in which an individual or group agrees to do something for another individual or group in 
return for something predetermined,” and “generalised reciprocity is based on a high level of 
trust …where frequent social interaction has laid a foundation for mutual obligation and 
responsibility for action” (p.107).  In this study, reciprocity includes both of these types, but 
excludes any monetary payments for goods or services.  
 Section 6.3 presents the results of the statistical social network analysis (SNA), which 
was used to explore the relationships among organisational characteristics, support content, 
and network characteristics.  These analyses begin by answering the fundamental social 
support question, ‘who gives what to whom?’  The analysis then explores what kinds of 
networks give what to whom.  And finally, ‘Are CSOs’ post-earthquake trajectories 
associated with certain network attributes?’ 
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6.3 SNA Results 
The analyses in this section examine the relationship between the supporter’s 
characteristics and the nature of the support (e.g. what kinds of support and how it was 
delivered).  I also explore whether and how the support network influenced an organisation’s 
post-disaster trajectory.  Along with the descriptive statistics in the previous section, the 
results in this section address the question, “What is the nature of organisational post-disaster 
support networks?”  In the latter half of the section I examine whether organisation’s post-
disaster trajectory was influenced by the nature of the support network.  
Through the analyses of the network data (the results of which are presented in Table 
29 and Table 30),
71
  
 
I wanted to explore the support implications of different kinds of 
network relationships.  I examined who was providing the support, their location, when the 
CSO was first in touch with the supporter, whether the support was reciprocated, and the 
relative importance the CSO placed on the supporter. ‘ 
6.3.1 Who delivered which kinds of support?  
Nearly every support type was significantly associated with a particular kind of 
supporter (Table 29).
72
  Unsurprisingly, emotional support was more likely to come from 
family and less likely to come from suppliers and other businesses.  Friends and family were 
less likely than expected, however, to act as sources of information and advice.  This support 
instead came from business associations and other businesses.  These supporters were more 
likely to have access to relevant and timely information or advice.  Physical resources were 
                                                 
71
 The chi-squared statistic is calculated by subtracting the expected count from the observed count.  Then the 
differences are squared for each cell, and the squares are divided by the expected number [(O-E)
2
/E].  The sum 
of all the values of [(O-E)
2
/E] for the variables of interest is the chi-square statistic.  The chi-square statistic is 
used to determine whether the relationship is significant.  Chapter 3 provides descriptions and justifications for 
the statistical tests applied in this section including Pearson’s chi-squared statistic, Pearson’s correlations, and 
the Kruskal-Wallis non-parametric analysis of variance (ANOVA).    
72
 Each network member could provide from one to all six support types.  Thus, when I ran the cross-tabulation 
and chi-squared analysis I ran each support type separately, resulting in a chi-squared value for each support 
type.  This differs from the results in Table 30, as each network member could only be associated with one 
category.  I therefore created a cross-tabulation table for all categories of the variables of interest.  
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most likely to come from suppliers.  Assistance and services, such as administrative support 
and help moving premises, were most likely to be provided by those with whom the CSO 
decision makers had a close relationship – primarily friends and family of staff and other 
parts of the organisation (i.e. others in the intra-corporate network). 
Although too few CSOs reported receiving bridging and advocacy support for the 
results to be statistically valid, Table 29 does show that this support most frequently came 
from business associations and government agencies or personnel.  These were the type of 
supporters that likely had the greatest access to broad and potentially powerful networks to 
which the CSO was not directly connected.  The relevance of arms-length ties for connecting 
egos to other networks is firmly established in Mark Granovetter’s much-cited 1973 article 
The Strength of Weak Ties.  Relationships with business associations or government agencies 
were, in most cases, ‘weak ties’, as CSOs generally interacted with them formally and 
relatively infrequently.  Nevertheless, these types of ties were excellent avenues for accessing 
information and expanding organisational network reach (i.e. through bridging and 
advocacy).  
Customers, community groups/non-profits, and competitors were not associated with 
a particular type of support, but rather supplied a wide range of support depending on CSOs’ 
needs.  These types of supporters might not have had access to the range of resources 
available to more influential supporters (e.g. government personnel), but they were often 
more flexible.  Ties that were flexible and adaptable, as discussed later, were instrumental in 
filling emergent needs quickly. 
Similarly, financial support was not significantly associated with a particular role 
type.  Financial support most frequently came from suppliers, in the form of discounts and 
extended credit, from government actors in the form of the Earthquake Support Subsidy and 
tax deferments, and business associations or industry groups (primarily Recover Canterbury) 
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in the form of grants.  CSOs, however, also received financial support from every other type 
of supporter in different forms.  
The nature of the relationship also varied depending on the network member’s role.  
CSOs were more likely to return support (reciprocate) to those with whom they had close 
relationships, friends and family, as well as other organisations in the same industry (Table 
30).  Support was more likely to flow one-way, without reciprocation, from organisations 
with which the CSO had more formal relationships: government agencies, suppliers, and 
business associations. 
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Table 29: Role types and support types, Pearson’s chi-squared results73 
  
Family Friends Supplier Customer 
Part of 
Org 
Org in 
Industry 
Business 
Assn. 
Community 
Group/ NPO 
Other 
Busin. 
Govt. Total X
2 
df 
Asym 
Sig.  
Support 
Type 
 
Emotional 
 
 
Obs. 21 10 14 11 6 11 10 8 11 13 114 41.02 10 0.00** 
Exp.  8.6 10.7 27.9 7.7 6.7 6.4 12.9 9.5 18.1 15 114 
   
Bridging 
Obs. 1 1 4 1 0 1 13 1 4 10 38 35.41 10 0.00** 
Exp.
74
 2.9 3.6 6 2.6 2.2 2.1 4.3 3.2 2.8 5 38 
   
Advice 
Obs. 4 4 16 0 4 5 24 8 11 10 86 47.79 10 0.00** 
Exp. 6.5 8.1 21 5.8 5.1 4.9 9.7 7.2 6.2 11.3 86 
   
Physical 
Obs. 6 10 31 7 7 6 2 7 7 9 93 39.7 10 0.00** 
Exp. 7 8.8 22.8 6.3 5.5 5.3 10.5 7.8 6.8 12.3 93 
   
Financial 
Obs. 4 4 34 9 4 5 13 11 6 20 110 18.18 10 0.052 
Exp. 8.3 10.3 26.9 7.4 6.5 6.2 12.4 9.2 8.0 14.5 110 
   
Assistance 
Obs. 15 25 32 8 18 6 5 12 6 10 138 62.43 10 0.00** 
Exp. 10.4 13 33.8 9.3 8.2 7.8 15.6 11.5 10.0 18.2 138 
   
*Significant difference at p<0.05, **significant difference at p<0.01 
                                                 
73
 Table 29 shows the expected value (Exp), calculated based on the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between role type and support type, and the observed value 
(Obs), the actual count of support instances from network members in different role categories. If the relationship is significant it means that we can reject the null hypothesis 
that there is no relationship between the supporter’s role and the support delivered.   
74
 Chi-squared results need a minimum of 5 responses in the expected cell to be statistically valid. 
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6.3.2 Where was support coming from?  
Overall the great majority of supporters (~70%) were located within Canterbury.  
That said, suppliers and other parts of the business were more likely than other types of 
supporters to be based outside of Canterbury (Table 30 shows the counts by role type of 
which supporters were located outside of Canterbury).  Of the types of support, only financial 
support was more likely than expected to come from outside of Canterbury (χ² (4, N=372) = 
14.0, p <0.05).
75
  This difference in the location of financial and non-financial support is in 
part due to the relative ease of giving monetary resources, discounts, or credit from a 
distance, as opposed to delivering services or physical resources.  Suppliers and other parts of 
the business (both often located outside of Canterbury as indicated in Table 30) were 
common sources of financial support. 
Financial support from outside of Canterbury may also reflect a greater sense of 
financial security for organisations operating outside of earthquake affected areas, compared 
to organisations dealing with the uncertain recovery environment in Canterbury.  Thus, 
connecting with supporters outside of Canterbury was often a useful approach for 
organisations that needed to access financial support.  
                                                 
75
 I conducted some additional chi-square analyses that are not included in Tables 6.4 or 6.5.  All chi-squared 
tests referred to in the text that are not presented in the tables are reported fully in the text, including, in order: 
the degrees of freedom, the sample size for the test, the chi-squared statistic, and the significance.  
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Table 30: Role type and support characteristics, Pearson's chi-squared 
76 
  Family Friends Supplier Customer 
Part of 
Org 
Org in 
Industry 
Business 
Assn. 
Comm. 
Group/ 
NPO 
Other 
Busin. 
Govt. Total X2 df 
Asym 
Sig.  
Sep Support 
Timing 
Value / / / / / / / / / / 149 30.45 11 0.00** 
Almost 
immediately  
Obs 14 2 16 4 9 3 6 7 7 2 67    
Within days, 
weeks, 
months 
Obs 
1 6 17 5 7 2 12 7 7 17 82    
Feb Support 
Timing 
 Value / / / / / / / / / / 293 55.01 20 0.00** 
Almost 
immediately  
Obs 17 5 19 7 10 2 6 8 2 2 81    
Within days 
or weeks 
Obs 5 19 35 7 7 8 14 7 9 9 134    
More than a 
few weeks 
Obs 2 8 25 5 0 5 10 8 6 6 78    
Importance  Value / / / / / / / / / / 457 75.80 33 0.00** 
Less (1,2) Obs 5 24 43 10 6 13 24 14 21 21 181    
More (3,4) Obs 20 25 60 26 16 11 21 33 16 41 276    
Reciprocity   Value / / / / / / / / / / 365 89.00 11 0.00** 
No Obs 9 14 81 13 12 4 37 16 13 39 239    
Yes Obs 19 20 9 11 10 17 5 13 13 9 126    
Out of 
Canterbury 
Value / / / / / / / / / / 372 30.10 11 0.00** 
No Obs 21 26 64 17 8 19 28 29 22 32 267    
Yes Obs 7 9 27 8 14 2 14 2 5 17 105    
*Significant difference at p<0.05, **significant difference at p<0.01 
                                                 
76
 A number of categories were combined to try to ensure that there were high enough values in each cell.  Expected values were calculated as part of the chi-squared 
analysis, but only the observed values are reported in order to keep the table relatively readable.  
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6.3.3 When did organisations begin mobilising support?  
Supporters with whom CSOs and their employees had close relationships (family and 
other parts of the organisation) provided support most quickly.  Those with a duty of care (i.e. 
local government actors) were next, followed by those with whom organisations had more 
formal market relationships (Table 30).  In September 2010, significantly more family 
delivered support immediately after the earthquake than expected, while government sources 
and business associations were significantly more likely than expected to deliver support 
later.  Similarly, after February 2011 it was family and other parts of the organisation that 
were in contact almost immediately after the earthquake.  Government actors were 
significantly more likely than expected to offer support within a few days or within a few 
weeks, and suppliers were more likely than expected to offer support more than a few weeks 
after the disaster.  
There was a significant relationship between support timing and emotional support (χ² 
(5, N=356) = 27.6, p <0.001), physical resources (χ² (5, N=356) = 8.25, p<0.05), and 
financial support (χ² (5, N=356) = 19.1, p<0.001).  Supporters were more likely to deliver 
emotional support and physical resources almost immediately after or within days of an 
event, whereas CSOs received financial support later (within weeks and more than a few 
weeks after the earthquake) more often than statistically expected.  There were few, if any, 
logistical barriers for emotional support, while early instances of physical resource support 
(e.g. emergency accommodation, replacement stock) required rapid adjustments to normal 
exchange protocols.  These rapid transactions required informal and flexible responses 
predicated on trust.  Conversely, acquiring financial support often required a greater time 
investment to for example, fill out forms (in the case of grants and loans) and lodge insurance 
claims. 
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6.3.4 How important was the support? 
The perceived importance of support was also significantly associated with who 
delivered the support (Table 30) and when (Importance*Support Timing χ² (9, N=356) = 
35.5, p<0.001).  Family members tended to be ranked as ‘most important’ more often than 
statistically expected, while business associations were ranked as less important.  While the 
importance rankings may, in part, reflect the degree of closeness that the respondent felt to 
the network supporter (privileging family members), family supporters were actually more 
likely to provide support earlier and, on average, to provide more types of support.   
Overall, the results in Table 29 and 30 show how segments of an organisation’s 
network provide support in different ways.  Close ties with family and other parts of the 
organisation were more likely to provide more types of support, faster, and therefore CSOs 
tended to see these supporters as more important.  Ties that were more formal or market 
based, however, were critical sources of advice and information and bridging and advocacy 
support.  Similarly, suppliers were a major feature in CSOs’ support networks.  They were 
the most common sources of support overall and the most common sources of financial 
support in particular.  Suppliers were also less likely to require reciprocated support, in part 
because they received payments more often for their goods and service, but also because they 
were more likely to be located outside of the affected areas.   
6.3.5 Which organisations had what kinds of networks?  
Organisational characteristics influenced the form of CSOs’ support networks.  The 
results shown in Table 31 indicate that larger and older organisations were more likely to 
have a low E-I score (i.e. were more likely to get support from other organisations in their 
industry sector) and to have more supporters outside of Canterbury.  Larger organisations did 
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not necessarily have larger support networks, despite the organisation presumably having 
more access to more connections through their employees. 
77
  
Network size was not correlated significantly with any of the variables, including 
direct impact score or days closed.  In other words, organisations that may have suffered 
more impact did not necessarily recall accessing support from more network members. 
Table 31: Correlations among organisation and structural network variables, Pearson’s correlations 
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FTE  
(FTE Corp) 1 
        
Duration operation 
(yrs.) 
.120  
(.758**) 
1 
       
Days closed 
-.131 
(-.210) 
-.309 1 
      
Direct Impact 
Score 
.070  
(.171) 
.079 .282 1 
     
Net Size 
.093  
(-.010) 
.025 -.037 -.007 1 
    
Net Density 
.187 
(.300) 
.345 -.071 -.009 -.283 1 
   
Reciprocity (%) 
-.090 
(-.094) 
-.173 -.102 -.101 -.180 .271 1 
  
E-I Index 
-.275 
(-.467**) 
-.478
**
 .195 -.007 .124 -.706
**
 -.034 1 
 
Ties Outside 
Canterbury (%) 
.064  
(.512**) 
.676
**
 -.185 .185 .057 .342 -.338 -.418
*
 1 
*Significant difference at p<0.05, **significant difference at p<0.01  
E-I index and support network density correlate significantly and negatively.  The 
direction of the correlation indicates that as networks become more homogenous (-1) (i.e. the 
CSO had more ties to organisations in the same industry) the more densely connected the 
networks become
78
.  Additionally, the more homogenous the networks were in this study, the 
                                                 
77
 It is possible that this is because only one respondent from each organisation completed the PAS exercise for 
each CSO.  When network data is gathered using qualitative methods, network size is relatively unreliable and 
needs to be considered an indicative estimate, rather than a reflection of ‘reality.’ 
78
 This corresponds with Granovetter’s (1973) finding that network members with more in common (shared 
attributes) are more likely to know one another. 
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greater proportion of ties the CSO had outside of Canterbury.  This is in part because much of 
the support that came from outside of Canterbury came from other parts of the intra-corporate 
network, which tended to interact with each other.  
Organisation attributes and support application 
Allowing CSO respondents to self-define support produced a broad interpretation of 
what organisations needed to help them cope following the earthquakes.  Many needs 
emerged in the earthquake aftermath that CSOs had not anticipated or planned for, such as 
the need to access the CBD cordon or the emotional strain of prolonged disruption on 
employees.  Thus, it was important to have relationships with others that were able and 
willing to adapt along with the CSO in the earthquake aftermath.  
As discussed in the previous section organisational attributes, particularly age and 
size, influenced the forms their networks took and the CSOs’ approaches to applying external 
support to their problems.  Older CSOs were more likely to be part of a corporation or 
formally affiliated with a larger organisation (the average age of corporate or affiliated CSOs 
was 45 years old, compared to non-corporate at 13 years old).  CSOs that were part of a 
larger organisation mobilised a relatively high proportion of support from within their wider 
intra-organisational networks in the earthquake aftermath.  Similarly, the older and larger the 
CSOs were, the lower their E-I index scores tended to be (Table 31).  This reflected the high 
degrees of support received from others within their industry, and the more ties they had 
outside of Canterbury (Table 31).  Again, these ties largely consisted of intra-corporate 
network members or connections made through those members. 
In contrast, organisation age correlated significantly and negatively with the 
proportion of family or kin ties in the network (r= -0.364, p=0.05).  In other words, younger 
organisations tended to mobilise a greater proportion of their support from family.  
Conversely, older CSOs were more likely to have established relationships with other 
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organisations in their industry and corporate support mechanisms that reduced the need to 
blur the boundaries between organisational and personal networks.  
Depending on their age and size, CSOs utilised support in different ways to address 
problems following the earthquake.  For example, if we examine two particularly prominent 
issues, accommodation shortages and managing workforce strain, there were distinct 
differences in the approaches of relatively older, larger CSOs and those of younger, smaller 
CSOs.   
Relatively older and larger CSOs (i.e. those in the upper quartile of age, older than 
27.25 years, and size, more than 9.25 FTE) mobilised intra-organisational networks and 
bridging support to access commercial accommodation.  For example, the Wellington office 
of National Service, a national public service organisation with nearly 290 employees in New 
Zealand (15 in Christchurch), coordinated the post-earthquake relocation process for their 
Christchurch counterparts.  Similarly, Kaiapoi Rental, part of a company with three branches 
in Canterbury (13 employees in Kaiapoi and 48 elsewhere in Canterbury) temporarily moved 
in with another Canterbury-based branch while their building was repaired following the 
September earthquake.  These two larger organisations were also able to use their employees 
to expand their ability to search for alternate accommodation.   
Conversely, smaller organisations (i.e. those with fewer than 9.25 FTE) relied far 
more on friends and other local businesses to help them secure alternate commercial 
accommodation in the earthquake aftermath.  Help from these supporters came in the form of 
information sharing including, for example, where rental vacancies had become available, 
and informal co-location arrangements.   
Workforce support was one of the most important types of assistance CSOs mobilised 
following the earthquakes.  Organisations simultaneously experienced increased demands on 
their workforce and challenges to their workforce’s ability to perform in their roles.  For 
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example, earthquake-affected organisations faced higher logistical and coordination demands 
due to disrupted infrastructure and supply chains.  They also faced increased administrative 
burden from insurance claims and relocation requirements.  At the same time, local labour 
productivity often decreased as employees dealt with damage to their homes, disrupted 
families, and other personal stressors.  Therefore, CSOs needed to find ways either, to reduce 
workloads, supplement the workforce, or to improve their capacity to cope with the 
additional strains in challenging circumstances.   
Both large and small CSOs used their networks to expand their workforce capacity 
after the earthquakes.  Smaller CSOs mobilised additional labour from family members and 
friends who assisted with administrative work, relocation management, and related tasks.  
Larger organisations redistributed work to out-of-town branches or brought in additional staff 
members from offices in unaffected branches.  
Smaller CSOs were also more likely to access financial support overall, and they often 
applied this financial support to help retain or enhance their workforce.  The Earthquake 
Support Subsidy (ESS), for example, was only available for small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs).   
Additionally, staff fatigue and strain reduced workforce productivity, increased intra-
organisational conflict, and stressed relations with customers and clients.  To address these 
issues, medium and larger CSOs provided employees with personal counselling, remote 
working options for staff, opportunities to rotate to non-earthquake-related jobs or offices 
outside of damaged areas, holiday packages, and flexible working options.  Small businesses 
(especially micro-businesses, with five or fewer employees), however, were generally unable 
to provide the same level of support.  They tended to mobilise support instead through extra-
organisational networks, with family members and friends providing a significant amount of 
emotional support and supplemental labour to cover for or assist fatigued employees.  Several 
226 
 
small business owners in this study discussed the importance of community members 
‘checking in’ on staff and receiving encouragement, empathy, and a sense of solidarity from 
members of their network.   
Despite some of the potential network advantages of larger organisations, smaller 
organisations overall did not have worse medium-term recovery outcomes, nor did they 
mobilise less support.  In part because their operations were often simpler than larger 
organisations, they were able to use informal sources of support including enlisting family 
and friends as movers, shop assistants, construction workers, and financial backers to fill 
needs where larger CSOs were able to use their intra-organisational networks and internal 
resources. 
6.3.6 Does post-disaster trajectory relate to network characteristics?  
Although there were notable differences among the network characteristics for 
organisations of different sizes, and support differed depending on the relationship 
characteristics, there were very few differences among the networks of organisations in 
different trajectory groups.  I used non-parametric ANOVA (Kruskal-Wallis) tests to examine 
the differences among the trajectory groups across the organisational, network structure, and 
support content variables.  
A significant Kruskal-Wallis result indicates that there is a significant difference 
between the rank means of highest and lowest ranked groups. For this test, the data points are 
ranked from lowest to highest. The test then examines the ranked positions of the scores in 
different groups (i.e. the trajectory groups). Thus, mean ranks reflect an average of the ranks 
within the comparison group presents the results for the network structure and support 
content by trajectory group. Table 32 presents the results for the network structure and 
support content by trajectory group.   
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This analysis begins to address the question, ‘What is the relationship, if any, between 
the nature of the support network and the organisations’ post-disaster trajectories?’ So, for 
example, Table 32 shows that organisations that had developmental trajectories on average 
had the largest network sizes, but that the difference between the trajectory groups is not 
statistically significant.  
In fact, the results in Table 32 show that none of the relational characteristics or 
network variables consistently varies among the trajectory groups.  Thus, at a general level, 
there is no obvious relationship between the nature of the support network and the 
organisations’ post-disaster trajectories.  For example, organisations that had positive 
(developmental) trajectories did not necessarily have less dense networks or more or less 
homogenous networks, even though these have been associated with organisational 
advantage in previous studies.  Neither did organisations experiencing a certain trajectory 
draw on significantly different kinds of support or access support from a particular kind of 
actor.  
Although the network and support characteristics do not significantly differ among 
the trajectory groups, some of the mean ranks show distributions among the trajectory groups 
that might indicate potential relationships given a larger sample of organisations.  For 
example, organisations that did well (experienced developmental change) mobilised 
relatively more emotional support from their networks.  Similarly, developmental CSOs also 
had the highest mean rank for the proportion of the network that was composed of friends, 
family, and business associations.  Additionally, these developmental organisations also had 
the highest mean reciprocity.   
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Table 32: Network structure and content by trajectory group, non-parametric ANOVA (Kruskal Wallis 
test) 
 Mean Rank Kruskal Wallis Statistics 
 
Trajectory  
   
Factors 
Degenerative 
Change 
Restoration 
to Pre-EQ 
Trends 
Developmental 
Change X
2
 df 
Asym 
Sig. 
Net size 16.78 12.83 18.63 1.349 2 0.51 
Net density  16.33 17.50 16.13 0.087 2 0.96 
Reciprocity (%)  15.11 12.00 23.00 5.636 2 0.06 
E-I Index 17.25 14.25 16.50 .475 2 0.79 
Emotional (%) 15.33 15.83 19.63 1.205 2 0.55 
Bridging & Advocacy (%) 16.75 12.25 19.13 1.975 2 0.37 
Advice Info (%) 16.78 16.25 16.06 0.038 2 0.98 
Physical Resources (%) 17.61 18.67 12.38 2.123 2 0.35 
Financial (%) 14.36 17.67 20.44 2.450 2 0.30 
Assistance Services (%) 19.19 15.50 11.19 4.124 2 0.13 
Family (%) 16.06 14.25 19.19 1.118 2 0.57 
Friends (%) 14.22 18.58 20.06 2.742 2 0.25 
Suppliers (%) 18.58 13.67 13.94 20.97 2 0.35 
Customer (%) 17.19 15.17 15.94 0.314 2 0.86 
Part of Organisation (%) 16.97 17.67 14.56 0.829 2 0.66 
Org. in Industry (%) 17.03 12.92 18.00 1.383 2 0.50 
Business Assn. (%) 14.06 18.17 20.75 3.125 2 0.21 
Commun.Group/NPO (%) 15.97 16.00 18.06 0.374 2 0.83 
Other Business (%) 14.97 17.67 19.06 1.274 2 0.53 
Government (%) 19.11 13.50 12.88 3.240 2 0.20 
CSOs with developmental trajectories in some way reciprocated the support of nearly 
50 per cent of network members on average, compared to the overall average of 35 per cent.  
The amount of reciprocated support provided by CSOs with degenerative trajectories, 
however, was bi-modal with the bottom quartile providing an average of just below seven per 
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cent and the upper quartile just over 60 per cent.  Figure 16 illustrates the wide distribution of 
reciprocity provided by CSOs that experienced degenerative change compared to the 
concentration of moderately high levels of reciprocity among CSOs that experienced 
developmental change.   
Figure 16: Percent of support reciprocated by trajectory group 
 
The average network reciprocity was lowest for CSOs that experienced restoration to 
pre-earthquake trends, but overall far fewer organisations had levels of reciprocity less than 
20 per cent compared to CSOs that experienced degenerative change and none had 
reciprocity levels over 50 per cent.  Interviews with respondents that had unusually high 
levels of reciprocity show that these CSOs tended to accept relatively high levels of support 
that was not directly relevant to organisational response and recovery activities.  Most of this 
support came from supporters with whom organisational leaders had close personal 
relationships.  They then responded with reciprocal support to these close supporters.  
Conversely, CSOs with very low levels of reciprocity received a relatively high proportion of 
their support through formal and market relationships (i.e. suppliers, government agencies, 
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and business associations).  These exchanges tended to be relatively simple and inflexible, 
meaning that CSOs could not easily adapt the support relationships to suit their unique or 
emergent needs.  
Although the network variables did not significantly influence the post-disaster 
trajectories, there are differences between the networks of different kinds of organisations 
(e.g. large and small organisations).  Similarly, the analysis of the various ways reciprocity 
was handled by organisations with different trajectories demonstrates that more needs to be 
understood about the way CSOs manage and maintain relationships.  This is covered in 
Sections 6.4 and 6.5.  
 
6.4 Theorising Relational Resilience 
The analyses in this section provide insights into the way different CSOs approached 
network creation and management prior to the earthquakes.  In this section, I draw 
comparisons among the different CSOs’ networks and networking practices to understand the 
variety of network forms and functions that contributed to or detracted from CSOs’ relational 
resilience.   
Relational resilience has three interacting elements.  Figure 17 depicts these elements 
and the development of relational resilience as an organisational process.  First, an 
organisation’s access to resilient network members contributes to the organisation’s 
resilience. Second, they need resilient relationships with those network members, and finally, 
they need the intra-organisational capacity to continue to maintain and manage the 
relationships.  This capacity is self-reinforcing, as an organisation’s ability to manage their 
network also means that they are better able to connect with resilient network members and 
to establish resilient (robust and adaptable) connections. 
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Figure 17: The organisational process of creating relational resilience 
 
Network creation is a path-dependent process.  CSOs’ pre-earthquake connections 
tended to form the basis of their post-disaster support network and often served as bridges to 
new network connections formed in the earthquake aftermath.  The majority of support came 
from local actors with whom the CSO or CSO employees had multi-year relationships.  It 
may, therefore, be possible to assess and develop relational resilience prior to a disruption by 
examining the nature of the nodes, ties, and the organisation’s capacity to manage nodes and 
ties.  The following sections use the case studies to explore the different elements of 
relational resilience.   
6.4.1 Resilient network members 
Resilient network members facilitated organisational resilience.  Being able to access 
support quickly and effectively from pre-existing ties enhanced CSOs’ capacity to meet their 
post-earthquake needs.  Network members needed to survive the earthquakes and to be left 
with adequate resources and adaptive capacity so that they were able to provide support to 
CSOs in the changed post-disaster environment.  
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The importance of network member resilience can be clearly demonstrated by 
examining instances of network failure and support gaps.
79
  The temporary or permanent loss 
of key suppliers or customers disrupted CSOs to different extents depending on their degree 
of dependence on that network member.  Ten CSOs permanently lost at least one service 
provider or supplier as a direct result of the earthquakes, and these losses in some cases 
directly impeded organisations’ ability to pursue recovery.  Following the February 
earthquake, for example, Coastal Retail & Craft’s accountant closed its firm for an extended 
period of time and later relocated out of the region.  This loss left a gap in the CSO’s 
potential support network and hindered its ability to apply for financial aid from Recover 
Canterbury:  
“The trouble was, I’m a one-man-band pretty much, but they wanted all the stuff 
from your accountant, from projections of how much you earn which is fine if 
you’ve got a company accountant, you can just tell them to go do that.  But it was 
just hopeless; screeds and screeds of paperwork trying to predict what we were 
going to do next year.  Our accountant was across the road and he’s gone, so we 
had to find a new one. It was just too much, we gave up.” 
The owner of Coastal Retail & Craft had no additional internal capacity to meet the 
emergent administrative needs of applying for grants in the earthquake aftermath, and due to 
the loss of a service supplier, the business also lacked the external support to assist with 
making such applications.  Conversely, the owners of The Attic described rapid access to their 
accountant as “critical” to their recovery, in part because the accountant’s file backup system 
enabled them to access copies of important records that had been lost in their building in the 
                                                 
79
 Although I did not capture systematic data comparing organisations’ pre-earthquake ‘routine’ networks and 
post-disaster support networks, at the end of the network exercise I asked questions about support that the CSO 
did not obtain, asked respondents to list network members that they normally would have sought support from 
but were unable to after the earthquake, and to list people or organisations that hindered their organisation’s 
ability to recover.  
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CBD.  In this case, the network member not only survived but had resilient systems in place 
that greatly enhanced The Attic’s ability to resume operating, despite having no data backup 
systems themselves.  
Over time relationships often accumulate trust, obligations and expectations of 
support, and foster norms of interaction.  For CSOs, these features of longer term 
relationships reduced transaction costs and made the network members more receptive to 
adapting their routine transactions to meet post-earthquake needs.  Supporters with whom 
CSOs had the longest relationships (10 years or more) tended to provide the most forms of 
support.  Long-standing supporters also provided assistance more quickly and more times 
following the earthquakes.  
Losing long-standing supporters was costly for organisations.  Investments in these 
kinds of relationships are often ‘sunk’ and so cannot be adequately recouped, transferred, or 
substituted if that network member is lost.  For example, a supplier, with whom Timber 
Craft’s owner had a multi-year relationship, went out of business following the earthquake:  
“One of the transport companies that used to bring stuff out to me […] closed 
down. […]  So that broke the camel’s back for me.  You sort of get to know 
contractors […] and the trucking firms are no different.  You ring someone up 
and if you’re in a hurry they’ll get it for you and if you don’t that’s fine you 
know?” 
Establishing a relationship with a new supplier was both time consuming and meant losing 
the tacit understandings and flexibility established over time with the previous supplier.  
Thus, even if organisations are adept at making new connections and filling gaps as needed, 
being connected to resilient others reduces the risk of losing sunk relationship investments.   
Network members that survived the earthquakes but were unable to cope with 
additional demands following the earthquake became bottle necks in the flow of resources 
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and information.  For example, three CSOs’ had issues with insurance brokers that effectively 
ceased functioning under the increased workload following the earthquakes, making it 
difficult for CSOs to progress insurance claims.  CSOs faced similar bottle necks with 
telecommunications companies.  Some responded quickly, making flexible arrangements to 
enable CSOs to implement rapid changes, such as call diversions and mobile services for 
electronic transactions.  Others were unable or unwilling to make even minor adjustments to 
their routine transactions.  CSOs that were connected to resilient network members 
maintained or quickly regained access to support that facilitated their recovery following the 
earthquakes.  
6.4.2 Resilient connections 
From the case studies, I identified two features of relationships established before the 
earthquakes that improved the resilience of the ties between the network member and the 
CSO.  These included: 1) the technical capacity to maintain or regain contact with existing 
ties and 2) trust and reciprocity.  
Technical capacity to connect 
At the most basic level tie resilience depended on organisations’ ability to get in touch 
with their network members in the earthquake aftermath.  Robust and redundant 
communication and information technology systems greatly enhanced this process.  
Organisations that had off-site or cloud based servers were able to access email data and 
client and supplier information even if they lost access to their building and primary 
computers.  Some CSOs had pre-established systems or quickly acquired the ability to reroute 
calls to other offices or to organisation members’ personal or work cell phones.  Similarly, if 
the CSOs and their suppliers, customers, or other parts of the organisation had multiple 
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modes of contacting one another (e.g. cell phones, social media sites, email, and fax) they 
were better equipped to reconnect quickly after the earthquakes. 
Five CSOs reported significant and prolonged communication disruptions with 
network members.  Communication disruptions, especially with suppliers and other parts of 
the organisation, caused lasting damage to relationships and slowed the progress of recovery 
for these organisations.  For example, after losing their computers and server in the CBD, 
Gilbert’s Building Supplies was unable to process payments for branches in other parts of the 
country and had no technical capacity to shift this responsibility to another office.  Due to 
cumulative delays, at the time of the interview in mid-2012 the regional manager estimated 
that the CSO was approximately six months behind on their accounts and facing chronic cash 
flow problems.  Similarly, immediately following the February earthquake the owner of 
Elegance evacuated to the North Island, and was unable to get in touch with one of the 
business’s key suppliers via telephone and had no alternate contact information for the 
supplier.  As a result, the supplier contracted with another organisation and would not re-
enter a business relationship with Elegance when the owner returned to Christchurch. 
Trust and reciprocity 
Trust and the obligation and expectation of reciprocity increased tie durability, and 
both eased and encouraged the exchange of resources and information.  Where trust exists in 
relationships the probability of opportunism is lower, and, as a result, trust increases the 
willingness of actors to engage in informal social exchange and the willingness to increase 
potential vulnerability to the another actor by, for example, loaning them money or sharing 
tacit information.
80
 
Trust in CSOs’ support networks was especially important when exchanging 
information and advice, outsourcing work, and receiving certain kinds of financial support.  
                                                 
80
 C.f. Nahapiet & Ghoshal (1998) and De Wever et al. (2005) 
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CSO decision makers often corroborated or discussed information and advice they received 
from official sources with network members they trusted.  Similarly, CSOs that had others in 
their network that they could trust to take on core organisational tasks or to assist with the 
additional workload generated by the earthquakes reduced the risk of staff burnout.  When 
taking on new network members to reduce the workload burden, trust could also be 
appropriated through referrals.  CSOs gave new supporters more responsibility if they were 
recommended or introduced by a source that the CSO trusted.  For example, in order to 
source a greatly expanded volunteer workforce, the director of Kaiapoi Society recruited 
volunteers that had an established relationship with organisations they trusted:  
“A lot of work had to be done in a very short amount of time to organise all of 
that.  It was this huge stretch of resources and making sure you didn’t just have 
any old Joe Blogs coming in and volunteering either.  They had to be reputable 
kind of people.  So, we enlisted help from the local Lions Club in Rangiora. Lions 
and Rotary played a huge part in that.” 
As a result of this appropriated trust, Kaiapoi Society acquired dozens of additional 
volunteers to meet its urgent needs without having to expend resources on a cumbersome 
vetting and monitoring process. 
Equally, when network members trusted CSOs the need for contracts and formal 
repayment arrangements was reduced.  Support could be transferred more quickly with the 
belief that the CSO would utilise the support appropriately and would compensate or 
reciprocate at some unspecified time in the future.  For example, many suppliers offered 
extended credit or offered supplies at no cost, trusting that the CSO would make payments in 
good faith when they were able.  Similarly, the ease with which CSOs were able to access the 
earthquake support subsidy (ESS) through WINZ represented a relatively high degree of 
generalised civic trust.  The ESS had low entry barriers and, as a result, CSOs mobilised this 
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support relatively quickly and easily following the earthquakes.  Despite the risk of 
distributing public money without a proper evaluation process, early appraisals indicate that 
the ESS ultimately saved the government money due the efficiency of its deployment and its 
timeliness in buoying disrupted small businesses (Fischer-Smith, 2013).   
Trust in networks is, in part, governed by the norm of reciprocity.  Reciprocity is the 
informal credit system in social networks, where the actor providing support creates the 
expectation of future support which the recipient feels obliged to repay at some point.  CSOs 
that had accumulated a lot of “credit slips” (to use Coleman’s (1988) term) prior to the 
earthquake were in a better position to mobilise support after the earthquake.  For example, 
Figure Financial’s clients showed up in force to help the business relocate because the owner 
had helped many of these clients in the past.  Figure Financial, therefore, held a number of 
credit slips, which the clients were eager to repay when the opportunity arose. 
The prospect for network members to accumulate new credit slips, at least indirectly, 
incentivised cooperation and coordination in the earthquake aftermath. In several cases where 
local actors provided support to a CSO, the CSO later responded in kind.  Due to the number 
of disruptions between 2010 and 2013, CSOs indirectly benefited local network members by 
accepting help, because it created an implied obligation that the CSO would reciprocate when 
the network member needed help.  When CSOs mobilised support from their network, they 
created an expectation of future support on behalf of that network member, which many 
supporters later cashed-in when they were disrupted.  Thus, receiving support from a network 
member created further expectations for reciprocity in the future.  This cycle of reciprocity 
presumably increased the durability and resilience of the ties.  
As the results presented in the previous section suggest, however, both too little and 
too much reciprocity may have detrimental effects.  It may be prudent for organisations to 
manage reciprocity like cash flow, monitoring how much support is coming in and going out, 
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and, possibly more importantly, when it will come in and out.  For example, 90 per cent of 
network members that received reciprocated support during the study period were based in 
Canterbury.  By accepting help from others who were disrupted, the expectation was often 
that CSOs would be open to reciprocating immediately or in the near future, so as to aid the 
supporter.  In some instances the clarity of formal or market transactions meant that all of the 
exchange took place up-front, and CSOs did not have to worry about a supporter calling in a 
credit slip at a less than optimal time later.  Thus as previously discussed, the amount of 
reciprocity and outstanding network credit needed to be effectively managed to enhance 
positive organisational outcomes.  
6.4.3 Network management and resilience 
The structure of CSOs’ networks influenced the way they accessed support.  Two 
features in particular, homogeneity and density, had implications for the way organisations 
approached their networks.  Although neither of these attributes differed substantially among 
the trajectory groups, they each had implications for how CSOs managed and mobilised their 
network.  Homogeneity – or the proportion of the CSOs’ network that was composed of 
similar others, can be assessed along two dimensions: within industry and geographically.  In 
this section, I also discuss three ways in which organisations approached their networks to 
manage and access support better following the earthquakes: using network coordinators, pre-
crisis network engagement, and managing the network as a resource.  
Network homogeneity  
Network homogeneity has many potential benefits for an organisation.  Overall, CSOs 
that were part of a larger corporate body drew more heavily on support from organisations in 
their industry.  CSOs that were part of a corporate entity had an average E-I index of 0.23 
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(relatively few ties with others outside of their industry group) compared to non-corporate 
CSOs with an average E-I index of 0.80 (most ties were outside of their industry group). 
While homogeneity can mean that CSOs are exposed to fewer unique resources, intra-
corporate and intra-industry (Table 33) homogeneity were linked to a sense of membership in 
a social collective.  This collective identity motivated network members to transfer support to 
other members of that collective in the earthquake aftermath.
81
  Organisations within the 
same industry, including competitors, were often best positioned to provide each other with 
support tailored to the CSOs’ needs (outlines several examples of the bespoke support 
provided by organisations with close market overlap). 
Table 33: Support received by CSOs from organisations with close industry overlap 
Relationship Description Post-earthquake Support 
Competing retailers located 
within a few blocks of each 
other 
Following the September earthquake, Amherst Retail and Kaiapoi 
Shoppe temporarily shared premises due to Amherst suffering building 
damage.  Following the February earthquake, Kaiapoi Shoppe lost a 
supplier and was able to make orders through Amherst’s supplier. 
Competing building supply 
companies in central 
Christchurch 
Gilbert’s building supplies and another local competitor assisted with 
each other’s workload and deliveries during a period of increased 
demand.  
IT organisations operating in 
Christchurch prior to the 
February earthquake 
Health Solutions joined an informal group of related IT businesses to 
regularly exchange tips on marketing, development, and other post-
earthquake business strategies.   
Historic archiving organisation 
based in Wellington (outside of 
affected region) and the 
Christchurch-based archiving 
branch of National Service 
The Wellington based archiving organisation stored materials for the 
Christchurch based National Service, organised meetings with the local 
sector, offered conservation material and arranged specialised storage 
and relocation assistance.   
In each of the examples in Table 33, network members provided support that was specific to 
the needs of the affected organisation. Receiving support specific to the organisation’s needs 
reduces redundant communications or support, and was preferable to receiving less relevant 
information and resources from actors less familiar with the needs of the organisation. 
                                                 
81
 In early conceptualisations of social capital, Coleman (1988) claimed that certain forms of social capital 
required closed social structures.  Closure facilitates the development of effective norms, which can be enforced 
with sanctions that can guide behaviour.  Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) later argued that identification with a 
closed social structure (group, organisation, sector) allowed “individuals [to] see themselves as one with another 
person or group of people,” which “may not only increase the perceived opportunities for exchange but also 
may enhance the actual frequency of cooperation” (p.256).  
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While intra-industry homogeneity was, for the most-part, beneficial, geographic 
homogeneity’s potential advantages were balanced by risk.  Overall, 88 per cent (28 out of 
32) of CSOs had 50 per cent or more of their support network members based in Canterbury. 
Canterbury-based supporters, including, clients, suppliers, and creditors, were often far more 
willing to readjust routines and accommodate earthquake disruptions than those in other parts 
of the country or internationally. Perhaps because local, Canterbury-based clients and 
suppliers had also directly experienced the disaster, CSOs viewed these supporters as more 
likely to grasp the magnitude of the disruptions and understand the difficulties they 
experienced.   
An over-reliance on local supporters, however, had some potential drawbacks.  For 
example, local supporters were more likely to draw on the CSO for support as well (i.e. to 
require reciprocity).  If not well managed, this expectation could be experienced as a drain on 
the affected CSOs’ resources.’ 
Supporters based outside of Canterbury helped some CSOs obtain resources, 
including workforce support, when local supplies were compromised.  Additionally, 
supporters outside of Canterbury were more likely than expected to be sources of financial 
support.  CSOs that relied heavily local supporters did not consistently perform worse than 
those that had more supporters in other parts of the country, however, an over-reliance on 
local support did present additional challenges for some CSOs. 
Density 
Like homogeneity, very dense support networks can potentially limit access to unique 
resources and information.  In this study, however, very low density networks were 
associated with CSOs that were not particularly effective at utilising external sources of 
support. 
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Four CSOs had completely unconnected networks (i.e. density of 0.0, as shown in 
Figure 18).  Three of these CSOs experienced degenerative change and one experienced 
restoration.  Each of these organisations also exhibited low levels of engagement with their 
network including relatively low levels of reciprocity in their networks (19% on average), 
and did not affiliate with groups, such as business associations, that could potentially bridge 
to further networks.   
Figure 18: Kaiapoi Corner Store at the centre of an unconnected network 
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The network in Figure 18 is perfectly ‘efficient’ in technical terms,83 which assumes 
that supporters that do not interact tend to provide unique resources and information. 
Completely unconnected networks, however, required a greater amount of input from the 
CSO. In this study, unconnected networks also tended to reflect the respondent’s lack of 
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The nodes were numbered in the order that the CSO respondent wrote them down during the name generation 
exercise.  The distance of the node from the ego (KF7) indicates their perceived level of importance to the 
organisation, with important nodes closer to the centre.  
83
 The calculation for network efficiency norms the effective size of the ego’s network by its actual size.  
Effective size is calculated as the number of network members that ego has, minus the average number of ties 
that each network member has to other network members (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005).   
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awareness about who was connected to whom, and how they might utilise their networks to 
reach others to whom the CSO was not connected. These CSOs’ leaders were particularly 
ineffective at managing and mobilising support from their networks, and struggled to 
supplement their internal capacity adequately with relational resilience.  
Unconnected networks, as described in Table 34, had several features in common, 
including a tendency to rely on arms-length, formal, or market ties; a lack of engagement 
with business associations or other groups that had important bridging and bonding roles; and 
relatively low levels of reciprocity.  
Table 34: CSOs with unconnected networks 
CSO 
Network 
size
84
 
Trajectory 
Network description 
Gilbert’s 
Building 
Supplies 
11 Degenerative 
The majority of this CSO’s network was composed of arms-length, 
formal, or market-based ties to suppliers (50%) and government 
agencies (20%).  They reciprocated support to 27% of ties.  The 
organisation leaders sought support as needs became apparent, rather 
than proactively assessing problems and managing relationships 
before problems became apparent.  They did not belong to any 
business associations, industry groups, or similar. 
Kaiapoi 
Corner 
Store 
18 Degenerative 
Over 80 per cent of support came through market relationships with 
suppliers (72% of support consisted of physical resources from 
suppliers, replacing stock and delivering extra supplies due to 
increased demand).  They did not belong to any business 
associations, industry groups, or similar.  Organisational leaders 
were resistant to engaging support to aid the organisation beyond its 
immediate operational needs.  They had 0 per cent reciprocity.  
Norwich 
Retail 
5 Restoration 
This CSO had few long-term supply relationships.  They tended not 
to engage in community activities.  Their support network had only 
five supporters, only two of which the CSO associated with prior to 
the earthquake.  They only reciprocated support to one network 
member.  Did not belong to any business associations, industry 
groups, or similar. 
Toasty’s 7 Degenerative 
The majority of this CSO’s network was composed of arms-length 
formal or market-based ties to suppliers (43%) and government 
agencies (29%).  Survival seeking, so only tended to accept help as it 
came, rather than mobilising support to reduce or avoid potential 
impacts.  They reciprocated to approximately 30 per cent of their 
network.  They did not belong to any business associations, industry 
groups, or similar. 
The CSOs in Table 34 also tended to wait passively to receive support or only mobilise 
support in reaction to problems as they emerged, rather than seeking support to help the 
organisation avoid problems.  For example, both Toasty’s and Kaiapoi Corner Store were 
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 Network size is a count of the number of network members (alters) in a CSO’s network.  
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relatively unaffected by earthquake damage, and received a significant boost in patronage 
after losing competitors.  They only began to experience degenerative change more than a 
year after the September 2010 earthquake as their contexts began to shift.   
Network coordinators 
CSOs could use structures within their network (i.e. the connections between the 
network members) to reduce the burden of network coordination.  Some CSO leaders 
informally assigned a particularly well-connected network member the role of ‘support 
coordinator’ as a way of reducing the burden of distributing and taking in support. 
Support coordinators reduced the frequency with which the CSO needed to interact 
with network members to whom they were both connected.  The coordinators, indicated with 
a black circle in Figure 19, tended to have a high degree of connectivity in the network prior 
to the earthquake, but also coordinated with new network members. 
Figure 19: Support coordinators in Kaiapoi Shoppe’s (left) and Executive Sweets’ (right) networks 
 
Coordinators took a range of forms within CSOs’ networks, but always served to 
reduce network complexity for the CSO.  The coordinator in Kaiapoi Shoppe’s network (on 
the left in Figure 19) was a particularly active industry group that engaged in information 
gathering and distribution for all of the associated organisations affected by the earthquake.  
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The coordinator also reported the status of suppliers and provided information about support 
offered by industry members and the government.  A family member of the owner in 
Executive Sweets’ network played a much different coordination role.  This person 
coordinated contact with agencies offering formal support (e.g. the Internal Revenue 
Department and Recover Canterbury) and communicated with mutual friends who wanted to 
assist this disrupted business.  In both of these cases, the role of the coordinator was to give 
the CSO a single point of contact to connect with support and information in a much broader 
support network.  
Other CSOs did not have a support coordinator but reduced the complexity of their 
network by collectively coordinating with cliques in their network.  A clique is a subset of a 
network in which the members are all relatively closely tied.  In the example depicted in 
Figure 20, the clique in Kaiapoi Society’s support network was a formally affiliated group of 
organisations to which Kaiapoi Society also belonged.   
 
Figure 20: Kaiapoi Society’s ego network support clique 
 
Kaiapoi Society tended to communicate in a group setting (group emails, conference calls, 
and meetings) with these supporters, again reducing the need for redundant communications 
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and ensuring that information was appropriately distributed.  Network coordinators reduced 
the number of individual engagements they need to have minimising the demand on the 
CSO’s resources, but retained the access to resources and information from a large number of 
supporters. 
Pre-crisis network engagement 
CSOs tended to draw on their pre-existing support network for resources and 
information soon after the earthquake events.  They then often expanded this network through 
their pre-existing ties (e.g. through bridging support).  Organisations that engaged with a 
larger network or actively associated with affiliation groups (e.g. business associations) prior 
to the earthquake were able to access resources and information from a wider base of support 
following the earthquake.  For example, Health Solutions was part of a larger corporate 
structure and had regular exchanges with other offices and corporate governing bodies in 
other parts of the country and abroad.  It was also an active member of several industry 
groups.  After the earthquakes, Health Solutions’ network was relatively large with 
approximately 20 supporters, including a business collective through which Health Solutions 
was able to interact with several other earthquake affected IT companies to exchange 
information and advice.  In contrast, the owners of Coastal Retail and Craft and Norwich 
Retail, both independent businesses, did not belong to any business associations or other 
support groups.  They mobilised support from four and five supporters, respectively.  Having 
a broad pre-existing network, with which the organisation was already used to engaging, 
provided CSOs with a platform on which to build their post-disaster support network.  
Similarly, organisational attitudes and practices that shaped pre-earthquake support 
relationships created pathways and built capacities for managing post-earthquake support 
relationships.  The director of Kaiapoi Support, for example, noted that due to limited 
budgets the organisation was already accustomed to sharing resources and collaborating with 
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other groups.  This openness and capacity for accepting donations, new volunteers, and 
engaging in mutual support facilitated rapid uptake of available support following the 
earthquakes.  Similarly, the owner of Figure Financial sought support and reaped the benefits 
of a supportive community cultivated prior to the earthquake.  The respondent illustrated this 
point describing part of the CSO’s relocation process after losing their premises in the 
September 2010 earthquake:  
“We had to move, and I had to let clients know that we were moving and if 
possible any trailers would be great.  [On moving day], the whole car park was 
filled with clients.  I just cried. I’m just your accountant.  And they’re going, ‘No 
you’re not just our accountant’.” 
This CSO owner had established a community of support through previous interactions with 
her clients and had, without explicitly intending to, accumulated obligations from these 
clients.  So although the direction of the support flow changed in the earthquake aftermath, 
the patterns of support connections often created a template for post-disaster support patterns.  
Managing the network as a resource 
The most notable difference between organisations that effectively mobilised 
relational resilience and those that did not was CSO decision makers’ capacity to recognise 
and manage their network as a resource rather than as a series of individual interactions.  
Network management required CSOs to draw on elements of endogenous organisational 
resilience, including staff engagement and involvement, situational awareness, and proactive 
posture to activate and manage relational resilience. 
I identified five approaches, enabled by indicators of endogenous organisational 
resilience that helped CSOs to benefit from their support networks.  First, CSOs needed the 
capacity for ‘situation monitoring’ so as to recognise current or potential gaps in their 
organisation’s internal capacity.  For example, several CSOs did not recognise the potential 
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for staff burnout and, therefore, turned down early offers of workforce or administrative 
support that could have eased demands on stressed staff members and owners.  CSOs were 
also better off if they were aware of their network potential, including where support was 
available, both within and outside of their routine network, and how to mobilise it best.  
CSOs often had more success obtaining information about the future of their building through 
frequent communication with their landlord, for example, than by directly trying to contact 
the city council.   
Second, CSOs could expand their network reach by involving staff in the 
organisation’s decisions before and after the earthquakes.85  Staff members whose support 
and opinions were valued and who were personally invested in the recovery of the 
organisation were more likely to mobilise social capital from outside the organisation to aid 
the CSO’s recovery.   
These kinds of action have been referred to as appropriable organisation, in that 
networks created for one purpose may be used for another (Coleman, 1988).  They are also an 
example of social capital aggregation.  If employees are willing to appropriate their external 
networks to aid the organisation, then the total amount of social capital available to the 
organisation increases markedly.  Some CSOs’ employees accessed networks formed in other 
contexts, such as church groups, families, and previous workplace, to aid their organisations’ 
recovery.  These ties helped CSOs acquire new accommodation, provide additional labour, 
obtain financial assistance, and, in one particularly dramatic instance, halt the demolition of a 
building the day it was supposed to come down.  An additional benefit of accessing support 
from employees’ personal networks is that in most cases the employee acted as a coordinator, 
bridging the interaction between their network and the CSO.   
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 C.f. Lee et al.’s (2013) definition of “staff engagement and involvement” in the New Model of Organizational 
Resilience.   
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Third, CSO leaders that assumed a more ‘proactive posture’ toward seeking and 
activating support mobilised higher quality (i.e. more directly applicable to the organisation’s 
needs) and more timely support.  Actively managing support transfers included asking for 
support rather than passively waiting to receive it, but also managing when and how support 
transfers occurred. 
Most CSOs experienced a surge in offers of support in the immediate aftermath of the 
major earthquakes.  They were often, however, unable to utilise the support at the time and 
the support was not always relevant to the organisation’s needs.  The regional manager of 
National Service found that offers of support were often poorly timed, and that those not 
dealing with the direct effects of the earthquake were unaware of the need for delayed or 
prolonged support.  Despite these frustrations, National Service was able to remobilise 
support from some network members once the CSO was able to properly assess its needs and 
create a recovery strategy.  Support remobilisation was an active process and was more 
practical and effective for CSOs than passively taking in support as it was offered (or not 
offered). 
Organisations that successfully remobilised support tended to:  
1. Acknowledge the offer of support.  
2. Communicate the organisation’s current position, and explain why they could 
not use the support offered at the time.  
3. Where possible and manageable, maintain communications with the potential 
supporter. 
4. If and when the CSO subsequently required assistance or other resources from a 
supporter, the CSO would approach the supporter and directly request assistance 
from them (instead of waiting passively for the supporter to offer again).  
249 
 
 
 
Supporters often did not offer support several times, and CSOs that did not actively 
re-engage with the supporter effectively allowed the offer to ‘expire’.  CSO leaders that 
maintained contact with supporters and actively engaged support when it was optimal for the 
organisation successfully accessed useful support.  
The fourth approach refers to organisations adding new network members.  Even 
CSOs with excellent pre-earthquake connections could not always mobilise appropriate 
support from their existing networks.  CSO decision makers also needed to be proactive 
about initiating contact with new sources of support.  Financial support was the most 
common form of support received from new (post-earthquake) network supporters, followed 
by specialist consulting advice (e.g. mentors from Recover Canterbury or conservation 
specialist that helped organisations with complicated relocation demands), and professional 
services (e.g. building checks by engineers).  In almost all cases, these forms of support were 
addressing new needs generated by the earthquakes.  
Finally, CSOs benefited from proactive engagement to maintain their relationships 
with existing network members throughout the recovery process.  Regular and transparent 
communication was helpful for maintaining, renegotiating, and mobilising network 
connections.  Organisations that reached out to customers (e.g. through social media as 
discussed in Chapter 5), suppliers, and other organisational stakeholders to alert them to the 
organisation’s situation were better able to maintain these connections following the 
earthquake.  For example, Kedzie and Sons mailed a survey to customers on their database 
asking “Where do we go from here?” with multiple choice options of areas they were 
considering for relocation.  This survey helped re-engage the clientele, informing customers 
that the business was still operating in a limited capacity and providing updated contact 
information.  Similarly, Wigwam pursued a line of forward, transparent communication with 
suppliers so as to avoid making their precarious financial position worse:  
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“I've spent the last year avoiding bankruptcy.  And how I’ve done that is by being 
in religious [regular] communication with all of my creditors, because I have 
seventy creditors.  Every month on the twentieth, the money is in the kitty that 
I’ve got revenue… And a year’s gone past and I’ve paid out heaps and I’m 
making progress, but it will be another year of paying people and I’ll be debt-free, 
that’s what I estimate… And they are all more than happy with that, because I 
guess they understand what the alternatives might have been, if one had rolled 
over and said I’m not going to do that, it’s too hard, wah, wah.” 
Because Wigwam communicated its situation and repayment strategy to suppliers, it 
was able to renegotiate terms of payment successfully and maintain constructive 
relationships.  Overall Wigwam was worse off following the earthquakes, but they were able 
to maintain their operations, clear their debt, and reopen fully in 2013. 
CSOs could increase their potential resilience by engaging in relationships with 
resilient network members and ensuring a sufficient amount of heterogeneity in the network 
(so as to avoid losing high concentrations of important support nodes in a single event).  
CSOs also build their relational resilience by engaging in durable relationships reinforced 
through reciprocal, trust-based exchanges, and by establishing robust and transparent 
communication processes.  CSOs that could find ways to manage their network to reduce the 
burden of coordination increased the relevance of support and improved their control over the 
timing and quantity of support through situation awareness and proactive posture. 
6.5 Networks and Resilience Conclusions 
The findings in this chapter contribute to the development of the concept of relational 
resilience, introduced in Chapter 5. Relational resilience is a dimension of organisational 
resilience mobilised through exchanges with other actors in an organisation’s support 
network.  It requires three elements: resilient network members, resilient connections with 
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those network members, and the capacity of organisations to effectively manage their 
network. 
Relational resilience blends the concepts of social capital and organisational capacity, 
as resilience is collectively created and regulated through structures and norms of interaction, 
and mobilised through a network of ties.  Yet, it also depends upon the capacity of the 
organisation to establish, maintain, and mobilise this social capital.  Thus, access to a resilient 
network is a necessary but insufficient condition for relational resilience.  The effective 
mobilisation and application of support depends upon internal organisational capacities. 
The results from the case studies help illustrate how relational resilience might be 
activated in a post-disaster environment and how it might differ among organisations.  
Beyond simply connecting with others who are resilient, organisations can significantly 
contribute to their relational resilience by managing and developing the relationships that are 
the conduits for potential resources.  Some of the most critical support came as a result of 
pre-existing relationships that organisations renegotiated in various ways to suit their post-
earthquake needs.  Renegotiation and support transfer were eased by trust and reinforced by 
the informal credit system of reciprocity.  Additionally, positive intra-organisational 
relationships with staff had a multiplier effect on network size (as staff became more willing 
to appropriate social capital formed in other contexts for the benefit of the CSO). 
Organisations that established resilient networking practices prior to the earthquakes 
performed better following the earthquakes than organisations with poor networking 
practices.  Organisations that performed best were also aware of their support needs and how 
to fill gaps in their organisational processes with external support.  They tended to approach 
support actively rather than passively, engaged with their networks to ensure that they 
received the right support at the right time, and successfully adapted (and continued to adapt) 
their organisation and their network in the dynamic recovery environment.   
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Lee et al.’s (2013) depiction of the external resource factor as “an understanding of 
the relationships and resources the organisation might need from other organisations in a 
crisis, and planning and management to ensure this access” (p.34) is quite relevant to the 
theory of relational resilience.  The results presented here provide a more thorough 
understanding of what those planning and management processes might look like before and 
after a crisis.  The theory of relational resilience proposed here integrates the concepts of 
endogenous resilience and external resource management with theories of network 
embeddedness and social capital.  Thus, relational resilience facilitates the connection 
between the resilience of a network, the social capital created in the network, and the 
endogenous capacities of an organisation participating in that network.   
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Chapter 7: Synthesis, Contributions, and Future Research  
The Integrated Research on Disaster Risk (IRDR) programme’s 2013-2017 strategic 
plan highlighted the need to understand the “structural and institutional forces better, and 
social and cultural practices, beliefs and perceptions that shape…resilience and vulnerability” 
(2013, p. 7).  Increasingly disaster researchers are adopting integrated rather than atomised 
perspectives of systems in order to understand the emergence of resilience and vulnerability 
better through complex interactions. 
Researchers and practitioners across a number of disciplines have contributed toward 
assessing and developing organisational resilience (the capacities that allow organisations to 
survive a crisis and thrive in the aftermath).  While this body of literature acknowledges 
interactions between organisations and their environment, current approaches to 
organisational resilience tend to be under-spatialised and under-socialised.  Resilience is seen 
as emerging almost exclusively through the endogenous properties and capacities of the 
organisation, and the environment tends to be characterised either as a source of threat or a 
pool of resources.  The results of the 32 organisational case studies presented in this thesis 
suggest that a contextual approach to resilience, similar to that proposed by the IRDR, can 
offer important insights into organisational processes and post-disaster outcomes. 
The concept of embeddedness contests the neoclassical assumption that economic 
action is motivated by self-interest and utility maximisation.  Embeddedness perspectives 
create room for the consideration of “structural and institutional forces” and “social and 
cultural practices” (IRDR, 2013) when examining organisational processes.  By taking into 
account organisational embeddedness, the research presented in this thesis can improve our 
understanding of organisational resilience and variability in organisational post-disaster 
outcomes.   
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Using in-depth longitudinal case studies of organisations located in the Christchurch 
CBD, Kaiapoi, and Lyttelton – among three of the worst affected commercial centres 
following the 2010/2011 Canterbury earthquake series – I examined how connection to 
context and support networks shaped organisational resilience and thus organisations’ post-
disaster trajectories.  I integrated approaches from community resilience and embeddedness 
theory to sharpen the way we conceptualise organisational connections to contexts and to 
examine the implications of these connections for organisations before and after disasters.  I 
framed my discussion around three research questions, and in this conclusion I discuss the 
key findings for each question in sections 7.1, 7.2, and 7.3. Finally, in section 7.4, I explore 
how these findings and the concepts developed in the thesis could be expanded through future 
research and practice. 
 
7.1 RQ1: How does an organisation’s embeddedness in its local context influence its 
post-disaster trajectory?  
Organisations become embedded in their contexts in different ways.  In this study I 
focused on organisational embeddedness in local (town) contexts and in networks of support.  
I identified 16 mechanisms through which the case study organisations (CSOs) had become 
tied to their local environments prior to the earthquakes.  The findings indicated that 
embeddedness differed among organisations in different industry sectors, between the CSOs 
in the three town centres, and between single-location independent businesses and complex 
or corporate organisations.  Overall, CSOs providing community services (i.e. the culture, 
recreation, and social service organisations) were most embedded, while CSOs in industries 
that delivered their products or services remotely or offsite were least embedded.  
Additionally, CSOs in the tight knit small town of Lyttelton had the highest average 
embeddedness, while those in the Christchurch CBD were least embedded.  Finally, small, 
single-location organisations tended to have higher degrees of local embeddedness than 
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complex and corporate organisations.  Organisations with higher levels of local 
embeddedness were more likely to relocate within their town after the earthquakes.  Town 
centres need a ‘critical mass’ of organisations to be viable as commercial and social hubs.  
Thus, organisations committed to recovering in a place following a disaster can have positive 
implications for the recovery of those centres.  By exploring the ways different organisations 
become embedded in places, we can begin to understand what kinds of organisations might 
stay or return to disaster affected places and for what reasons. 
The degree of embeddedness did not differ significantly between CSOs that 
experienced positive (i.e. developmental and restorative) post-disaster trajectories and those 
that experienced negative (i.e. degenerative) post-disaster trajectories.  In itself 
embeddedness was neither a universal good nor a universal bad.  What made embeddedness 
‘good’ or ‘bad’ depended on how the organisations’ contexts changed in the earthquake 
aftermath, and the ways in which their connections to those contexts influenced their capacity 
to recover.  Embeddedness in local environments can increase organisational exposure to 
local disruptions.  It can anchor organisations in places or relationships that may no longer be 
conducive to organisational health, and can constrain organisation’s adaptive options.  At the 
same time, local embeddedness can facilitate adaptation by improving situation-specific 
sense-making in complex environments.  It can help organisations to create meaning and 
collective purpose (cognitive embeddedness) and it can increase access to social capital 
(network embeddedness).  Additionally, healthy and adaptive institutions can create recovery 
enabling environments for organisations (institutional embeddedness).  Organisations are 
resilient, in part, because they are embedded in resilient contexts.   
Organisations with positive (developmental and restorative) post-disaster trajectories 
shared a number of endogenous capacities, including proactive posture, situation awareness, 
and good intra-organisational communication and leadership.  These attributes allowed them 
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to understand their connections, recognise emerging problems and opportunities, and to 
expand their access to resources, information, and decision making support through 
interaction with their contexts.  For example, CSOs that recognised their dependence on a 
healthy organisational ecology to generate business usually sought to move to intact 
ecologies in recovered or unaffected areas or used mobile and temporary premises to take 
advantage of temporary organisational ecologies that emerged after the earthquakes.  Those 
organisations that were not aware of their relationship to their organisational ecology 
sometimes stayed in areas that were no longer conducive to their organisational health or 
moved to areas that also proved detrimental in some respect.  CSOs that performed best 
following the earthquakes demonstrated a good understanding of their connections to their 
altered contexts, made ongoing adjustments within their constrained adaptive space, and 
developed and utilised connections to their local contexts to recover following the 
earthquakes.  
Through the investigation of the first research question, I developed the concept of 
contextual resilience. Contextual resilience combines the ideas of the resilience of social, 
economic, and institutional contexts in which organisations are embedded and the 
organisational capacity to navigate and interact with these contexts in ways that increase 
organisational advantage.  Embeddedness in resilient places, resilient institutions, and 
resilient networks increases organisations’ ability to survive and thrive after a disaster.  
Resilient contexts can supplement weaknesses in an organisation’s endogenous capacities. 
For example, Port Retail and Craft had inadequate internal resources to fully recovery and 
did not pursue many adaptations in the earthquake aftermath.  Yet it was partially buoyed by 
social capital in Lyttelton which reinforced the norm of supporting local businesses, and 
indirectly helped by community organisations that worked to keep visitors coming to the 
town.  Conversely, embeddedness in contexts that are not resilient can hinder an 
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organisation’s capacity to recover even if it has a relatively high degree of endogenous 
resilience.  Kaiapoi Rental, for example, implemented innovative and proactive adaptations 
throughout the recovery period, but still experienced degenerative change because it was 
highly embedded in a challenging local housing and rental market and constrained by 
institutions that limited where it could operate.  
The embeddedness approach developed in this thesis contests the fiction that 
organisations and their contexts are at the same time bound together and yet recover and 
adapt independent of each other (Iversen and Armstrong, 2008).  Although organisations 
have endogenous capacities that may enable post-disaster recovery, they are also always 
embedded within structures that influence their processes and outcomes in numerous obvious 
and subtle ways.  Resilience is produced through interaction, and can become part of a 
positively reinforced feedback loop.  Resilient organisations improve community and place-
based resilience (e.g. Cutter et al. 2010; Norris et al. 2009; Tierney and Bruneau 2007), and 
resilient contexts (e.g. communities and places) in turn increased organisational resilience.  
Resilient organisations were then better able to capture and apply the benefits of resilient 
contexts, which allowed them to contribute to contextual resilience.  
 
7.2 RQ2: What is the nature of organisational post-disaster support networks?  
One of the richest and most fruitful areas of research in the embeddedness literature is 
the examination of relational networks.  Although a large and growing number of studies 
have examined the ways networks shape organisational action and can improve 
organisational advantage during routine times, only a small handful of studies have 
investigated the nature of the networks organisations use to help them cope and recover 
following disasters (e.g. Chewning (2009); Doerfel et al.(2010); Graham (2007)).  Thus, my 
investigation of the CSOs’ network embeddedness began by exploring the nature of the 
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networks themselves, or ‘which supporters provided what to which organisations’ and ‘what 
kinds of networks provided what to which organisations’.    
Every CSO in this study accessed support in some form through a network comprised 
of formal and informal ties.  Support tended to come from local supporters and from those 
with whom organisations had a long-term relationship.  CSOs mobilised support to aid every 
aspect of organisational functioning, from supporting employees’ emotional wellbeing, 
advocacy, and advertising to obtaining supplies and constructing temporary premises.  
Support most frequently came from other organisations with which the CSO had some degree 
of formal relationship (suppliers, government agencies, and business associations).  Post-
earthquake support networks, however, often blurred the boundaries between personal and 
organisational networks, with CSOs using employees’ friends, family, and other extra-
organisational social capital to meet organisational needs.  
The characteristics of the relationship between CSOs and their network members 
influenced how and what kinds of support were exchanged.  Close and informal relationships 
with friends and other parts of the intra-corporate network were the quickest to provide 
support, provided more kinds of support, and were more adaptable to emergent post-
earthquake needs.  Other relationships delivered specialised support.  For example, 
organisations in the same industry as the CSO were often best-positioned to provide specialist 
supplies, labour support, advice, and locations from which to operate.  Additionally, 
relationships with local actors were more likely to be adaptable to emergent post-earthquake 
needs than those outside of Canterbury (e.g. Canterbury-based suppliers were often more 
flexible with deliveries and more willing to offer extended credit), in part, because of 
heightened collective identity developed through the common experience of the earthquakes.  
Close and local supporters, however, were also more likely to require reciprocated support, 
which, without careful management, could become taxing on CSOs’ already stretched 
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resources.  Conversely, ‘arms-length’ or more formal ties (e.g. government agencies and 
business associations) were often less flexible and tended to be considered less important by 
CSOs, but also did not come with the implied obligation of reciprocity.  Organisations 
benefited from having a mix of formal and informal ties in their support networks.  
This examination of the nature of organisations’ support networks was important for 
two reasons.  First, the results call into question the almost exclusive focus on formal 
organisational networks (e.g. relationships based on contractual, market, and governance 
agreements) that are common when extra-organisational relationships are factored into 
studies of organisational resilience.  For small businesses especially, informal and inter-
personal relationships were instrumental for mobilising support following the earthquakes, 
and these relationships were often the earliest and most flexible sources of support.  Second, 
these results illustrate the importance of organisational and employee participation in extra-
organisational networks prior to disasters.  Pre-existing relationships formed the basis of 
post-disaster support networks, and often new network members were added with bridging 
help from existing network members.  The results demonstrate the path-dependent process of 
network formation, which supports the need for careful cultivation and management of a 
range of formal and informal ties and local social capital, prior to a crisis.   
The concept of relational resilience, which may be considered the network form of 
contextual resilience, emerged from my analysis of the CSOs’ interactions with their support 
networks.  Relational resilience refers to the organisational adaptive capacity that emerges 
through interaction with a relational network.  Relational resilience requires three interacting 
components: resilient network members, resilient ties to those members, and the 
organisational capacity to initiate, manage, and maintain those relationships.  Relational 
resilience, like contextual resilience, places some of the organisation’s resilience potential 
outside of the organisation.  The network members have their own endogenous resilience, but 
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organisational networks can enhance their capacity for a resilient response following a crisis.  
Similarly, resilience can be created through interaction between organisations and their 
network members.  Again, as with contextual resilience, organisations need the endogenous 
capacity to recognise, mobilise, manage and form new supportive relationships in their 
networks. 
 
7.3 RQ3: What is the relationship, if any, between the organisations’ post-disaster 
trajectories and the nature of these support networks? 
The final research question addressed the relationship between CSOs’ support 
networks and post-disaster trajectories.  Ultimately, the variation in CSOs’ post-disaster 
trajectories had less to do with the general characteristics of the networks (e.g. network size 
or the proportions of different kinds of supporters) and far more to do with the nature of the 
relationships with their supporters and the organisations’ capacity to maintain those 
relationships.  The analysis demonstrated that attention needs to be paid not only to which 
ties are activated for what purposes, but also to how the ties are cultivated in the social 
environment over time and how organisations adapt, maintain, and renegotiate their ties for 
different purposes. 
If an organisation’s network members did not survive and adapt in the earthquake 
aftermath, it hindered organisational capacity to respond and implement adaptations.  For 
example, organisations that lost critical suppliers faced greater challenges to their recovery 
than those that did not.  Similarly, organisations whose connections were both strong and 
flexible, reinforced through trust and reciprocity and supported by resilient technologies that 
allowed them to connect, were better able to maintain these relationships and adjust them to 
suit their post-disaster needs.  Additionally, CSOs’ ability to connect to new network 
members was eased in cases where they could link to others through trusted network 
members.  Finally, the ability to form and manage the network meant that organisations could 
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access the right kinds of support when they needed it, reduce the burden of coordinating 
communications, and maintain positive relationships with those they might need or want to 
work with in the future. This analysis further demonstrated the need to consider resilience as 
a capacity developed through interaction, and hindered by an exclusive focus on the internal 
organisational environment.  
 
7.4 Furthering Organisational Resilience through Embeddedness Perspectives 
This thesis is intended to contribute to a more sophisticated understanding of 
organisational resilience, and the findings have both conceptual and practical applications.  
There are many potential directions for future exploration for both researchers and 
practitioners. 
With respect to research and conceptual development, more needs to be understood 
about how to orient organisations toward resilience thinking and incentivise actions that build 
resilience prior to a disaster.  The way extra-organisational relations motivate and influence 
adaptive action and resilience building is a potential rich area for exploration.  There are 
indications that the character of social networks and interconnectedness have a greater 
influence on environmental perceptions and behaviour than personal characteristics such as 
age, gender, or the quality and quantity of information provided (Rayner & Malone, 1998).  
Thus, it is possible that an inter-organisational network that promotes awareness of potential 
environmental changes (e.g. disasters, climate change, and economic crises) and resilience 
building activities may be even more effective than building a strong business case for 
resilience.  
The research presented in this thesis can also be developed to provide measurable and 
comparable indicators of contextual and relational resilience.  Such indicators could be 
incorporated into existing measures of organisational resilience, like the New Model of 
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Organizational Resilience.  An enhanced version of this model may help organisations, like 
the 32 CSOs in this study, to identify aspects of their connectivity that can help them 
establish resilience in their everyday operations.  It may also help them improve their 
capacity to operate and adapt within dynamic contexts.  Understanding how embeddedness 
can co-create resilience may also incentivise collaborative resilience building between 
organisations and the social contexts they inhabit.   
Another interesting avenue for future work would be to examine the different scales at 
which organisations become embedded and the implications of this for their resilience.  
Future research could valuably explore the relevance of embeddedness and network concepts 
to the resilience of a wider range of organisational types and sizes, and in different cultural 
contexts than were examined in this study.  New research in these (and other) areas should 
help us to build an integrated and inclusive understanding of the “structural and institutional 
forces, and social and cultural practices, beliefs and perceptions that shape…resilience and 
vulnerability” (IRDR, 2013, p. 7), both for organisations and society more generally.   
The ideas introduced in this thesis can also be advanced by practitioners interested in 
enhancing organisational resilience.  By actively considering organisations’ contexts and 
networks practitioners can develop proactive interventions to enhance organisations’ 
contextual resilience.  This can occur at a number of levels, including within organisations, 
networks, places, and formal institutions (government and policy).  
Cultivating contextual resilience at the organisational level would require 
organisations to develop systems for monitoring and evaluating their connections to their 
external contexts in order to identify potential sources of inertia and potential sources of 
resilience.  If organisations recognise sources of inertia that may restrict their adaptive 
options in the future, such as territorial restrictions and critical or irreplaceable network ties, 
they can explore ways to reduce the inertia or to adapt around these organisational 
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‘immovables.’  If an organisation does have certain ‘immovable’ connections, it may also 
want to consider ways that it can contribute to the resilience of the entity to which it is 
connected.  For example if an organisation cannot relocate it may want to contribute to social 
capital by supporting social activities and connectivity in the territory where the organisation 
must operate. 
Resilience interventions can also be implemented at the network level. Groups of 
organisations that interact, through a business association, for example, can develop methods 
of engagement that enhance the resilience of the network as a whole.  Actions might include 
developing a culture of transparent communication, identifying ways to enhance the 
efficiency of coordination if group action is needed, or finding ways to incentivise specific 
and generalised reciprocity among network members.  
Place-based communities can also interact with organisations in ways that build 
resilience for the place and the organisations that inhabit it.  For example, local cultures that 
reward the norm of supporting local businesses contribute to the health of the business and 
increase the organisations’ local embeddedness which may incentivise reinvestment in the 
area after a disruption.  
At the formal institutional level, the government can consider policies that support 
organisations following disasters.  In New Zealand, prior to the Canterbury earthquakes, there 
was no precedent of providing support to businesses affected by disasters.  In the earthquake 
aftermath the government implemented the earthquake support subsidy (ESS).  The ESS 
provided critical support for thousands of small and medium sized enterprises in the 
Canterbury region. According to early evaluations, the ESS saved businesses and jobs, 
enhanced economic confidence, and contributed to positive relations between businesses and 
the government (Fischer-Smith, 2013). This action, small as it might seem, had a positive 
impact on the progress of Canterbury recovery as a whole.  Thus, as with all of these multi-
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level interactions, recognising that resilience is co-created can enhance the efficacy of 
resilience interventions.   
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